

THE SUMMIT

FOREIGN AFFAIRS



Fall 1985

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REAGAN AND GORBACHEV

Superpower Summitry
Troubled Coexistence
Gorbachev's Strategy
Gorbachev and Economic Reform

Richard Nixon
Adam B. Ulam
Jerry F. Hough
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Richard Nixon

SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY

Forty years ago, U.S. nuclear power was indispensable in ending World War II. In the postwar era, American nuclear superiority was indispensable in deterring Soviet probes that might have led to World War III. But that era is over, and we live in the age of nuclear parity, when each superpower has the means to destroy the other and the rest of the world.

In these strategic circumstances, summit meetings between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have become essential if peace is to be preserved. Such meetings will contribute to the cause of peace, however, only if both leaders recognize that tensions between the two nations are due not to the fact that we do *not* understand each other but to the fact that we *do* understand that we have diametrically opposed ideological and geopolitical interests. Most of our differences will never be resolved. But the United States and the Soviet Union have one major goal in common: survival. Each has the key to the other's survival. The purpose of summit meetings is to develop rules of engagement that could prevent our profound differences from bringing us into armed conflict that could destroy us both.

With this limited but crucially important goal in mind, we must disabuse ourselves from the start of the much too prevalent view that if only the two leaders, as they get to know each other, could develop a new "tone" or a new "spirit" in their relationship, our problems would be solved and tensions reduced. If history is any guide, evaluating a summit meeting in terms of the "spirit" it produces is evidence of failure rather than success. The spirits of Geneva in 1955, of Camp David in 1959, of Vienna in 1961 and of Glassboro in 1967 each produced a brief improvement in the atmosphere, but no significant progress on resolving major issues. Spirit and tone matter only when two leaders of nations with similar interests have a misunderstanding that can be resolved by their getting to know each other. Such factors are irrelevant when nations have irreconcilable differences, which is the case as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned.

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The obsession with style over substance among some observers is ludicrous. The fact that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has a firm handshake, excellent eye contact, a good sense of humor and dresses fashionably is no more relevant to his policies than the fact that Khrushchev wore ill-fitting clothes, drank too much and spoke a crude Russian. Anyone who reaches the top in the Soviet hierarchy is bound to be a dedicated communist and a strong, ruthless leader who supports the Soviet foreign policy of extending Soviet domination into the non-communist world. We can "do business" with Gorbachev, but only if we recognize that the business we have to deal with involves intractable differences between competitive states.

President Reagan will be urged to prove to Mr. Gorbachev that he is sincerely dedicated to peace and that, despite his tough rhetoric, he is really a very nice man. President Reagan does not have to prove that he is for peace. Mr. Gorbachev knows that. What is vitally important is that he also understand that President Reagan is a strong leader, one who is fair and reasonable, but who will, without question, take action to protect American interests when they are threatened.

Debates about ideology will serve no useful purpose. Mr. Gorbachev is as dedicated to his ideology as President Reagan is to his. Neither is going to convert the other.

In the postwar era, no two leaders come to a summit with more political support at home or more endowed with charm and charisma. But for one to try to charm the other would bring not affection but contempt; this would certainly be Mr. Gorbachev's reaction. An essential element of a new relationship is not sentimental expressions of friendship but hard-headed mutual respect. In 1959, before I met Khrushchev, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told me that he sensed in his meetings with the Soviet leaders that, above all, they "wanted to be admitted as members of the club." This is a small price to pay for laying the foundations for a new structure of peace in the world.

II

Can two powers with diametrically opposed geopolitical interests avoid war and develop a peaceful relationship? It is important to recognize clearly the major dangers which could lead to nuclear war. In descending order of likelihood they are:

1) War by accident, where one side launches a nuclear attack because a mechanical malfunction creates the mistaken impression that the other side has launched an attack;

2) Nuclear proliferation, which could put nuclear weapons in the hands of a leader of a minor revolutionary or terrorist power who would be less restrained from using nuclear weapons than the major powers have been;

3) Escalation of small wars in areas where the interests of the superpowers are both involved, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;

4) War by miscalculation, where a leader of one superpower underestimates the will of the leader of the other to take ultimate risks to defend his interests.

In all four of these scenarios, the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in reducing the danger and risks which could lead to a nuclear war. They are, therefore, areas where tough-minded diplomacy culminating in agreements at the summit level can play a constructive role.

The next most likely danger is a Soviet preemptive strike to liquidate the Chinese nuclear arsenal. This is not a danger at the present time because China lacks the industrial base and military capacity to be a serious threat to the Soviet Union. But as China begins to develop such a capacity in the future, a Soviet leader could decide that it is better to strike before China becomes a major nuclear power. A nuclear war between major powers, like the Soviet Union and China, could escalate into a world war. That is why it is in the interests of the United States and the West to welcome, not oppose, efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to reduce tensions.

The least likely danger of nuclear war is a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe or the United States. The Soviet leaders are and will continue to be dedicated to extending communist domination over non-communist nations. But they are not madmen, and they are not fools. No matter how confident they are that they can win a nuclear war, it would be at the risk of great destruction to the Soviet homeland. Having Europe and the United States reduced to nuclear wastelands would be the bitter fruit of such a "victory." World war has become obsolete as an instrument of policy between the two superpowers. That is why the primary danger, as far as the United States and Western Europe are concerned, is not destruction in war but surrender to nuclear coercion.

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Reducing the danger of nuclear war involves arms control, but it is a mistake to support arms control as desirable in itself and to believe that any agreement is better than none. The primary purpose of arms control is to reduce the danger of war. It is not the existence of arms, but political differences that lead to their use, which leads to war. A bad agreement that opens the way to Soviet superiority increases the danger of war. Even a good agreement will not prevent war if political differences lead to armed conflict. Thus, an agreement reducing arms but not linked to restraints on political conduct would not contribute to peace. If political differences escalate into war, it is no comfort to know that each side has the capacity to destroy the other only two times rather than twenty times.

President Reagan has been unfairly criticized for adhering to the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty negotiated by President Jimmy Carter but not approved by the Senate. The critics contend that the reason the Soviet Union is ahead and that we are behind in land-based strategic missiles is because the Soviets are cheating on the arms control agreements and because those agreements restricted our strategic programs. There is no question that the Soviets will do all that is allowed under an arms control agreement and will stretch it to the outer limits and indeed will cheat if they can get away with it. But they gained their superiority in strategic land-based missiles not because of what *they* did in violation of arms control agreements but because of what *we* did *not* do within the limits allowed by the agreements. We must also face up to the hard reality that without a credible arms control initiative, it would be impossible to get congressional approval for adequate defense budgets to match the Soviet effort or to retain the support of our allies.

It is contended that because of the flaws in the agreements and the Soviet practice of violating them, the United States would be better off without any agreement. Yet, while there is strong evidence that the Soviet Union is probably violating provisions of SALT I and SALT II, it is complying with the limits on the fractionation of warheads agreed to in SALT II. If President Reagan had decided not to continue complying with SALT II, the Soviet Union would not consider itself to be bound by these provisions and limitations either; it could attach 30 warheads to each of its 300 giant SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles rather than the 10 allowed under the treaty. This would mean an increase of 6,000 warheads in the Soviet

arsenal. The United States has no missiles of this size which would allow us to match such an action by the Soviets.

Looking to the future, without a new arms control agreement, even if the United States were to continue its own arms program at the levels requested by President Reagan rather than the far lower levels approved by Congress, and if the Soviets were to continue their programs at current levels, the Soviet Union will be further ahead in nuclear missiles in 1990 than it is today.

If we are to prevent otherwise inevitable Soviet superiority, our only option is to negotiate a new, verifiable arms control agreement based on strict parity that denies a first-strike capability to the Soviet Union as well as to ourselves. What is most urgent is to remove the threat of the SS-18s and the new ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, which are designed not to attack our cities in retaliation for an attack on the Soviet Union but for a decisive first strike against our missile sites. Many senators and congressmen have voted for the 40 MX missiles in the hope that they would be an effective bargaining chip in the Geneva negotiations. But the Soviets are not philanthropists. They will not cut back their 300 SS-18s to only 40 without getting something in return.

That is why, contrary to the critics' contention, the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is indispensable to arms control. Without it, the Soviet Union would have no incentive to limit its offensive weapons. It is important, however, to distinguish among three different defensive systems.

A defensive system to protect our entire population would make nuclear weapons obsolete and thus replace deterrence as our defense against nuclear weapons. But for such a system to be effective against an all-out Soviet attack, it would have to be virtually leakproof. In view of the dramatic scientific breakthroughs made in my lifetime, I do not contend, as some do, that this is impossible. But we cannot base our *current* strategic planning on a system which, at best, will not be ready for full deployment until the next century.

A system that defends our missile sites, however, is possible in ten years or less. Even if it is only 30-percent effective, it would effectively deny the Soviet Union a first-strike capability against our missile sites. The purpose of such a defensive system would be not to replace deterrence but to strengthen it.

The third kind of system, a thin population defense, which would not be adequate against an all-out Soviet attack but

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would be effective against an accidental launch or an attack by a minor nuclear power, is also feasible within the next ten years. This is an area where the Soviet Union could agree with us that developing and deploying such a limited system is in their interest as well as ours.

President Reagan is correct in insisting that research on all aspects of the SDI is not negotiable, both because a ban on research is not verifiable and because if there is even a remote chance to develop a total population defense it should be a priority goal of our defense establishment. We also must have in mind that the Soviet Union is spending twice as much as we are on defense against nuclear weapons.

But deployment, as distinguished from research, for defense of our missile fields is the ultimate bargaining chip, just as was the case with SALT I. We should agree to limit our deployment of defensive weapons *only* if the Soviets significantly reduce and limit their offensive weapons. The choice is Gorbachev's. Either the Soviets cut back on their offensive forces or we will deploy defensive forces to match their buildup.

III

Arms control and political issues must go forward together. Progress on arms control can lead to stability and the reduction of political tensions. Reduction of political tensions can lead to a better climate for reaching an arms control agreement that is fair to both sides. Those who contend that we should seek arms control regardless of what happens on political issues should bear in mind that what destroyed any chance for Senate approval of the SALT II treaty was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, there is no chance that the Senate would approve an arms control treaty at a time when the Soviet Union is supporting anti-U.S. forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

A summit agenda, therefore, should have as its first priority not arms control but the potential flash points for U.S.-Soviet conflicts. It is highly doubtful that we would have agreed to SALT I in 1972 had we not settled in the Berlin Agreement of 1971 those issues which had led to so many crises since the end of World War II. A similar opportunity is presented in the Middle East and Central America today.

The most difficult and potentially dangerous issue which brings the two nations into confrontation is the Soviet policy of supporting revolutionary movements against non-communist governments in the Third World. The Brezhnev Doctrine

of 1968, announced after Soviet troops crushed a rebellion against the communist government of Czechoslovakia, proclaimed that Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe were irreversible. Putting it simply, Brezhnev said, "what's mine is mine." By Soviet probes in Latin America, Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Mideast against allies and friends of the United States, that doctrine has been extended to mean "what's yours is mine." The Soviet leaders must be made to understand that it would be both irrational and immoral for the United States and the West to accept the doctrine that the Soviet Union has a right to support wars of liberation in the non-communist world without insisting on our right to defend our allies and friends under assault and to support true liberation movements against pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World.

We cannot expect the Soviets to cease being communists, dedicated to expanding communist influence and domination in the world. But we must make it clear to the Soviets that military adventurism will destroy the chances for better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We must also make it clear that the revised Brezhnev Doctrine of not only defending but extending communism will be answered by a Reagan Doctrine of defending and extending freedom. Our only common interest is to conduct ourselves in such a way that such conflicts do not escalate into nuclear confrontation.

In view of the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, both nations have a mutual interest in working together to combat international terrorism, whether promoted by states or individuals. With the progress that is being made in the technology of miniaturization, the time is not far off when the danger of breaking the nuclear threshold will come from individuals and not only nations. If the nuclear genie gets out of the bottle, the fallout could affect all nations and particularly those which have nuclear weapons. The Soviets should be asked to join us in a declaration that terrorists and those who give aid and comfort to terrorists are guilty of an international crime and should be dealt with accordingly.

While we should hold the Soviets accountable for the actions they take that are opposed to our interests, we should recognize that they are not responsible for all of the troubles in the world. The income gap between nations that produce raw materials and those that consume them, famine due to climatic causes, radical Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist movements ema-

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nating from Libya and Iran—all of these problems would exist even if the Soviet Union did not exist. But rather than exploiting such problems, the Soviet Union should join the United States and other Western nations in combating them. The Soviets should be especially concerned about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism not only because one-third of the population of the Soviet Union is Muslim, but also because the Muslim revolution competes with the Soviet revolution for the support of people in Third World nations.

There is one phase of our competition which should be brought under control—competing with each other in fueling the arms race in the Third World. U.S. and Soviet arms sales to Third World countries run to billions of dollars. Most of these countries are desperately poor, and they need economic assistance far more than they need additional arms. For the Soviet Union to arm India, while the United States arms Pakistan, can only end in tragedy for the people of both countries. Even though these are only non-nuclear arms, they are instruments of war, and small wars always have the potential of escalating into nuclear wars. There is no prospect for reducing arms sales soon, if at all, but both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have an interest in controlling them and not letting them drag us into conflict.

IV

Turning to collateral issues, while it is an illusion that trade by itself will lead to peace, an increase in unsubsidized trade in nonmilitary items can provide a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to avoid conduct that increases political tensions between our two countries. Trade and political issues are inexorably linked. For the United States to increase trade, which the Soviets need and want, at a time when they are engaging in political activities that are opposed to our interests, would be stupid and dangerous. No nation should subsidize its own destruction.

One of the most widely held misconceptions is that person-to-person programs and cultural exchange will significantly reduce tensions. As a longtime supporter of such programs, I must reluctantly point out that this is not the case. “Getting to know you” is not the issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. What are called the three Cs—consular, cultural and commercial issues—will and should receive appropriate attention at summit meetings. But since Soviet authorities

decide who is to go to the United States and what and whom foreigners can see in the Soviet Union, no one should be under any illusion that agreements in such peripheral areas by themselves have any significant effect on the nature of the conflict between the two superpowers.

The most highly charged emotional issue is that of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The Soviets insist that under no circumstances will they allow their internal policies to be a subject for negotiation with another government. We should make human rights a top-priority *private* issue but not a *public* issue. We saw this principle in practice in 1972. In my summit conversations with Brezhnev, I privately urged that he lift limitations on Jewish emigration in order to gain support for détente in the United States. A record 37,000 exit visas were granted in that year. The following year, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the trade bill put public pressure on the Soviets to increase Jewish emigration. The Soviets reacted by sharply *reducing* the number of visas rather than *increasing* them.

v

For the past five years I have strongly urged holding annual summit meetings. Such meetings can serve useful purposes apart from reaching any major substantive agreements. Most important, they can substantially reduce the risk of war from miscalculation. This will be the case not because the two leaders will charm each other or find that they like each other but because they will understand each other's interests, respect each other's strength, and know the limits beyond which they cannot go without running the risk of armed conflict. This was a factor after the 1973 summit which probably helped to convince Brezhnev that I was not bluffing later in the year (October 1973) when I ordered an alert of our forces to back up our demand that he not intervene unilaterally in the Middle East war.

Moreover, when a summit meeting is scheduled, it inhibits one side from engaging in actions that would be clearly against the interests of the other during the period before the meeting; thus each party will have an incentive to avoid conduct which might poison the atmosphere. This factor probably also played a role in cooling the 1973 crisis.

A summit meeting is also a very useful tool to get a bureaucracy moving. The Soviet bureaucracy is notoriously and maddeningly slow, rigid and inflexible. The U.S. bureaucracy is

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not free of such faults. There is nothing like the deadline of a summit to knock heads together and to shape up a bureaucracy. The danger which must be avoided is pressure, especially from the bureaucracy, for agreements for agreements' sake to ensure the success of the summit. It is far better to have no agreement at all than to negotiate a bad one.

VI

One hundred and fifty years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed with incredible foresight:

There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to bend toward the same end although they start from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans—the Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

This was written long before the communists came to power in Russia. We must recognize that while Russians and Americans can be friends, our governments are destined by history to be adversaries. Yet while we are destined to be adversaries, we have a mutual interest in avoiding becoming enemies in a suicidal war. This requires a candid and honest recognition of our irreconcilable and permanent differences, not a superficial glossing-over of them. A difference not recognized can be dangerous. A difference recognized can be controlled.

The one absolute certainty about the Soviet-American relationship is that the struggle in which we are engaged will last not just for years but for decades. In such a struggle, one advantage the Soviet Union has over the United States is that its foreign policy has consistency and continuity. The leaders change but the policies remain the same. Khrushchev wore short-sleeved shirts and Brezhnev wore French cuffs, but both set the same foreign policy goals: the extension of Soviet domination and influence in the world.

Every eight years and sometimes every four years, American policy, with bipartisanship virtually ended by the Vietnam War, oscillates between extremes of underestimating and overestimating the Soviet threat. What is needed is a steady, consistent policy with bipartisan support that does not change from one

administration to another. This is a long struggle with no end in sight. Whatever their faults, the Soviets will be firm, patient and consistent in pursuing their foreign policy goals. We must match them in this respect. Gorbachev, at 54, is a man who does not need to be in a hurry. He may live long enough to deal with as many as five American presidents. We must not give him the opportunity to delay making a deal with one president in the hope that he might get a better one from the president who is to succeed him.

Adam B. Ulam

FORTY YEARS OF TROUBLED COEXISTENCE

W

hat wise men had promised has not happened. What the damned fools predicted has actually come to pass," exclaimed Lord Melbourne during one of the British politician's fits of exasperation over the situation in Ireland. Well, viewing the post-World War II course of Soviet-American relations, one is tempted to echo the nineteenth-century statesman's sentiments.

To be sure, during the last phases and immediately following the war, some very sensible and knowledgeable men entertained serious animadversions concerning the U.S.S.R. and its behavior on the international scene. But in public such pessimism was usually associated with the die-hard reactionaries, ex-communists with personal grievances about the state which represented the cult that had betrayed their hopes, and those incurably sentimental about lost causes, e.g., Poland. When the guns were finally silenced, the general mood in this country was still that expressed by Walter Lippmann one year before: "Not since the unity of the ancient world was disrupted has there been so good a prospect of a settled peace."¹

America's leading publicist was not overlooking difficulties and question marks concerning the Soviets' behavior. The Polish issue could already be seen as a harbinger of potential trouble in East-West relations. Lippmann addressed this vexing problem with a mixture of realpolitik and hope; the United States, he wrote, "should recognize as valid and proper the strategic system of the Russian Orbit as including within it the states east of Germany and west of the Soviet Union."² "Orbit" was of course a euphemism for "sphere of influence," a term grating to the Americans' democratic virtue. And the hope

¹ Walter Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, p. 132.

² *Ibid.*, p. 158.

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was that this sphere of influence would be of an old-fashioned nineteenth-century kind, the leading state in the area (one felt also inhibited from calling it the "imperial power") respecting its associates' internal autonomy. Thus the writer was impressed by the fact "that Marshal Stalin has now repeatedly affirmed the democratic principle in respect to his dealings with his neighbors within the Russian Orbit."³

Problems concerning the Soviets' "orbit" and international behavior in general were also very much on the mind of a then relatively junior American diplomat stationed in Moscow, but his conclusions were quite different from those of Lippmann. George Kennan minuted in September 1944, "It would be useful to the Western world to realize that . . . the men in the Kremlin have never abandoned their faith in that program of territorial and political expansion . . . which underlay the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact of 1939."⁴ The young diplomat had little patience with those who put credence in the Soviets' profession of democratic virtue: "An exhausted and war torn Eastern Europe would provide a plastic and yielding mass from which the objectives of Russian statesmanship could easily be molded."⁵ And finally, this *cri de coeur* from Kennan about the possibility of the United States really getting a handle on the Soviet dilemma: "There will be much talk about the necessity for 'understanding Russia'; but there will be no place for the American who is really willing to undertake this disturbing task."⁶ Two and a half years later the reverberations of the very same writer's "Mr. X" article in *Foreign Affairs* went far in dispelling his earlier and gloomy ruminations. History is cruel on the Pollyannas, but occasionally it does confound a Cassandra.

But in the immediate wake of V-E Day, Mr. Kennan's apprehensions only deepened. In words which have not entirely lost their relevance today, he noted how quickly Western public opinion passes over the latest act of the Soviets' international mischief-making: "It is entirely agreeable to Moscow that Americans should be indulged in a series of illusions which lead them to put pressure on their government . . . to go always one step further in pursuit of the illusive favor of the Soviet

³ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁴ Quoted in George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, p. 519.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 520.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

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government. . . . If things at any time get hot, all they have to do is allow another personal meeting with Western leaders and thus make a fresh start, with all forgotten.”⁷

Whatever the sages’ and experts’ hopes or misapprehensions, the ineluctable feature of the post-victory political scene in the United States was that the President’s role as commander in chief became once more subordinate to that of politician. That freedom of diplomatic maneuver which had been the President’s between Pearl Harbor and V-J Day had now of necessity been much reduced, and with it went the ability to impress Stalin that this country would not tolerate the U.S.S.R. violating its wartime pledges and promises.

There were people in Washington who were aware of, and deeply unhappy over, what the Soviets were doing in Eastern Europe; but for the vast majority of Americans, the news from that part of the world made as yet but little impression. The Russians were proving something of a nuisance but, after all, they had suffered so much and fought so heroically in the war. Surely the recent memories of comradeship-in-arms, the new edifice of the United Nations and the Soviet Union’s self-interest offered substantial hope for good, if not cordial, U.S.-Soviet relations and for peace.

Given the volatility of American public opinion, it was reasonable to predict—*pace* Mr. Kennan—that this mood of complacency vis-à-vis the Soviets was bound to give way, first to irritation, and then to serious apprehensions over the Kremlin’s actions and intentions. Psychologically what probably first triggered such reactions was not so much what the Russians were doing, but the posture of ominous isolation that the U.S.S.R. chose to adopt almost immediately following the war.

From Moscow’s point of view, reasons for this attitude were quite compelling. Continued friendly intercourse with the West was held by Stalin—and probably correctly—to have potentially unsettling domestic effects, encouraging the illusion (fostered by the Soviet government itself during the war) that the Soviet peoples’ lives would be freer and easier, or as a Soviet poet in 1944 was allowed to write, “After the victory we shall call a halt, drink a cup and rest to our heart’s desire.”⁸ And so the state-of-siege mentality, natural in war, had to be main-

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 544–45.

⁸ Alexis Surkov, “From Yesterday’s Notes,” *New World* (Moscow), Nos. 1–2, Vol. 46, p. 49.

tained in peacetime, because as Stalin asserted in his speech of February 9, 1946, one could hardly hope for lasting peace as long as capitalism, and with it imperialism, remained in the world. The ideological motif, which had been de-emphasized in favor of nationalism during the most desperate period of the struggle, was now forcefully reasserted by the dictator. "Our victory means above all that our social system has won. . . . Our political system has won."⁹

From the point of view of foreign affairs, the abrupt cooling of relations with the West was prompted mainly by the need to obscure the Soviet Union's weakness vis-à-vis the United States. The U.S.S.R. did not wish to appear awed by America's monopoly of the bomb, by the transatlantic colossus' prodigious industrial power, or by its huge naval and air forces. Undue friendliness might signify the Kremlin's nervousness; continuation, not to mention expansion, of contacts with the West would reveal the frightful extent of the country's devastation, hence vulnerability.

On the contrary, the glacial tone of Soviet responses to American diplomatic initiatives and entreaties was intended to, and in fact did, convey the impression of Moscow's self-confidence and intransigence. Consider the question asked by Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith during his audience with Stalin as late as April 1946: "What does the Soviet Union want and how far is Russia going to go?" and the dictator's answer: "We are not going much further."¹⁰

The average U.S. citizen's puzzlement, and then anxiety, over the Soviet Union's behavior was paralleled and then outpaced by the American policymaker's concerns on the same count. No matter what issue or area was under the scrutiny of the State Department in 1946-47, the Soviet Union and/or communism appeared to present an obstacle to that stable international order for the sake of which, it had been believed, the United States had fought the war. To the impotent resentment over the Soviets' tightening grip on Eastern Europe was added the alarm over the communist threat in China. In the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. blocked every proposal to make that body an effective guardian of peace, including the plan for international control of nuclear energy. The French and Italian Communist Parties seemed quite likely to come to

⁹ Josef Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 3, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p. 7.

¹⁰ Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, New York: Lippincott, 1950, p. 50.

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power, and through entirely legal means. The communists ignited civil war in Greece, and Moscow's strident territorial demands on Turkey gave somber meaning to Stalin's sardonic "We are not going much further."

America's national debate about its relations with the Soviet Union could then, as now, be epitomized by the titles of two celebrated novels of the Russian nineteenth century, *Whose Fault Is It?* and *What Is To Be Done?* On the first question, by the end of 1946 the American verdict was unequivocal: the U.S.S.R. was guilty of stirring up trouble throughout the world. But the crux of the problem lay, as under vastly different circumstances it still lies, in the second question: what could be done to convince—constrain—the Kremlin to alter its policies? How could a democracy that had traditionally tried to eschew playing a world role cope with the complex and disturbing dilemmas of the postwar international situation?

In its attempts to impose restraint upon the Soviet Union and to do what was then thought to be virtually synonymous, to curb the spread of communism, the United States was handicapped by what were considered as self-evident facts. The first of these was that it was well-nigh impossible through diplomatic procedures to dislodge or moderate Soviet influence within the countries and areas occupied during the war by Moscow's armed forces. And the second was that the U.S.S.R., unlike the United States, which rapidly demobilized its land forces, still maintained a vast standing army, which—were the almost unimaginable to happen—could reach the English Channel in a matter of days.¹¹

In retrospect, it is the latter belief that is most astounding. Common sense should have argued that a country that had lost over 20 million lives and suffered corresponding material losses must have demobilized its army as rapidly as did the United States. Man- and womanpower was desperately needed in the Soviet factories and farms to begin what then looked like a long and arduous process of restoring the national economy, and thus providing the U.S.S.R. with what in the modern age are more important sinews of power than a huge army: an efficient industry and agriculture. As a matter of fact, in 1948 the Soviet Union had about 2.8 million men under arms, a

¹¹ "By 1948 . . . the Anglo-American armies had been weakened by demobilization while Russian forces were maintained at almost wartime levels." Max Charles, *Berlin Blockade*, London: Wingate, 1954, p. 20.

figure barely in excess of that of the United States and one which hardly indicated the Kremlin's fear of war, or its intention or ability to pounce upon Western Europe.

As to the Soviets' tenacity in holding on to their gains, the evidence is far from one-sided. In 1946, the Soviet Union had pulled out its troops from northern Iran, where it had previously established two puppet regimes, and which in view of its strategic and economic importance might well have been expected to share the fate of Bulgaria or Hungary. Why did the Kremlin decide upon this retreat, and then watch passively while the Iranian government liquidated the separatist regimes and executed their leaders?

Prior to March 1946, the Soviets paid no heed to British and American pleas to pull back their troops, as the U.S.S.R. had pledged to do along with the other two powers during the war, and as the United States and Britain had already done. But on March 5, 1946, at Fulton, Missouri, Churchill delivered his stirring Iron Curtain speech denouncing Soviet expansionism and pleading for the democracies to close their ranks. He roused Western public opinion to full awareness of the continuing Soviet depredations and stiffened the spine of Western diplomacy. The Iranian issue was then on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. Viewed from the Kremlin, the situation became uncomfortable, and one day after the convening of the Security Council on March 26, Gromyko announced that the Soviet Union would pull out of Iran within six weeks.

Iran's case should have been instructive. In 1946 the United States *was* carrying a big stick—never mind the bomb—but the enormous industrial and technological power of the United States was sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from any steps which might just conceivably escalate into a confrontation: the man in the Kremlin was not a Hitler, but was, at least insofar as foreign policy was concerned, a prudent statesman, carefully calculating the pros and cons of every Soviet venture. Two years later he would refrain from an armed attack upon rebellious Yugoslavia—though in 1948 there was but little chance of the West bestirring itself on behalf of Tito's regime, until quite recently the most fanatically communist and pro-Soviet of all within the U.S.S.R.'s orbit.

But what America also needed in the immediate postwar era (and indeed during the last phases of the war) was to speak loudly to the Soviets. Instead, its voice was subdued. When confronted with the Soviets' violation of their wartime pledges,

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Washington's policymakers saw no way of dealing with the situation except through pleading or ultimatums. And the latter was not practical politics: who in the America of 1945-46 would have approved of anything that just might lead to a real shooting war? That a country conscious of its strength and of its protagonist's vulnerabilities had at its disposal a number of other devices and options beyond pleading and issuing explicit threats was not to dawn upon American diplomats until later. But time is a very precious commodity, especially in the atomic age.

II

That the policy of "containment" was, from the American point of view, a natural response to the impasse in Soviet-American relations was more than evident by the end of 1946. Attempts to persuade the Soviet Union to mend its ways had proved unavailing, efforts to coerce were thought to be too risky and not practical politics. Even before Mr. Kennan published the article which made the term a household word, President Truman imparted concrete meaning to containment by enunciating on March 12, 1947, the doctrine that became associated with his name: the United States stood ready to block further Soviet expansion and assume direct responsibility for guarding the periphery of the free world. Though the Truman Doctrine referred directly to the American pledges to Greece and Turkey, it was rationalized in terms of a global struggle.

In June came the stupendous initiative of the Marshall Plan. This also was a cardinal part of the policy of containment: through the restoration of economic health to Western Europe, its democracies were to become resistant to the bacillus of communism. As originally formulated, the plan also appeared to envisage a renewal of cooperation between East and West. But after some initial hesitation, Stalin decided, correctly from his point of view, that the U.S.S.R. was still too weak to ask for and receive capitalist largesse, with its inevitable concomitant of Westerners prying into his country's affairs and obtaining a realistic picture of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The Soviet refusal, though half-anticipated, must have relieved many on the shores of the Potomac.

And in July of 1947, so momentous a year in the annals of American diplomacy, Mr. Kennan formulated "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," his theoretic and historical rationale for

containment: that any fresh and overt usurpation by the Soviets was to be countered by the West with a display of strength. But the main stress in Kennan's argument was on the necessity of securing the economic and social health of the Atlantic community.

The Soviet Union, "Mr. X" asserted, was still motivated by the messianic urge to conquer the world for communism; the Kremlin was still persuaded that the ineluctable malfunctioning of capitalism, and the consequent crises and social turmoil experienced by the democracies, would pave the way for Soviet-communist expansion. Only when such hopes were definitely confounded and the West shown to be prosperous, strong and self-confident, would the Soviets be ready to negotiate in good faith. You must impress the Russians with your strength and stability before you can hope to negotiate meaningfully with them—this was the implicit message of the article. The containment formula thus neatly bypassed the issue of *previous* Soviet international misbehavior as seen in the West.

The test of containment's prescription that the Soviets must be met with "unalterable counterforce" at "every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful world" came with the Berlin blockade. Its imposition demonstrated considerable confidence on Stalin's part that the democracies were unlikely to resort to violent reprisals and that the blockade could be immediately called off were the situation to grow too hot. The lesson of the crisis proved ambiguous. The West did not abandon its plans to unify the three Western zones into what was to become the Federal Republic of Germany (which thwarted the original rationale of the Soviet move). Yet, since the threat was countered with the airlift, rather than with an unalterable counterforce, Moscow was not disabused of the notion that West Berlin was an exposed nerve of their rivals' postwar system, one that could be pressured again if the broader objectives of Soviet policy should require it.

The crisis should have instructed the West about what was the central Soviet concern in Europe. If the democracies were too pacifically minded to risk a forcible "rollback" of the Soviet sphere of interest, was it not possible that they would attempt it in an indirect manner? Consider the following scenario: an armed revolt against its communist regime breaks out in Czechoslovakia. A resuscitated Wehrmacht rushes in to help the rebels. The Soviet army could, of course, suppress the

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insurrection, but what if the Americans intimated that the Soviet move *might* lead to U.S. atomic reprisals? The contingencies of a “rollback” and of “massive retaliation” were very much on the minds of the men in the Kremlin, years before those terms were used by John Foster Dulles.

As the Soviet leaders pondered the implications of the Marshall Plan, it must have appeared to them to prefigure perfectly this scenario. Why should American capitalists pour billions of dollars into the restoration of the economies of their potential rivals on the world market? The “logical” explanation was that the economic rehabilitation of Europe, and especially of West Germany, was intended to enable what in 1949 became NATO to build up a powerful military establishment, which in turn would press, if not indeed force, the U.S.S.R. to surrender the fruits of its victories.

The founding of the Cominform (Stalin’s coordinating agency for the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., its satellites and France and Italy) and the rhetoric which accompanied it lend supporting evidence to this interpretation. The Cominform was to provide a formal machinery with which the Soviets might deal with any potential troubles with their satellites; the rather incongruous presence of the Italian and French Communist Parties in this grouping is explained by the fact that those two were to disrupt the operations of the Marshall Plan in their countries, and thus frustrate the capitalists’ sinister anti-Soviet designs. If we want to pinpoint the beginning of the cold war, it falls midway between the announcement of the European Recovery Plan in June of 1947 and the foundation of the Cominform in September.

Containment was designed to elucidate America’s response in two contingencies; the possibility of a direct Soviet threat to the non-communist world and of communism becoming the beneficiary of the economic and social disruption left in the wake of the war. Yet little in the doctrine, as originally enunciated, provided guidance as to how this country could or should cope with what became and remains the most perplexing problem for the West: that the Soviet Union was the catalyst and/or beneficiary of the turmoil produced by the rapid and dramatic decomposition of the pre-World War II order in the Third World. The rapidity and the extent of Mao’s victory in China evidently astounded Moscow as much as it chagrined Washington, and while the former must have greeted it with very mixed emotions, on the surface at least the Soviet Union’s

position was greatly enhanced: the world's most populous nation was now its ally.

The Korean War exposed another pitfall of the containment argument: communist aggression could not always be linked directly to the U.S.S.R.; having come suddenly, the attack on South Korea could not be deterred by a *show* of American strength, it had actually to be fought—and primarily by U.S. forces.

In an overall assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations, it might appear out of proportion to devote so much space to the first few years after the war. Yet those were the years which set the pattern for the often tempestuous coexistence of the two superpowers, a pattern that in many ways has endured to this day.

III

The outward forms of Soviet-American intercourse underwent a profound change in 1953. With Stalin's death, the Kremlin altered the style of its foreign policy. Stalin's successors were less fearful that conciliatory policies toward the West might be interpreted by the latter as signs of weakness. The Soviet Union's position vis-à-vis the United States *was* much stronger than it had been at the end of the war; its economic recovery came much faster than might have been expected, its heavy industry was growing at an impressive pace. America's monopoly on nuclear weapons had been broken. As Khrushchev's antics were to demonstrate, the Soviet leadership believed that, politically and psychologically, even a small stock of such weapons in its armory offset the much greater arsenal at the disposal of a democracy.

New confidence was balanced by fresh fears in Moscow. Stalin's successors did not share his belief that he could maintain a high degree of international tension without risking a confrontation with the West. Nor did they think themselves capable of continuing the course of draconian repression he had imposed on not only his own society, but also the Soviet Union's satellites. And the Kremlin felt it could no longer afford to treat China with the cavalier insouciance which the megalomaniac dictator had displayed toward Mao's regime. All in all, the entire international picture, especially in view of the arrival of the new Eisenhower Administration in Washington with its strident rhetoric against communism, called for flexible diplomacy and for abandoning that stance of ominous and

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menacing isolation with which the Kremlin had sought to impress and awe the world between 1946 and 1953.

The new style of Soviet policy did not mean new objectives. In Europe, concern touched mainly on the resolution of the German question, in line with what Moscow believed to be its security interests, and with the preservation, though in a less rigid form, of control over its satellites. In the Far East, it was hoped that the Soviets' more respectful treatment of China, as well as extensive economic and technological assistance to Beijing, would prevent the tensions already smoldering beneath the surface of Sino-Soviet relations from erupting into the open, and that the two communist powers would continue to present a united front to the outside world.

The basic premises of Soviet foreign policy also remained unchanged. The United States, for all of Secretary Dulles' challenging rhetoric and his pact-building, was not seen as a clear and present danger. The more immediate threat to Soviet interests lay in Western Europe achieving political and military, as well as economic, unity; NATO's land forces (with the resurrected German army) balancing those of the U.S.S.R.; and the West European economy—flourishing by the late 1950s—exerting a strong pull on Russia's East European clients. To deal with such dangers, the U.S.S.R. relied partly on its own counterparts to the European Community and NATO. (Revealingly, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was inaugurated not in 1949, as was NATO, but in 1955, after West Germany joined the North Atlantic alliance.) But the most effective way of blocking European unity, Moscow evidently believed, was to abet and exploit the individual European states' troubles, both internal difficulties and those experienced in coping with their rapidly disintegrating colonial empires.

The Soviets' more activist policies in the Third World were spurred not only by the expansionist itch, but also by a clever appreciation of how the overseas travails of Britain, France and Belgium diverted those countries from closer European unity, and of how the former imperial powers' attempts to retain influence in those areas tended to provoke the disapprobation of their allies, and especially the traditionally anti-colonial Americans. Yet, for all of its rhetoric, and even after the Suez crisis, America was seen by the Third World as an ally of the old imperial powers, and by the Arab component as a special friend and protector of Israel.

The ubiquity of international crises and trouble spots at once

obscured and intensified the rivalry between the two superpowers. The tone of Moscow-Washington relations grew more relaxed, in line with the Kremlin's oft-proclaimed goal of basing those relations upon the principle of peaceful coexistence and, as compared with the Stalin era, greatly expanded contacts of all kinds between East and West. Despite the collapse of the Hungarian revolt and Khrushchev's periodic threats, the world situation seemed much rosier from the American point of view than one had had any right to expect in, say, 1947: Western Europe not only undergoing vigorous economic growth, but reaching toward political unity as well; the communist world, once seeming unalterably monolithic and ominous, now experiencing internal strains in the wake of de-Stalinization; and the tension in Sino-Soviet relations already visible to a perceptive observer. And yet there were constant crises and clashes, their potential escalation being all the more disquieting now that the U.S.S.R. had acquired nuclear weapons and Khrushchev stood ready to brandish them at the slightest provocation.

At the same time, Khrushchev abandoned that *immobilisme* that had characterized Soviet diplomacy during the cold war. It was not only the onset of the jet age that spurred the new Soviet leader to his frantic journeying. He was promoting a new image of the Soviet Union: a country seeking a genuine détente with the West, partnership rather than subservience from other communist states (as long as the terms of that partnership were defined by Moscow), and cordial friendship with the new nations.

The U.S. response to this new style was at first one of reserve—the memory of Yalta was still too recent and rankling—but then reserve was succeeded by puzzlement. Those “spirits” of Geneva and Camp David were soothing but short-lived, and produced little in the way of concrete results. And then the other Khrushchev would emerge, one threatening a new and *complete* blockade of West Berlin, breaking up the Paris Summit of May 1960 over the U-2 episode and, in 1961, attempting to bully the new American President in Vienna. Washington had to wonder, as Ambassador Smith did years before, what was it that the U.S.S.R. really wanted, and how far did it propose to go?

If the main shortcomings of American policies after the war came from an insufficient awareness of America's strength and Russia's weakness, then the basic flaw of American diplomacy in the 1950s and early 1960s lay precisely in the inability to

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perceive what the Kremlin wanted and to understand that there were serious and negotiable goals behind Khrushchev's confusing pyrotechnics.

There was the Soviets' perennial concern about Germany, this time centered on the fear that Bonn might acquire nuclear weapons of its own. The Berlin crisis of 1958–62 was not prompted by the Kremlin's lusting for West Berlin, as was widely believed in the West. It was the main feature of the design to cajole the United States and its allies into agreeing on a German peace treaty that would categorically preclude the Federal Republic from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons (recognition of the sovereignty of East Germany was another but rather secondary objective of the scheme).

Frustrated by the Americans' obstinacy and/or incomprehension of his policy, Khrushchev chose indirect but even more dangerous means of pressuring Washington. There is a great deal of circumstantial evidence that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were intended to be used for bargaining: Washington would agree to a German treaty on Soviet terms as the price for withdrawal of the missiles. And it is also likely that another part of the bargain would have had the United States lifting its protective shield over Taiwan, the concession which Khrushchev hoped (over-optimistically) would induce Mao to give up Chinese plans to acquire nuclear weapons.

If those were indeed the goals of Soviet policy, why did Khrushchev not state them explicitly, rather than try to obtain them through a tour de force that brought about the most dangerous confrontation yet between the two superpowers? Certainly, from the U.S. point of view, his first objective was negotiable; and the prospect of China acquiring nuclear arms was being viewed with as much apprehension in Washington as in Moscow. No student of Soviet foreign policy can cite many examples of the Kremlin being frank and explicit about its most acute fears and real objectives. Did Khrushchev, in view of his troubles with China, contemplate a far-reaching understanding with the United States? In a speech at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Andrei Gromyko said:

Our country places special importance on the character of the relations between the two giants—the Soviet Union and the United States. If those two countries united their efforts in the cause of peace, who would dare

and who would be in a position to threaten peace? Nobody. There is no such power in the world.¹²

These words were undoubtedly much pondered in Beijing, but they could hardly sound enticing to Washington after the unpleasantness of the Vienna Summit and the Berlin Wall. As it was, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was the furthest the temperamental Soviet leader got in his on-again-off-again search for a rapprochement with the United States. And it is possible that his removal from power in October 1964 set back what would have been the most far-reaching easing of tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. since the onset of the cold war.

IV

Surveying international affairs up to 1964, one could say without much fear of being contradicted that their outstanding feature had been the Soviet-American rivalry; and by the same token, had the two superpowers composed their differences, the world could have looked hopefully to an era of real peace and stability. But the year which saw a change of command in the Kremlin, the United States gearing for a large-scale intervention in Southeast Asia, and China exploding its first nuclear device ushered in a period that was to make the world picture much more complex and paradoxical.

The United States entered into its ill-conceived and ill-fated enterprise in Vietnam with an eye not on Moscow, but on Beijing. The latter was widely believed, and at the time correctly, to be purveying a much more militant brand of communism than the Soviet Union, and hence had to be presented with a palpable proof that "wars of national liberation," when directed against U.S.-sponsored regimes, would not be allowed to succeed. Who then would have dared to predict that, largely because of the reverberations of the Vietnamese imbroglio, an American President would in 1972 become a guest of the People's Republic of China?

In the early 1960s, it was also believed by U.S. policymakers, and again not without reason, that it was China which had the most influence over North Vietnam and was inciting it to intensify the civil war in the south, while the U.S.S.R. was, without much success, urging moderation upon Hanoi. Within

¹² *Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU*, II, Moscow, 1962, p. 343.

a decade, North Vietnam, by then ensconced firmly in the Soviet camp, overthrew the pro-Beijing Kampuchean regime; its relations with the People's Republic went from bad to worse and culminated in a frontier war in 1979. One must add to the list of paradoxes the fact that probably nothing that was done since the war by either of the two communist powers has proved as damaging to the West's cohesion and interests as the blow delivered by OPEC in 1973-74 and the consequent economic and social disarray in the entire non-communist world.

Soviet-American relations also became more complicated because of the increased troubles both powers were now experiencing with their allies and clients. Whatever the intentions and designs of Moscow and Washington policymakers, they could be frustrated momentarily by a decision reached independently by Paris, Hanoi, Tel Aviv or Cairo. What used to be in a sense the reassuring, if not beautiful, simplicity of a bipolar world appeared by the late 1960s to have become largely a thing of the past. One could no longer argue, as many Americans would have been inclined to do a few years earlier, that the increasing anarchy of the world scene was invariably profiting the U.S.S.R., and that each new international crisis was seen by the Kremlin as an opportunity to deal yet another blow to Western interests and prestige.

How the phrase "entangling alliances" became applicable also to the Soviet Union could be best illustrated by the Middle East crises of 1967 and 1973. After the Six-Day War, Moscow attempted to cover up its discomfiture at its inability to render effective help to its Arab allies by frantic diplomatic activity, including a Soviet-American quasi-summit in Glassboro. An even more vivid example was provided by the Yom Kippur War. Even before its outbreak, the Soviet Union had reasons to be dissatisfied with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and suspicious that he would eventually adopt a pro-American orientation. Yet the pro-Arab momentum of Soviet policies constrained Moscow to render Cairo material assistance and to threaten, when the fortunes of war began to shift in Israel's favor, to send Soviet troops to the Middle East. This in turn led to the United States putting its armed forces on worldwide alert. It is arguable that both moves were largely in the nature of theatrics, but superficially at least, a conflict which neither of them had wished for or initiated propelled the two superpowers to the brink of confrontation.

The late 1960s then brought an aggravation of the Soviet-

American rivalry, yet, at the same time, an enhanced awareness that the realities of the international situation and of the atomic age constrained both sides to continue a dialogue and attempts at a rapprochement. The nuclear non-proliferation agreement of 1968 was one evidence of this common-sense recognition. What Khrushchev sought to gain by his pyrotechnics and ultimatums, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team achieved through patient diplomacy: a de facto, if not quite de jure, German peace treaty with the West that recognized East Germany's statehood and Bonn acknowledged formally the territorial changes mandated "provisionally" by the Potsdam agreements. And though they were delayed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the negotiations on strategic arms limitations finally opened in 1969.

v

Détente, as finally proclaimed and registered in a number of agreements in 1972, was the result not only of Moscow's and Washington's recognition that, as a Soviet writer on international affairs wrote, "In a world where international tension is the rule . . . states may be drawn quite unintentionally into a sequence of events in which eventually they lose control over the situation and it becomes impossible to prevent a catastrophe."¹³ Détente sprang also from a confluence of other facts: America's weakened international position because of Vietnam; and the Soviets' growing fears about the Sino-American rapprochement as well as their heightened expectations about the benefits to their economy accruing from greatly increased West-East trade and technological exchanges. And last, but certainly not least, by 1971-72 both superpowers had, though for different reasons, a clear interest in, if not stopping, at least placing some rules and constraints on the arms race.

Détente, in the Kremlin's view, was not meant as a sharp break with its traditional policies. Competition with the United States for worldwide influence would continue, and not only, as Moscow's spokesmen piously declared, at the ideological level. At the same time, that competition would now be subject to certain rules and cautions intended to prevent it from turning into sharp clashes and possible confrontations.

By the same token, it is a mistake to view the 1972 Moscow

¹³ Georgi Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1973, p. 109.

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Summit and its agreements as yet another ruse and deception on the Soviets' part: the U.S.S.R. secured the acknowledgment of its superiority in certain categories of strategic weapons and thus rendering nugatory America's nuclear umbrella over the West; obtained access to Western credits and technology to strengthen the faltering Soviet economy; and gave the United States little if anything in return. That view of détente gained wide credence in the United States after 1975, in the wake of the Soviet intrusions in Angola and the Horn of Africa, North Vietnam's violation of the Paris agreement, and Moscow's unconcealed relish at the overthrow of the pro-U.S. regime in Iran and the subsequent hostage crisis. And with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the tottering edifice of détente finally collapsed. Insofar as the United States was concerned, its death certificate was President Carter's withdrawal of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreements from further consideration for Senate ratification and a number of punitive sanctions against the Soviet Union that were adopted at the same time.

Yet, when taxed with the above charges and if speaking frankly, a Soviet spokesman might well retort that many of the travails of détente were caused, in a way, by the Americans themselves. Was it the Soviets' fault that shortly following the 1972 summit meeting, the Watergate affair plunged the country into a constitutional crisis that for a number of years virtually paralyzed American foreign policy, thus presenting the Kremlin with a number of opportunities for practically riskless foreign ventures? Or was it Moscow's fault that the reverberations of Vietnam made the Congress diffident about any initiative by the executive that might require forceful action abroad? Years before in Vienna, Khrushchev had told President Kennedy that the Americans could not expect the Soviet Union to sit, so to speak, with its arms folded. And he well might have added, "especially if the United States by its sins of omission or commission enables us to grasp a fresh prize."

And at another level, our imaginary Russian spokesman could argue that détente was too readily taken by the United States as a license to meddle in domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin showed its goodwill by allowing a large number of its citizens to emigrate, and yet the Congress would not authorize the most-favored-nation clause in a trade treaty unless the Soviet Union formally and specifically recognized the

right of Soviet Jews to emigrate, something which no sovereign state could accept. And when it came to political dissenters. . . . And so the collapse of détente was also caused, even if only secondarily, by the inevitable discord between the practices of democratic politics and the logic of an authoritarian system.

VI

When they meet this fall in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev might well begin their chat by congratulating themselves on the fact that the demise of détente was not followed by a new cold war. Strains between the two countries notwithstanding, the dialogue has continued. To be sure, harsh things have been said on both sides. But the most strident Washington rhetoric about Moscow, and vice versa, sounds almost complimentary compared to what the leadership of the U.S.S.R. and China had been saying about each other until quite recently (language that did not prevent both sides from attempting to mend their relations and manners once they decided that it was in their national interests to do so). In fact, oratory apart, the Soviets have had little reason to complain about the record of Mr. Reagan's administration. Consider the following:

1) Though the President strongly denounced SALT II during the 1980 electoral campaign, the United States has up to now observed scrupulously the provisions of the unratified treaty;

2) Had the White House and the Pentagon been set on an uncompromisingly anti-Soviet course, they would have been unsparing in their efforts to secure Beijing's goodwill and cooperation. But due largely to the Administration's scruples over Taiwan, relations between the United States and the People's Republic have cooled considerably since 1981;

3) Mr. Reagan lifted the grain embargo imposed in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion.

To be sure, the last five years present the most vivid illustration of the main and abiding problem besetting Soviet-American relations. Call it ideology, if you will. But what concretely upsets and frightens the Americans about the U.S.S.R. is what the Kremlin *does*, and what must be a continuing source of apprehension to the latter springs from what America *is*. The premises of the Soviet system virtually constrain it to set itself in an adversary position vis-à-vis the United States, insofar as the competition for worldwide influence and prestige is concerned—competition that by now has but little in common

with the erstwhile dream of converting the world to communism. By the same token, the notion of the imperialist threat is a vital ingredient of the Soviet rulers' unceasing effort (which varies in intensity) to inculcate in their people that siege mentality intended to make the population acquiesce in the deprivations they suffer as citizens and consumers. It is not so much concern for national security as for their own political security that prompts the Kremlin's masters to render support to the anti-American forces in the distant Caribbean, induces them to squash attempts at liberalization in Poland, and makes them rationalize such individual acts of brutality—found reprehensible by the non-communist world—as the shooting down of the Korean airliner. One is almost tempted to postulate that the task of finding a *modus vivendi* between the superpowers would be easier were the United States also an authoritarian society.

As things stand, reaching that *modus vivendi* has been made both more imperative and more complicated by the problem of nuclear weapons. The first point does not require an elaboration. As to the complications, they arise largely from the paradox that nuclear arms control, though the most sharply contested, is *not* the most important issue in Soviet-American relations. Many would challenge this assertion. Yet while weapons themselves do not cause wars, political collisions between the great powers may. Any conceivable treaty delimiting the number and characteristics of missiles, warheads, etc., in the hands of the United States and of the U.S.S.R. would still leave each superpower with enough to devastate the other.

The assumption that nuclear arms control is both the centerpiece and the probing stone of East-West relations has undoubtedly been of benefit to the Kremlin, since it has enhanced its bargaining power. The Soviets can afford to be tenacious and seemingly intransigent in any negotiations bearing on the issue. They may refuse, if it suits their mood and as they did in the 1979 Vienna talks, to link arms control to any broader political understanding between the two powers.

Contrariwise, a large segment of public opinion in a democracy will always cling to the belief that *any* agreement that promises to constrain the nuclear arms race is in and by itself the surest guarantee of peace. But it is not only public pressure that weakens the hand of the United States when it comes to actual negotiations. U.S. policymakers have for too long—witness the doctrine of mutual assured destruction—tended to

neglect the psychological impact of nuclear arms, their importance being assessed purely from war-fighting and/or deterrence points of view. An American expert might indeed have viewed with equanimity the fact that the SALT I agreement limited the United States to 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles, while allowing over 1,600 to the Soviet Union. But, as the reactions (and eventual overreactions) of the average citizen of the United States or West Germany were to demonstrate, these figures and other quantitative disparities between the nuclear armories of the two superpowers are bound to be of great political significance.

To be sure, one must not assume that the Soviets' campaign against the Euromissiles and the Strategic Defense Initiative is entirely contrived out of bluff and bullying. The deployment of the Pershing II missiles on West German territory might well have suggested to the Kremlin's oversuspicious mind the possibility of Bonn eventually getting its finger on the nuclear trigger. As to the SDI, the Soviets, while not themselves laggard in working on strategic defense, may be genuinely concerned about the possibility of an American technological breakthrough that could alter the entire deterrence picture. But since, as we have seen, Moscow is seldom entirely candid in revealing its real fears, it is not out of the question that the fuss raised about Star Wars may be prompted by the desire to secure American concessions on a quite different issue.

In any case, when they meet, the two leaders might be well advised to recognize that, even if it does materialize, a new agreement (SALT, START or whatever you might call it), however far-reaching, can be meaningful and reassuring only within the context of a broader political understanding between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Even if such an understanding is reached, could it prove less ephemeral than the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev pledge that both powers would eschew "efforts to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly"? Even the closest of allies would find it impossible to abide by that. Yet, as we have seen, the hyperboles of the 1972 summit apart, while détente crumbled largely on account of Soviet transgressions, these were often unwittingly brought about by America's sins of omission and commission.

And so, if we do not pitch our expectations too high, a more durable U.S.-Soviet rapprochement is possible, but only if the United States can learn new political and diplomatic skills and

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the Kremlin can unlearn some of its old habits. It is tempting to forecast, but it would be foolhardy to count on Gorbachev's U.S.S.R. concentrating its energies and resources on the domestic front and eschewing entirely its propensity for international mischief-making. But it is not unrealistic to expect that the needs of the Soviet economy, on the one hand, and an alert and purposeful U.S. diplomacy on the other, might constrain the Kremlin to display more prudence and greater restraint in its foreign policy.

As this survey of the 40 years of troubled Soviet-American coexistence suggests, an effective foreign policy, at least for a democracy, does not depend only on the skill of the experts. Both the American public and its government ought to be mindful of the past. The 1940s and early 1950s teach us how vital it is to correctly assess strengths and vulnerabilities, both our own and those of the U.S.S.R. The Khrushchev era shows how important it is to penetrate the rhetoric of Soviet policies and discern their real aims and fears. The late 1960s and the 1970s warn against allowing democracy's internal turmoil to affect unduly its foreign stance. And the current emotionalism in which the debate about subjects like nuclear arms control and international terrorism is swathed makes it all the more important for the American public to develop that combination of sophistication and patience, qualities which in turn enable the policymakers to combine tenacity of purpose with a flexibility of tactics—the necessary prerequisites for a viable U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

Jerry F. Hough

W

GORBACHEV'S STRATEGY

hen Yuri Andropov died in February 1984, the Central Committee waited four days to name his successor. It is not clear whether this resulted from a real struggle for power or was simply because of an intervening weekend. In either case, the delay symbolized the stagnation and even the retrogression during Konstantin Chernenko's year in office.

In March 1985, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary was announced just four hours after the announcement of Chernenko's death, even though one Politburo member (Vladimir Shcherbitsky) was still in the United States. On the next day, all Soviet newspapers had the same format: page one contained a communiqué about the Central Committee session that had elected Gorbachev, a biography of the new general secretary and a large photograph of him; page two reported Chernenko's death and carried his obituary and picture.

Even then, Gorbachev seemed to be signaling that he was a man in a hurry; events since confirm this impression. As we approach an important summit meeting in Geneva, it is time to give serious thought to who Gorbachev is and where he is going.

II

It would be a grave mistake to dismiss Gorbachev as only another typical party apparatchik, especially if such a judgment is combined with the more fundamental mistake of seeing the party apparatus as the opponent of change and the technocratic state as the proponent. Gorbachev was the most atypical regional party first secretary in the Soviet Union of the 1970s.

Nearly all of the provincial party secretaries in the Russian Republic and the Ukraine (excluding the autonomous republics based on other nationalities) were engineers or agronomists.

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Indeed, in the 25 most populous and politically important regions in 1981, 80 percent of the first secretaries had engineering backgrounds, with an average of nine years' work in industry, construction, transportation or administration. With years of subsequent work in the party, they have had a chance to broaden their perspective beyond the narrow production focus of the Soviet manager; but many surely retain the disdain for the consumer and the distrust of the market that their early background encouraged.

Gorbachev, by contrast, was extraordinary. He was the only graduate of Moscow University among the regional first secretaries. He was the only lawyer. He joined the Communist Party at the age of 21, compared with an entry age of 25 for the average regional first secretary of the Russian Republic and the Ukraine in 1981. He was also on an extraordinarily fast track, becoming a regional first secretary in his home province of Stavropol at 39, compared with an average age of 47 at which his counterparts reached this level. In 1980, he became a full member of the Politburo when he was only 49, eight years younger than the next youngest Politburo member of the time, Grigory Romanov, and 17 years younger than the next youngest Politburo member serving in Moscow.

Gorbachev owes his rise to many factors. His rapid promotions almost surely reflected an understanding by the aging leadership that the Soviet Union faced new challenges that required a man with a different perspective to handle them—of course, after the aging leaders had themselves departed. In any case, he obviously was very bright to have been admitted to Moscow University with a peasant background at a time when lower-class origins were not a factor in admission. It is impressive that a man of this background graduated with distinction. A friend from his university days, Zdeněk Mlynář (a Czech Politburo member during the “Prague Spring,” now in exile), has painted a favorable picture: “Gorbachev the student was not only very intelligent and gifted, he was an open man, whose intelligence never carried over to arrogance; he wanted—and was able—to listen to the opinions of all he spoke to. Loyal and personally honest, he won an informal and spontaneous authority.”¹

¹ For an excellent article that includes much of the evidence from Gorbachev's trip to Britain and the Mlynář article, see “Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin,” *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1985, especially pp. 9–12, by Archie Brown, a leading specialist on the Soviet Union at Oxford University.

In addition, Mlynář reports that Gorbachev was very much a child of the 20th Party Congress of 1956 (the first congress after Stalin's death). He adjusted well to the Khrushchev era, and it can hardly be a coincidence that when he picked the date to open next year's 27th Party Congress, which will complete his own consolidation of power, he selected February 25—thirty years to the day that Khrushchev gave his secret speech denouncing Stalin.

Political ties were also, of course, enormously important in Gorbachev's rise. The province of Stavropol in the Caucasus was the one that Mikhail Suslov, the longtime Politburo member, had led from 1939 to 1944. Gorbachev's first major patron, however, was Fedor Kulakov, the party first secretary under whom he rose in Stavropol. Kulakov had been a close associate of Chernenko in the region of Penza in the mid-1940s, and this association had to have been a critical factor in Brezhnev's promotion of Kulakov to Central Committee secretary for agriculture in 1965. In Moscow, Kulakov was in a position to render critical support to his own protégés, such as Gorbachev; this must have been a key reason in Gorbachev's eventual selection as Kulakov's successor as Stavropol first secretary. Since Gorbachev was promoted to the Politburo when Chernenko was riding high, the old Chernenko-Kulakov tie was probably important for Gorbachev.

During Gorbachev's stay at Moscow University, the party first and second secretaries in Moscow at the time were Viktor Grishin, the first secretary of the Moscow party in the 1970s, and Ivan Kapitonov, the Central Committee secretary for personnel; they surely saw him as a Muscovite in the traditional political battles between the Moscow and Leningrad party factions. Gorbachev gave every indication of being the type of man who would cultivate such useful ties. Also, his legal education and background may have given him the chance to speak out on law-and-order questions when he was involved with the Moscow party leadership, and thus to court the secret police chief, Yuri Andropov, whom he may have met even earlier.²

Nevertheless, the man who almost certainly had the decisive influence on Gorbachev's promotion in the late 1970s was

² Reports are circulating that Gorbachev was close to Andropov in the early 1970s, when the latter vacationed in Stavropol, and that Andropov recommended him to be selected as a Central Committee secretary in 1978, *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1985. It must, however, be remembered that, of the former leaders, only Andropov is currently in favor, and the incentive for official myth-making is therefore extremely high.

Leonid Brezhnev. By that time, Brezhnev, general secretary since 1964, had no interest in policy innovations, but he was naturally keenly interested in maintaining his own political position. He had the political strength to impose two totally inappropriate cronies, Konstantin Chernenko and Nikolai Tikhonov as number two and number three in the political system. Brezhnev was not about to accept a new, young Politburo member, such as Gorbachev, who did not fit in with his political interests, and he still had the power to prevent such an appointment.

In fact, however, Gorbachev served Brezhnev's interests perfectly. Brezhnev was strengthening his power with the appointments of Chernenko and Tikhonov and reassuring the Central Committee members with job security. In a sense, though, these moves also weakened Brezhnev's political position. His political problem in the late 1970s was that the middle-level administrative elites were overwhelmingly in their fifties; these men naturally had to be more concerned about the future than Brezhnev's generation.³ The military had to be even more concerned as the Soviet Union slowed the growth in its military procurements and as the American buildup accelerated. The chief of the general staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, began speaking out with increasing sharpness. If the rate of economic growth continued to decline, if administrative and labor efficiency continued to fall, if corruption was not punished, these conditions would have dangerous consequences for the 1980s and 1990s. In short, those concerned about the future might even come to believe that the removal of Brezhnev was indispensable.

Gorbachev's promotion was an answer to these concerns. As a man with attractive personal qualities and well connected to a wide variety of political leaders, he was perfect insurance for Brezhnev. It would be assumed that Gorbachev was a potential successor, and thus a guarantee against long-term stagnation. Yet, his extreme youth in comparison with the rest of the Politburo meant that, in the short run, he could not be a credible alternative or threat to Brezhnev. Thus, Brezhnev could trust the Politburo and Central Committee to allow Gorbachev to gain experience and be tested while Brezhnev lived out his days in peace.

³ See the elaborate documentation of this point in Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980.

Brezhnev's death, however, could have been a political disaster for Gorbachev if the new general secretary was to be a healthy 60-year-old, or even a healthy 70-year-old. Rather than risk defeat himself, it made more sense for Gorbachev to support an ailing general secretary who would set the stage for reform, appoint him secretary in charge of personnel and allow him to build his own political machine.

Viewed from this perspective, the events of 1982 (Brezhnev's death and Andropov's accession) appear very different from the conventional Western version. Instead of being a protégé, picked from virtual obscurity in 1983 by Andropov, Gorbachev was already a man of genuine standing and power. Andropov was not selected general secretary by the military and the secret police, who have as little right to become involved in factional politics in the Soviet Union as the American military and the FBI have in the United States. Rather, Andropov's electors were the government and party officials on the Politburo and in the Central Committee.

Andropov's major support was from the group associated with Andrei Kirilenko, the longtime senior personnel official in the Politburo, until he was replaced in that responsibility by Chernenko in 1977 or 1978. Both Andropov and Kirilenko had been Komsomol secretaries in educational institutions in the city of Rybinsk (now renamed Andropov) in Yaroslavl province in the mid-1930s, and Andropov shared Kirilenko's substantive position in the great policy battles of the 1970s. With the exception of Gorbachev, all of Andropov's chief appointments in his first year had been very close to Kirilenko—Egor Ligachev, Nikolai Ryzhkov, Viktor Chebrikov, Vitali Vorotnikov (all subsequently promoted by Gorbachev).

Andropov accepted—or had to accept—Chernenko as the nominal second secretary in terms of status, but he took away personnel matters from Chernenko's jurisdiction and moved him into the slot of ideologist, far from the levers of real power.⁴ It was Gorbachev who became the real second secretary under Andropov. He not only retained responsibility for the agro-industrial complex, but he was also given Chernenko's old responsibility for personnel selection. At some point, per-

⁴ He was actually more successful in handling Chernenko than Leonid Brezhnev was in dealing with his chief rival, Nikolai Podgorny, who was not only second secretary but retained the personnel slot until he was moved aside into the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet over a year later.

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haps even from the beginning, or perhaps not until after Andropov's death, Gorbachev was also given the duty within the Politburo of supervising economic coordination, including supervision of the economic department of the Central Committee led by the new secretary Nikolai Ryzhkov.

Everything was going well for Gorbachev. If Andropov had lived another six months, he could have completed his attack on Chernenko, for Chernenko's declining health was undermining his own position as much as Andropov's efforts. Alas, from Gorbachev's point of view, Andropov died after only 15 months in office; fortunately, from Gorbachev's point of view, the new general secretary, Chernenko, was also ailing. As part of the bargain that resulted in Chernenko's selection as general secretary, Gorbachev was given a broad set of responsibilities that not only designated him as the heir apparent but also gave him control over so many levers of power that he was virtually unchallengeable as Chernenko's successor.

Under Chernenko, Gorbachev assembled all or most of the duties of four members of the Politburo of 1980: his own duties of that time, which included supervision of the agro-industrial complex; Suslov's responsibilities for propaganda, education, science, culture and relations with foreign communists; Chernenko's authority for personnel (though not for the police); and, finally, Kirilenko's assignment for coordination of the economy (but not detailed supervision of heavy industry and construction). He was thus in a strategically advantageous position to consolidate his control for a full year before Chernenko's death. Other political figures had every incentive to jump on his bandwagon rather than struggle against him. Thus, when Chernenko died on March 10, 1985, there was no reason other than propriety to postpone the announcement of Gorbachev's selection.

III

An understanding of Gorbachev's strategy rests on two bases. First, he gives the appearance of being a truly world-class chess player who delights in complex combinations and knows how to make them. Second, as a relatively young man, he must worry about the Soviet Union's very serious problems with a long-term perspective (he will be 69 in the year 2000). But Gorbachev has to play a very complex game. Unless we comprehend the nature of that game, we will never understand his individual moves. We have to move beyond notions of simple

dichotomies between reform and discipline, between détente and anti-Westernism, or fuzzy concepts of decentralization, for these notions leave us ill prepared for what will be occurring and what is to come.

Certainly, it is correct that Gorbachev's primary problem is the economy. The central difficulty is not the long lines at the stores. Standards of living are, in fact, rising steadily, and in such circumstances the Soviet people will endure lines for years. Nor is the central difficulty lagging rates of economic growth. Western countries could live quite easily with steady two-to-three-percent growth, especially when coupled with an absence of unemployment.

The problem with the Soviet economy is technological backwardness. The party has successfully identified itself with the goals of national defense, of national power and of catching up with the West; this identification with Russian nationalism and patriotism is a major reason why the Soviet system has been stable compared with regimes in East Europe where communism has meant a loss of national independence and power. Talk about the superiority of totalitarian controls that never can be challenged is simply inconsistent with events in Hungary and Poland, for domestic revolts would have swept away those regimes had it not been for the presence of outside Soviet troops.

The technological lag, however, threatens a series of disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union. First, it completely undermines the ideological claim that only socialism is capable of maintaining the drive for growth and technological advance. The question for the Soviet Union now is not equality with the West, but with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Brazil and even Taiwan. It turns out that the Soviet model was good for heavy industry and growth in the smokestack period of industrialization, but is terrible for heavy industry in the current electronics-computer phase.

Second, the lag in technology also seriously undermines certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The standing of communist parties in Europe has been declining for over a decade, even in the face of quite poor economic performance in their respective countries that should theoretically be advantageous to local communists. In the Third World, radical revolutions have been occurring only in preindustrial states. The politics of industrializing Third World countries—Indonesia, India, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—have all been moving

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to the center and to the right, while radical regimes such as China, Mozambique and perhaps now even Vietnam have been evolving in the same direction. A fundamental cause is that the Soviet economic system is widely seen as a completely ineffective model.

The technological lag undercuts Soviet foreign policy in another way. If the Soviet economy were capable (and it should be) of exporting capital and advanced technology as Japan does, foreign policy consequences would follow. For example, the Middle East is on the Soviet southern border, and the Soviet Union is fortunate in having millions of citizens with Muslim backgrounds and linguistic skills who would be excellent salesmen and representatives in this area. If the Soviet Union had a properly functioning economy, it would have a major role to play in Middle Eastern economies, and political lines of influence would tend to follow the economic ones.

The technological lag also threatens to open an enormous window of military vulnerability for the Soviet Union in the future. As Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov wrote, both before and after he was removed as chief of the general staff, nuclear weapons are almost impossible to use. As conventional weapons undergo qualitative improvements in coming years, and as the modernization of the Chinese economy gives Beijing a stronger military machine, the Soviet Union needs to computerize its own conventional forces or risk falling seriously behind. And if a breakthrough occurred in the American space defense program, perhaps even one that was simply transferable to conventional weaponry, the situation would be immeasurably worse. It is one thing for a country such as the Soviet Union to develop a specialized high technology element such as a guidance system for its rockets; it is something quite different to introduce miniaturized computers and related equipment in all military components and to recruit and train soldiers who can operate such a modernized force.

Without question, Gorbachev understands all of this. He has not been talking about agricultural reform or about lines in the shops, but about technology, technology, technology. He has spoken repeatedly about the urgency of the task of raising the Soviet Union to world levels of technology. He has repeatedly said that foreign policy depends on the effectiveness of one's domestic model. Even while Chernenko was alive, Gorbachev had the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Policy Committee, which he chaired, hold a session on foreign economic relations

with the Third World (the committee never had substantive sessions under his predecessors). Everyone knows that the Soviet Union cannot develop such economic relations except on the basis of the export of manufactured goods.

A series of interrelated problems must be attacked if the problems of growth and technology are to be seriously addressed. First, in the trade-off that any society must make between growth and technological innovation, on the one hand, and social welfare and individual security on the other, the Soviet leadership of the last quarter of a century opted heavily for the latter. This trade-off became the focus of the great political battle of the Brezhnev era, with a Politburo group led by Kirilenko supporting growth and investment and the Chernenko-Suslov group supporting what they called "social justice"—egalitarian wages, subsidized food prices and job security for the worker. Brezhnev supported Chernenko and Suslov, and this was a major cause of the declining rate of economic growth.

Second, the Soviet system is too centralized, and the problem becomes progressively worse as the economy becomes more complex and moves toward the "third industrial revolution" of computers and electronics. With all investment and product decisions having to go through the ministries and the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) in Moscow, huge bottlenecks and inflexibilities result. Yet, it is impossible simply to decentralize authority to the factories, for uncontrolled managers will maximize profits by raising prices. If central administrative controls are reduced, they must be replaced by the even harsher controls and discipline of the market.

Third, Soviet industry has enjoyed a level of protectionism unthought of in the non-communist world. Even protected Japanese manufacturers have long been forced to export and hence to compete with foreign manufacturers in foreign markets. Soviet industrialists are seldom compelled to export and have few incentives to do so. Even when the Soviet Union imports Western goods, Soviet manufacturers lose no business and hence do not have to meet Western standards in production. It is no coincidence that the negative features of the Soviet economy are precisely those that any textbook on free trade would predict.

In sum, economic reform is politically very difficult. It has to attack the social policy that benefits the industrial worker, and the worker has been one of the few secure supports of the

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regime. Moreover, the industrial managers are ambivalent: they would support a change in social policy and a widening of their prerogatives vis-à-vis the workers (“decentralization” is often a code word for this), but they have no desire for the harsh discipline of the market, let alone for the pleasure of competing with Toyota. And, of course, an attack on protectionism involves an opening to the outside world that arouses many fears. While it would be advantageous to have Tadzhik salesmen selling Soviet computers in Teheran, what ideas would they bring home, especially when they studied the local culture enough to advertise effectively?

IV

As a Soviet leader handles the politics of building coalitions and neutralizing opposition—political as well as popular—he has a very sensitive problem of the proper sequencing of decisions. It would be madness to arouse all the potential opposition at the start, and Gorbachev surely is not going to do so.

The first stage of his strategy has become clear. He (like Andropov) has promoted men who were very close to Andrei Kirilenko. These men are likely to support industrial growth and a change in social policy, and these steps will come first. In this sense, the policies of Gorbachev and Andropov are similar to Reaganism and Thatcherism. Indeed, the Gorbachev Politburo rejected the Five-Year Plan for 1986–1991 drafted on Chernenko’s guidelines. The new guidelines surely will reflect Gorbachev’s new priorities.

The second part of Gorbachev’s strategy is to launch a major attack on the central state apparatus in Moscow. He was absolutely scathing in his denunciation of the ministries in his speech on June 11, 1985, and he was absolutely correct in pointing to the Moscow technocracy as the center of the opposition to reform:

The ministries, in their present form . . . have no interest in the economic experiment. . . . [They] have vast experience and ability in swaddling up everybody and interpreting the decisions of the Central Committee and the government in such a way that after their application . . . nothing is left of them.

His audience applauded, and Gorbachev retorted sarcastically, “If the ministers are applauding too the ice has begun to shift.” This produced both laughter and applause.

For this purpose he intends to mobilize the provinces and, specifically, the regional party officials against the central ministries, much in the way that Khrushchev did in 1957. The provinces feel all the constraints and rigidities embodied in ministerial directives and decisions made in Moscow, and this anger pours forth in the articles their officials write in the press. Like Andropov before him, Gorbachev has been promoting men with provincial backgrounds. None of the three men named to the Politburo and Secretariat this July had ever worked in Moscow before 1985. The five Politburo members over 70 (their average age is 74) have worked in Moscow for nearly a quarter of a century on the average; but the eight members who are under 70 (their average age is 60) have worked in Moscow for an average of only six years (four years if the KGB chief is excluded).

The problem is not just an economic one. The phenomenon Gorbachev is attacking reflects a major devolution of power from the Politburo to the ministries in the Brezhnev era. As the Soviet scholar Tatyana Zaslavskaya expressed the point in *Izvestia* on June 1, "The present system is characterized by obvious hypertrophy on the middle level and a relative weakness on the lower and, to some extent, on the higher level."⁵ Another Soviet scholar called this condition "feudalistic socialism," for under Brezhnev the ministries really did come to act like independent baronies, operating under a weak king. Gorbachev is determined to end this decentralization, but in favor of a different form of decentralization that better achieves central goals.

A great many of these governmental officials will surely be replaced before the new Central Committee is elected at the next party congress in 1986, including probably the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Tikhonov. This in itself will not transform the administrative system, only give Gorbachev the chance to appoint more supporters to the Central Committee. The major attack on the ministries will have to be on their powers.

The question that Gorbachev has studiously avoided answering is what type of reform ("perfecting of the economic mechanism") he will sponsor. It is easy for a Soviet leader to talk loosely about more initiative for the provinces and the factories,

⁵ Zaslavskaya was the author of a famous secret memorandum, the "Novosibirsk Report," that advocated a strategy for reform.

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for both the provincial and factory officials will love that. Moreover, who can oppose, in principle, a policy emphasizing industrial growth? But behind the generalizations lie hard choices.

First, if Gorbachev is going to reduce the very high level of agricultural investment and shift some of it to industry, how can he improve agricultural performance without a major reform that permits private peasant investment? How can he attack social policy without giving the workers something in return, like a better diet? While he has said almost nothing about agricultural reform, it has to be high on his agenda if he is serious. Zaslavskaya has rightly said that agricultural reform should have priority, and should center on the creation of such mechanisms as the family-sized brigades.

Second, if Gorbachev is going to decentralize authority from the ministries and state committees, he must institute other controls. He has said that GOSPLAN should be a center of "economic science." If this means it will be headed by a major economist, he has real change in mind. But whatever he is thinking, he will soon face the dilemma that Khrushchev encountered when he established regional economic entities. He will either have to start instituting administrative controls over "localistic abuses" or move forward with the reform.

Gorbachev has described the problem in such urgent terms that he has made it difficult for himself to go backward. He has called for "a deep reconstruction of the whole economic mechanism," "a decisive revolution in the economy," "a fundamental perfecting of the system of price formation," "a major reconstruction in the minds of economic managers." He has specifically pledged not to allow deeds to lag from words, and he asked the rhetorical question, "Are we not turning too sharply?" His answer was direct: "No . . . a different approach, a calmer one would not do for us. The times dictate that this is exactly how we must act."

V

The West, of course, is far more interested in Soviet foreign policy than in the inner structure of socialist economic systems. The debate has begun on whether the replacement of Andrei Gromyko as foreign minister signals a significant change in foreign policy.

The debates in the West about Soviet foreign policy are, unfortunately, marred by an excessive narrowness in posing

options for the Soviet Union. Usually the discussion does not go much beyond whether a Soviet leader is for or against arms control or détente with the United States, whether the Soviet Union is going to be assertive or passive in the Third World. Since the Soviet Union had the same foreign minister for 28 years—and one who was basically America-oriented in his policy—we came to take for granted his view of the available alternatives and the views of his like-minded bosses as the only ones possible. It simply is not true. Far more fundamental questions are now being debated in the Soviet Union.

First, the basic Soviet policy toward the West in the last 40 years has, in my opinion, been imperfectly understood. We talk about constant Soviet efforts to undermine NATO and the Japanese-American alliance, but then note with relief the clumsiness, the inflexibility or the sheer stupidity of the Soviet leaders who have conducted these policies. A different—and, I think, more accurate—explanation is that the leaders of the Gromyko generation have actually been quite intelligent in their tactics toward the alliance, but have had very different goals than we have assumed.

The vast majority of men of the Brezhnev-Gromyko generation were born between 1900 and 1910 and were almost all thrust into high positions in the wake of the purges of 1937–1938. Men of this generation remember World War I; their fathers may have fought in the Russo-Japanese War and reminisced about it; they, themselves, were high officials in World War II. (Brezhnev was a political officer at the front, Dmitri Ustinov was a defense industry minister, and Gromyko was head of the American desk of the foreign ministry in 1939 and ambassador to the United States in 1943.) Thus, clichés about the Russian obsession with Germany and Japan are quite relevant to this generation, which has dominated the Soviet administrative system for nearly 50 years.

Basic Soviet foreign policy since the war has been based on the theory that international relations are determined by two contending camps. Stalin thought that the relations between the two had to be hostile, while his successors have thought—or at least hoped—that détente between them was possible. All, however, have insisted on Soviet control of the communist bloc, and all have essentially been willing to concede American dominion over the industrialized non-communist world.

Indeed, men such as Gromyko have even been tolerant of NATO and the Japanese-American alliance precisely because

they were mechanisms to control Germany and Japan and to keep them non-nuclear. In addition, as the Soviet commentator, Aleksander Bovin, seemed to taunt Gromyko in the late winter, "a healthy ideological instinct is at work in the bipolar policy" and "a multipolar policy noticeably complicates the work of diplomats." Gromyko, of course, has been willing to play on alliance tensions as a means of influencing the United States, but he has rarely gone further. Those who warn against German revanchism and Japanese militarism in the Soviet press are, in fact, supporting this Gromyko line; real independence for these two former enemies would be against a long-term Soviet interest.

Recently, however, there have been advocates of a fundamental change in the direction of a more multipolar policy, in large part for reasons related to economic reform and domestic politics. They warn in the Soviet press of American "fascism" and the dangers of a first-strike strategy and advocate the need to seek allies against these dangers. This view contemplates much more radical changes toward the end of the decade than Gromyko would have ever considered, i.e., approaching Japan and Europe by such concessions as returning the southern Kurile islands to Japan, permitting far closer East German-West German economic ties, and encouraging equity ownership for foreign investment in the Soviet Union.

The second fundamental question for Gorbachev is the nature of Soviet policy in the Third World. If radical revolutions are likely to occur only in preindustrial countries, the Soviet Union is playing a losing game if it concentrates its policy on radical regimes and movements. It is betting on Nicaragua with its three million people and conceding Mexico with its 70 million to the United States. And it is doing this when it knows in its heart that Mexico is quite likely to draw Nicaragua tightly within its sphere of influence in the long run.

In the Soviet debates on the Third World, many Soviet analysts, most notably the best of them, Nodari Simoniya of the Institute of Oriental Studies, essentially argue that Marx was right: capitalism normally follows feudalism and the Third World is therefore basically on the Western European path of development.⁶ They conclude that the Soviet Union should

⁶ The evolution of Soviet debates is discussed in Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, October 1985. Simoniya is also the leading Georgian in the Moscow foreign policy establishment, and if Shevardnadze were to draw on him and his ideas, Soviet Third World policy might become very interesting indeed.

concentrate its foreign policy on the important, industrializing, capitalist Third World countries. Soviet policy toward India is explicitly put forward as the model.

The third and most fundamental question on the Soviet agenda is the basic relationship to the West. In the West we analyze Soviet policy toward Europe almost exclusively in geo-strategic terms. But these considerations are far from the only ones. An opening to the West in foreign policy has often been favored or opposed primarily because of the impact of exposing Russia to Western culture and ideology.

The battle in Russia on the proper relationship to the West has been a long and basic one. In the nineteenth century, the forces that we loosely call Westernizers were gradually winning over the forces we loosely call Slavophiles. Events such as the pogroms were the anxious response of traditionalist forces to trends in Russian development that they saw emerging as victorious. In this broader historical perspective, the Bolshevik revolution became a victory for many values within the Slavophile tradition—for the image of Russia as a country different from Western Europe, a country not to be corrupted by European values and institutions and a country that should civilize Europe rather than the opposite.

The issue of the relationship to the West was repeatedly fought out after the revolution—in the battle over recognition of the foreign debt and the monopoly of foreign trade in the early 1920s, over the continuation of the Grand Alliance in the mid-1940s, over the degree to open up the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s and the late 1960s. Now the issue is central once again, but the balance of forces is very different from the 1960s. Slavophile exclusivity has proved a failure in achieving the Slavophile goal of Russian dominance or even equality. Now those forces that want to integrate Russia more into the world—although not, of course, to make it identical with the West—can use the old slogans about catching up, about a foreign threat, about Russian equality and leadership. But they can now argue that only by attacking protectionism, only by subjecting the industrial managers to foreign competition, can these goals be achieved. They can now call for an opening to the West in the name of national defense. It is a winning argument.

VI

Gorbachev comes to power with very little foreign policy experience. He handled himself well on trips to countries such

as Canada and Great Britain, and he showed himself to be quite knowledgeable. He made a favorable impression on his British hosts, including some very hard-headed politicians. Foreign travel, however, is a different matter than having an interest in the substance of foreign policy. In England, Gorbachev became enlivened when people asked him about domestic policy, not when he talked about foreign policy; the conventional judgment that his overwhelming priority is domestic affairs is surely correct.

Where the conventional judgment about Gorbachev is wrong, however, is in the assumption that domestic policy can be isolated from foreign policy. If a prerequisite of economic reform is to subject industrialists to foreign competition, and if the central domestic political question is the relationship to Western ideas and institutions, then foreign policy is an intimate component of domestic policy.

As he surveys foreign policy, Gorbachev faces two major problems. The first is that domestic economic reform involves contradictory foreign policy imperatives. On the one hand, economic reform is politically very difficult, and the classic answer is for a leader to emphasize a foreign threat. On the other hand, the pressures that an increase in investment pose for social expenditures could be alleviated if military expenditures were reduced, while the emphasis on a foreign threat could actually lead to pressure for an increase in military expenditures. Moreover, any attack on protectionism is incompatible with a policy of isolationism and autarky.

Several answers to this dilemma suggest themselves. One is to emphasize the long-term threat rather than a short-term one. Military readiness and weapons procurement are extremely counterproductive economically. The long-term threat, by contrast, can be met by relying more on research and development, including basic computer and laser technologies. Such expenditures can be quite useful in helping to overcome the technological lag. In this sense, Star Wars and the Chinese modernization are perfect threats: neither is any danger for the next decade, but both pose an ill-defined yet potentially enormous danger over the long run.

Another way to resolve the conflicts between domestic and foreign policies is to move away from the old two-camp theory toward the multipolar theory. The United States could be singled out as the greatest threat, while fundamental concessions could be offered to Europe and Pacific Basin countries such as Japan and South Korea in order to guarantee a secure

economic opening to the outside world. Such a policy differentiation would have the further political benefit of allowing a Soviet leader to call for an opening to the West, not in the name of "liberalism," but as a strategy of attack on the United States and its alliance system.

Andropov may have been moving in such a direction. In September 1983, after the KAL 007 incident, he warned in an interview against having "illusions" about dealing with the United States. While not rejecting détente as such, he seemed to be addressing his foreign minister and the validity of Gromyko's America-oriented policy. This tentative Andropov line was reversed under Chernenko, and was symbolized by the growing cannonade of press attacks on German revanchism.⁷

If the first problem that Gorbachev faced in March was the contradictory imperatives of domestic reform, his second major problem was Andrei Gromyko. Part of the Gromyko problem was related to policy, assuming that Gorbachev does, in fact, want to return to Andropov's multipolarism. While Gromyko had accommodated himself to very different leaders over a 45-year period, it would have nevertheless been awkward to have a foreign minister who fundamentally opposed a shift from the old policy. Moreover, if Gromyko could be moved aside, this could be a signal of change in the way that Vyacheslav Molotov's replacement of Maxim Litvinov was in 1939.

Probably an even more important part of the problem, however, was a personal one. Gromyko was the one Politburo member other than Gorbachev with real stature and the only one with real foreign policy experience. And what experience! He headed the American desk of the foreign ministry when Gorbachev was in the second grade and became foreign minister when John Foster Dulles was secretary of state and Gorbachev was two years out of college. Gorbachev may well respect and even like Gromyko, but he had to rebel against the situation from a personal point of view. Imagine how a new U.S. president would react in, say, 1988, if Dulles had been serving as secretary of state continually since the mid-1950s.

In the spring and early summer of 1985, Gorbachev solved an extraordinary number of his problems with a truly brilliant combination of moves. First, the press played down the themes of German revanchism and Japanese militarism, thus returning to the general approach of the Andropov period. In the Bitburg

⁷ For a documentation of these points, see Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Perspectives on European Security," *International Journal* (Toronto), No. 1, 1985, pp. 20-41.

controversy of last May, it was President Reagan who was treated as a near-fascist in the Soviet press, not Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Gorbachev's own speeches were sharply anti-American.

In July, Gorbachev removed Grigory Romanov from the Politburo in disgrace. Romanov had represented the military and the defense industries on the Politburo, and was a leading spokesman for the policy of stressing the near-term threat. Romanov's slot on the Secretariat was given to a new appointee, Lev Zaykov, a former defense industry plant manager from Leningrad, and a man whom Gorbachev had personally installed as Leningrad first secretary in 1983. Romanov had not been a serious political threat to Gorbachev in recent years, and the Soviet military had never been strong during succession periods. Romanov's removal, however, dramatized Gorbachev's authority to those at home and abroad who had a different opinion on these questions.

At the same time, Gorbachev relinquished his right to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and returned to the more normal pre-1977 pattern of reserving the post for a ceremonial figure or a defeated rival. Not only did he give the post to Gromyko, thereby removing him from the foreign ministry, but in his nominating speech Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the Supreme Soviet Presidium's role in supervising local soviets.

Of course, this step in itself did not solve Gorbachev's problem, for Gromyko remains on the Politburo. If someone used to deferring to Gromyko (worst of all, a foreign ministry subordinate) had been named foreign minister, it would have taken years for him to achieve real independence. The appointment of an outspoken enemy of Gromyko would have caused bad feelings, and such a man still could not have been promoted to full Politburo membership at once. The selection of Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister was the totally unexpected masterstroke that achieved the objective.

VII

Shevardnadze is a man with very little experience in foreign policy and, judging by his speeches, a man without a great deal of interest in it. Unlike most other Politburo members, he did not even mention the subject in his Supreme Soviet election speech in February 1985. Thus, his appointment ensures that Gorbachev will be his own foreign minister.

Shevardnadze, however, has personal ties with the general

secretary. He was Komsomol leader in Georgia from 1957 to 1961, precisely the same time that Gorbachev held an analogous post in the bordering province of Stavropol. The two must have met at that time. Moreover, shortly after Shevardnadze became first secretary in Georgia in 1972, Brezhnev encouraged a number of republics to conduct experiments in agricultural administration. Georgia entered the "competition" in 1974, and its particular experiment was endorsed by Gorbachev when he was the agricultural secretary of the Central Committee. In the process of implementing the system nationwide, Gorbachev consulted Shevardnadze frequently. Shevardnadze is a man with whom Gorbachev can work easily, but with his lack of experience there will be no question which of the two is dominant.

If one is to judge by the newspaper of the Georgian Central Committee, *Zarya Vostoka*—and there are subtle but substantial differences in foreign coverage from one republican newspaper to another—Shevardnadze is quite enthusiastic about negotiations and dialogue. For example, the Georgian newspaper covered the Gromyko-Shultz talks in Geneva in January favorably in comparison with many other newspapers (notably, that of the Ukraine, where the hard-liner, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, is first secretary). It paints a more favorable picture of the need for negotiations in the Middle East than does, for example, the newspaper of neighboring (and Muslim) Azerbaidzhan, where Geydar Aliyev (now a deputy premier) was first secretary.

Shevardnadze gives every impression of being an ideal foreign spokesman for the first media-oriented general secretary. He is handsome, speaks with a light and even humorous touch and has shown a real interest in public opinion in Georgia (both in conducting public-opinion polling and in trying to influence public opinion with a sophisticated newspaper).⁸ All of the talk about the "dour" foreign minister that marked the Gromyko period is now likely to disappear from the foreign press.

The real question is Shevardnadze's capability and inclinations as a foreign policy adviser to a general secretary who also has little experience. He was a strong supporter of economic reform and of promoting exports early in the Chernenko period, and thus should have no trouble subordinating foreign

⁸ For a first-rate study of Shevardnadze in Georgia, see Elizabeth Fuller, "A Portrait of Eduard Shevardnadze," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 219/85, July 3, 1985.

policy to reform.⁹ And he should have no problem with a policy that becomes more Europe-oriented. He is likely to be a strong supporter of a policy that opens the country more to the West in general. Georgia was a Christian country, whose church had long ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, and which joined the Russian empire in the nineteenth century more or less voluntarily as protection against Iran and Turkey. The Georgians have looked upon themselves as a European, not a Middle Eastern, country, and they tend to look at an opening to the West and a more relaxed Soviet system as a way to ensure more leeway for Georgia within the U.S.S.R.

But does Shevardnadze have the conceptual framework or experience to conduct a complicated multipolar policy? As Aleksander Bovin warned, such a policy does "complicate the work of diplomats." Much will depend on whom Shevardnadze relies for advice. Gorbachev still must change the 81-year-old and 76-year-old Central Committee secretaries responsible for foreign relations, and he does not yet have a new personal assistant for foreign relations. There is a strong possibility—perhaps even a probability—that Gorbachev will follow the examples of Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy and Nixon, and leave his foreign minister to conduct public diplomacy while pulling actual policymaking control into his own office—that is, into the Central Committee apparatus.

He already has selected a longtime specialist on foreign relations (and the sharpest public critic of the Gromyko foreign policy), Aleksander Yakovlev, as head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee—a department that will once again take over the role which has been handled in recent years by the foreign information department of the Central Committee.¹⁰ Yakovlev's writings are virulently anti-American.

⁹ In April 1984, Shevardnadze held a Georgian Central Committee session on economic reform at which he called for "daring decisions," a Central Committee conference on the necessity to export manufactured goods and a major conference on public opinion with national participants. *Zarya Vostoka*, April 7, 1984, p.3; April 11, p.3; April 27, pp. 1, 3; April 28, pp. 1–3.

¹⁰ Yakovlev is a name which American foreign policy audiences should learn, for he may be a major figure on the Gorbachev team. A party apparatchik in Yaroslavl province in the late 1940s and early 1950s, he moved into the Central Committee apparatus in 1952, specializing in the study of the United States. He spent a year at Columbia University in the late 1950s, and then returned to the Central Committee, serving as first deputy head of the propaganda department (1966–73). He was demoted to the ambassadorship to Canada in 1973, after writing an article attacking Russian chauvinism; many Soviet intellectuals remember this well, and consider him quite "progressive." He was brought back by Andropov to head the most important foreign policy institute, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), returning to the propaganda department this July.

His recent book, *From Truman to Reagan*, is quite extreme, even for recent years, and it won the Soviet equivalent of a Pulitzer Prize in May of this year. His recent writings have been quite favorable about Europe and especially Japan. If Gorbachev is going to combine a strong anti-American theme with a more general opening to the West, Yakovlev seems the ideal man to be in charge of the Soviet media.

Gorbachev obviously sees himself as a strong leader, and such leaders surround themselves with lieutenants of conflicting views. Only the future will show whose ideas he will ultimately adopt. The first key test will come at the summit meeting with President Reagan in Geneva. Gromyko oriented his policy toward the United States and sought agreements for agreements' sake. The Soviet Union was even willing to pay fairly high prices for agreements, for example, Jewish emigration in exchange for the SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty. The summit will provide some indication of whether this pattern will continue.

That Soviet policy may be shifting was indicated by reports of contacts between Soviet and Israeli diplomats. If these reports are correct, it may be that the Soviet Union will no longer accept a linkage between U.S. policy and Jewish emigration, but instead will deal with the "center of power" in the Middle East on that question, Israel.

One also suspects that the Soviet Union may be modifying its position on Star Wars, agreeing to a separation of research from testing and perhaps even agreeing to tie such a limited agreement to cuts in offensive weapons. However, it is likely that the Soviets will be quite rigorous in defining testing and quite insistent on the inclusion of anti-satellite testing within a reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Thus, while one can imagine some type of agreement at the summit—perhaps a reaffirmation of the SALT limits, with a second new type of missile permitted (the SS-24 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and the U.S. Midgetman)—not much movement on key issues seems likely.

Gorbachev may well play the summit as no more than a stopgap. He could then use the meeting to complete the movement of policy away from the Gromyko line. To Gromyko and to the Europeans he could say: "We tried. We even talked with the devil, but Andropov was right. One cannot have illusions about the possibility of dealing with the Americans." Indeed, a flawed summit would give even Gromyko a way to suggest

gracefully that a new strategy must be tried. Star Wars would remain the threat that drives Soviet economic reform.

VIII

The way in which Gorbachev's foreign policy plays out will not, however, depend on him alone. In chess, one must react to an opponent's moves as well as plan one's own, and a combination that is appropriate in one circumstance is not the best in another. It may be that Gorbachev is deliberately postponing some personnel and policy decisions until after the summit in order to judge what he needs to do.

Of course, in drawing on the analogies to chess, we cannot go too far. Gorbachev is playing a different game. In diplomatic chess, one also must conduct one's moves in ways that are as obscure—or more obscure—to onlookers as to one's opponents. President Reagan discovered early in his administration that it was counterproductive in Europe to combine a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union with hard-line rhetoric and an unwillingness to negotiate. He changed his public posture, and the results were gratifying. Gorbachev surely has learned this lesson, and his desire to influence the Europeans will require him, too, to give the appearance of reasonableness toward the United States, regardless of the core of his policy.

Ultimately, however, the real question is: which game is Gorbachev playing? Clearly, he is playing the game of economic reform, and his foreign policy will be heavily influenced by that fact. He will not be able to conduct an effective foreign policy unless he reduces the level of Soviet secrecy. But to what extent does he have the independent goal of integrating Russia back into European civilization? By choosing to open his party congress on the anniversary of Khrushchev's secret speech, he has ensured world press attention to that historic event. He has used other signals, such as naming a lawyer to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences who has written in *Pravda* about the inviolability of the mails and telephone conversations. One of the first *Pravda* editorials after Gorbachev took office emphasized the need for honesty in history; his own acceptance speech highlighted the need for publicity in government.

It is precisely with such an accumulation of subtleties that the Soviet Union initiates major changes in policy, but there are many harbingers that do not have their spring. Economic reform is politically very difficult, and the last thing that Gorbachev will tolerate is organized dissident activity or agi-

tation for free trade unions while reforms are under way. As in the mid-1950s, political change will be contradictory and gradual, if it comes at all. As 1953 was in fact a major watershed, so, in retrospect, we may look back to 1985 as another great divide in Soviet history. At this point, the most we can say with confidence is that the fundamental questions of Russia's relationship to the West are under debate, and that the new Soviet leader is a chess player of a quality that we have not seen for many decades. The West must give the most serious consideration to Gorbachev's strategy and to the best ways to seize the opportunities that are offered and the challenges that are posed.

Marshall I. Goldman

GORBACHEV AND ECONOMIC REFORM

Soviet citizens were probably relieved at the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for he stands in sharp contrast to his aging and ailing predecessors. At 54, he is young enough to be their son. More important, the mortality odds are that he will be around for a decade or more to implement those programs he wants. The likelihood of such continuity is in itself an important change. Also impressive are the speed and the purposefulness with which he has assumed control and addressed himself to the country's problems. This is clearly a man in a hurry who realizes he has to deal with some significant dilemmas, particularly in the economic sphere.

Gorbachev's tasks are not simple. His immediate concern is to halt the industrial decline which set in just before Konstantin Chernenko's death. Production during the early part of 1985, especially in February, was very disappointing. Output dropped in more industries than not. To some extent, this was due to the very cold weather this year, and to the chance of an extra working day in early 1984. But whatever the explanation, the production decline strongly resembled that faced by Yuri Andropov after Leonid Brezhnev's death. Then, as now, the new leader moved with dispatch and immediately began to fire key officials. In the limited period he was in power, Andropov fired over 20 ministers and deputy ministers, along with 20–30 percent of the party and government officials at the local level. This not only served to rid the system of incompetent and corrupt officials but also to warn others that unless they put in more and better efforts they might be next.

In the short run, Andropov's "get tough" strategy worked. Under Brezhnev, Soviet work habits had deteriorated; alcoholism, corruption, inefficiency and disinterest made poor qual-

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ity and decreased output inevitable. As the former head of the KGB, Andropov realized full well the source of the problem and moved quickly to try to correct matters. By emphasizing discipline (in a single speech he used the word "discipline" 13 times), he managed in a few weeks to reverse the drop in production and "to get the country moving again." Like Andropov, Gorbachev has already found that the even stronger medicine he has prescribed has an impact. Economic growth has, in fact, accelerated.

In addition to the emphasis on discipline, however, Gorbachev has added an emphasis on "intensification." By *intensification*, he apparently means *retooling of industry*, but the word in the Soviet context also means more efficient use of equipment, which in turn implies greater discipline as well. Gorbachev stresses the need to intensify the development of the machine tool industry. He apparently believes that if better and more energy-efficient machine tools can be produced, many of the Soviet technological and economic problems will be solved.

II

All of this is fine in the short run, but increasing the output of steel and machine tools does little to fill the Soviet Union's long-run needs. The Soviet Union already produces twice as much steel as the United States and two or three times the number of machine tools. However, the long-run needs of the Soviet Union are much more complex. It is not so much a question of more, but rather of better. The Soviet Union must improve the quality of production and, more important, find some way to foster innovation and master the production of the new high technologies, including information technologies—computers, computer-aided design and manufacturing, microprocessors, fiber optics, ceramics, electronics, copying machines, robots, lasers, optics, and bio- and medical technology, products seldom the center of Gorbachev's concern.

The inability to invent and master the production of such products, or in many instances even to copy their production when imported, is perhaps the Soviet Union's most serious economic shortcoming. The solution to these problems will not come overnight nor will it come about simply from improving discipline. If Gorbachev is to solve the Soviet Union's economic shortcomings, he *must* impose on the country a structural

economic reform—or, as he has called it, “a profound transformation in the economy”—that will set free the Soviet Union’s inventive, productive and investment spirits.¹

The implications of such a far-reaching reform are potentially very disruptive. For a starter, most proposals involve the abandonment of central planning. It is ironic, but because the alternatives are so far-reaching, the more successful Gorbachev is in reinvigorating the Soviet economy in the short run, the more likely he is to encounter opposition to any long-run structural change. If things appear to be going well, why take the risk? This paradox explains the reaction of the chairman of the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN), Nikolai Baibakov, to the improved production results during Andropov’s first few months in power.² When asked about the prospects for extensive reforms, he replied that since the economy was again growing “normally,” there was no need to give up central planning. Since the Soviet Union was growing faster than many Western countries, why give up a good thing?

In some ways, it is too bad that Brezhnev did not live another four or five years. Then the structural shortcomings, which he did nothing to correct, would have been highlighted more and presumably Baibakov would have been less complacent. Baibakov might not have been so smug if the Soviet Union had undergone severe political and economic convulsion comparable to China’s Cultural Revolution, or that experienced by Hungary. After their trauma it was clear to the Hungarians and the Chinese that the status quo, or even marginal improvement, would no longer suffice. Luckily for the Soviet Union, it has so far been spared such trauma, but in the long run, this good fortune may actually impede Gorbachev’s efforts at meaningful change. In other words, the Soviet Union might have been better off if it had been worse off.

For Gorbachev, then, the long-run challenge is the Soviet Union’s inability to master the new high technology that is sweeping the rest of the world. Whereas in the developed and many developing economies the microprocessor is becoming increasingly sophisticated and already has become an essential component of almost everything from toys to production processes, in the Soviet Union it is just beginning to appear.

The Soviet technological lag is compounded by the fact that

¹ *Pravda*, December 11, 1984, p. 2.

² *Pravda*, August 18, 1983, p. 4; *The New York Times*, August 18, 1983, p. 1.

the life cycle for modern high technology products is seldom more than two to three years. That means that today's products become obsolete faster than ever. The rapidity of technological innovation is a significant change from two decades or even a decade ago, when the product life cycle was more likely to stretch a decade or more. In those days, before the advent of cheap semiconductor chips, product change generally meant little more than a change in style or a new set of tail fins. With the advent of process control, minicomputers and robots, even heavy industry operations such as steel mills and automobile factories have changed markedly. Forty years ago, if you had seen one steel mill or one automobile plant, you had seen them all. Today they are continually evolving.

The emphasis on high technology has been accompanied by an increased role for services. Engineers, scientists, secretaries, repairmen, installers, customer representatives, salesmen and consultants have all become a much more important part of the production process. Only about 30 percent of the employees in most high technology companies are actually blue-collar workers. The rest are service employees of one sort or another. That is a very different profile from the one that exists in the traditional heavy industries.

Changing technology and an increasing role for services have become a much more important, if not the most important, ingredient in economic growth. Marx would say that the mode of production has changed, but the Soviets have not yet responded to the changing nature of technology and services. Services, for example, are still regarded as frivolous. The Soviet Union's strength has always been in its ability to mobilize large amounts of capital in an economically poor or backward environment and, year after year, to invest that capital in basic industrial products such as steel mills and machine tool factories. This worked well for decades because technology was so stable. Indeed, the Soviets considered "obsolescence" to be an artificial creation of the capitalist world. Foreign businessmen have been struck by the fact that the Soviets use imported equipment as much as two or three times longer than Western managers operate similar equipment.³ In effect, Soviet managers use one blueprint over and over again. As a number of

³ These are the preliminary findings of an interview project I have been conducting with Western and Japanese businessmen which attempts to examine the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union.

Soviet economists have acknowledged, this was the essence of the Soviet central planning system.⁴

There is little doubt that if technology had remained relatively stable, the Soviet economy probably would have continued to perform well relative to the rest of the world, in much the same fashion as it did until the 1960s, and Gorbachev would have fewer problems. But as Gorbachev himself has acknowledged, "In the early 1970s, pronounced difficulties in [Soviet] economic development became evident."⁵ Technological change has become increasingly important, and as a consequence, the Soviet centralized planning system and the central mobilization and control of capital have become increasingly counterproductive. As Marx would have said, the central plan has become a fetter.

Central planning in the Soviet Union penalizes rather than encourages innovation. Soviet industrial ministers and factory managers have traditionally been rewarded for producing more, rather than improved, products. Any manager who shuts down the production line in order to change models or upgrade product quality risks a drop in production and thus a drop in his or her bonus. Seldom is any bonus provided for better quality. Even when managers want to innovate, they invariably find it impossible to obtain the necessary capital funds for any innovation not anticipated well in advance.

By contrast, what is important in the high-tech industrial world of today is not the centralized mobilization and allocation of capital but flexibility and quick response time. In most societies, response time is usually faster when there are decentralized sources of capital. A few bureaucrats sitting in Moscow making ponderous committee decisions involving massive sums cannot deal with the high risks involved and the rapid product turnover of the high-tech economy. That requires many decision-makers with immediate access to varying quantities of capital.

III

Some Soviet economists are aware of the unsuitability of the Soviet economic system for the new technology. As early as the mid-1960s, when the disparities and the rate of technological change were not as pronounced as they are now, the so-called

⁴ Tat'iana Zaslavskaja, "The Novosibirsk Report," *Survey*, Spring 1984, pp. 91, 95.

⁵ *Pravda*, June 12, 1985, p.1.

Liberman reforms were aired. This was an effort to decentralize control and replace the role of production quotas with a new emphasis on quality and profits. Unfortunately, the reforms were quickly circumscribed by bureaucratic obstruction, and there was little to show for the effort. Yet the debate about the need for reform continued.

More recently, academicians Tat'iana Zaslavskaia and Abel Aganbegian, of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk, have written particularly penetrating analyses of the problem.⁶ Both call for a thorough reassessment of the suitability of the central planning system. Other specialists such as Evgenii Ambartsumov have gone so far as to advocate a return to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of Lenin, with its legalization of a market and small private enterprises.⁷ Outside the U.S.S.R., countries which once adhered to the Soviet economic model—such as Hungary, China and even Bulgaria—now have concluded that progress and industrial competitiveness lie in a different direction. The Chinese have even begun to question the very relevance of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin for some aspects of modern-day economic development.

In contrast, the Soviet bureaucracy staunchly defends central planning.⁸ As unsatisfactory as the present economic situation may be, Soviet authorities worry that meaningful economic change may produce unpredictable results. Reform of the central planning system would almost inevitably mean a greater reliance on the market and on prices. Such a shift brings with it the threat of disruption. Even under the best of circumstances, market systems are afflicted periodically by unemployment and inflation. Certainly this has already happened in Yugoslavia, Hungary and China.

Soviet leaders repeatedly denounce unemployment and inflation as two intolerable aspects of capitalist life. For the record at least, the Soviet Union has no unemployment or inflation. In reality, however, there has been unofficial inflation. One estimate puts it at about four to five percent a year or more. Similarly, there is unemployment, but it is disguised by the inefficient use of workers.

This situation has led Soviet officials periodically to authorize

⁶ Zaslavskaia, *op. cit.*, p.88; *Trud*, August 28, 1984, p. 2; *Izvestia*, June 1, 1985, p. 3.

⁷ Evgenii Ambartsumov, "Analiz V.I. Leninym prichin krizisa 1921 g. i putei vykhoda iz nego," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, April 1984, p. 15.

⁸ E. Bugaev, "Strannaia pozitsiia," *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1984, p. 119; *Pravda*, June 21, 1985, pp. 3-4.

experiments to discover whether enterprises can reduce their work forces and still increase production. The inducement is the promise that the wages not paid to the workers who were fired will be shared, at least in part, by those who stay. When in 1968 the Shchekino chemical plant near Tula significantly reduced the size of the work force and yet increased factory output, it was widely agreed that if similar experiments were introduced in other Soviet factories the same thing would happen.⁹ But even though overemployment is the norm and the Shchekino results were promising, the experiment was not widely replicated.

One explanation has to do with the dynamics of the Soviet bureaucratic system. Soviet planners decided that if the Shchekino factory could do so well by cutting off the first layer of surplus labor, it could do even better by cutting off the second layer and raising the work norm, and so on. Most Soviet managers and workers quickly concluded that the Shchekino example was a treadmill to be avoided.

There was also criticism from those who were fired. A reasonable number simply found jobs elsewhere in the plant. But many workers were not so fortunate. To them, being fired was little different from what happens in the capitalist countries. This was a breach of the implicit social contract that supposedly compensates the Soviet population for a lower standard of living and more stringent political controls.

The social contract provides for law and order and a slow improvement in the standard of living, without inflation and, most significant, without overt unemployment. As the Soviets see it, the right to a job is as important, if not more important, a human right as the right to free speech. That is why the Soviets insist that only their system with its guarantee of full employment offers truly meaningful human rights to its citizens. In fact, the new Soviet constitution adopted in 1977 has a clause guaranteeing each citizen a job. Any reforms that jeopardize this commitment in a significant way are likely to generate enormous bitterness and, ultimately, political protest.

Because the Soviets have been using state control and central planning for almost six decades, the distortions that have developed during that time are considerably more pronounced and thus more difficult to deal with than those facing the Yugoslavs, Chinese and Hungarians, who have had a shorter

⁹ *Pravda*, January 29, 1970, p. 1.

history of using the system. There is no way to measure the exact size of the economic disproportions within the Soviet economy but some idea can be obtained from the size of the subsidies that are paid. The annual subsidy for the production of meat and milk totals 40 billion rubles (about \$52 billion a year), and still there are shortages.¹⁰ The annual housing subsidy totals 6.5 billion rubles (about \$8.5 billion). Similar subsidies are also required in other basic sectors; the coal industry, for instance, continues to operate at a loss, despite a considerable increase in wholesale prices in January 1982.

Another distortion is the large consumer savings. In 1983 the increase in savings bank deposits alone of 12.6 billion to a total of 187 billion rubles actually exceeded the 10-billion ruble increase in retail sales.¹¹ Thus enormous disposable income is available, largely accumulated because of the relatively poor selection of consumer goods in the shops. Were the state to unleash market forces, this disposable income would constitute an enormous potential for inflation.

Some Soviet economists have argued that the transition to a market system need not be so traumatic. It could be done piecemeal, as in Hungary or China. The case of Hungary seems to indicate that piecemeal change is possible without too much disruption. Efforts to reduce the scope of Hungarian central planning began as early as 1957. The role of the market was increased further in 1968, and again recently, without dispensing completely with the central plan.

Can such piecemeal change work in the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union is different enough from Hungary to cause doubt. With some reason, Soviet economists explain that Hungary is much smaller in size and population. The Hungarian population is relatively homogeneous; working with 273 million diverse Soviets versus 11 million Hungarians makes a big difference. Nor should it be forgotten that the last time the Soviets authorized economic and political decentralization was right after the revolution, when several of the republics tried to declare their independence. Much of that sense of nationalism remains today and, in a market-oriented, decentralized economy, might reexpress itself in similar calls for political independence.

¹⁰ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 43, October 1984, p. 15.

¹¹ "Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie," *Narodnoe khoziaistvo CCCP*, v 1983, Moscow 1984, pp. 444, 454.

There are also some questions about just how successful the piecemeal reform in Hungary has actually been. Hungary has done well in agriculture, but Hungarian industry is still a long way from being internationally competitive. Also, the benefits of the reform have not been shared equally. In China as well as Hungary, the private landlord, peasant and shopkeeper classes have profited at the expense of the bureaucracy and the army, engendering considerable resentment.

To reform gradually, the Soviets would have to find ways to integrate the central planning process and the market, each of which leads to different and sometimes contradictory allocation results. In effect, they would have to deal with an economy heading in two different directions at once. A story still being told in Moscow about the effort made to improve Moscow's traffic illustrates the fear of a collision. "The British have an efficient system; let's switch traffic to the left side of the road," argued one Moscow authority. A wiser head warned that the switch might be too confusing if made at once. Instead, he proposed that only trucks and taxis with the most experienced drivers move to the left during the first stage of the experiment. Passenger automobiles would continue on the right side of the road for another six months, so they could prepare themselves, at which time they too would move to the left.

Not surprisingly, some of the initiatives adopted by Andropov and emphasized by Gorbachev, designed to "enhance the independence of enterprise," collide with the realities of the central planning system. The reform of July 26, 1983, initiated by Andropov, allowed a few industries to take a portion of their profits and place the money in a special development fund. The money from this fund was to be used by the manager to supplement the machinery assigned to him by the central planners. It was Andropov's assumption that a measure of this sort would stimulate enterprise managers to greater productivity and innovation.

As anticipated, the enterprise managers accumulated large sums of rubles in their development funds. They soon discovered, however, that those rubles had no value.¹² In a centrally planned economy, it is not money but allocation authorization that counts. As S. A. Sitaryan, the vice chairman of GOSPLAN, pointed out, "It is all very well to tell enterprises they should

¹² *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 28, July 1984, p. 8; No. 31, July 1984, p. 6; No. 35, August 1984, p. 8.

use the development fund to improve their technical equipment. But unless the development fund also provides the enterprise with the actual material resources, the whole effort is meaningless."¹³ In other words, it is not as easy as it might seem to graft features of a market economy onto a centrally planned economy.

If piecemeal reform is difficult, why not a comprehensive change? Some Soviet economic theorists argue that a massive switch from the central plan to the market can be implemented without enormous price fluctuations and significant unemployment, provided known monetary and fiscal tools are used. In theory at least, a skillful monetarist might be able to drain excess money from the system. This would take much of the pressure off prices and prevent too many windfalls. Yet even if the monetarist approach proved effective, it is hard to see how the Soviets would be able to reduce their output of obsolete steel without closing down some Soviet steel mills—and therefore generating unemployment. Conversely, the start-up of production of highly sought-after products such as computers or blue jeans would most certainly command high prices and, for a time at least, create windfall profits.

Theoretically, sophisticated monitoring of monetary and fiscal policy may reduce the magnitude of the disproportion, but since such techniques have not been used since the revolution, where will Soviet leaders find anyone with the requisite monetary and fiscal skill to implement such policies? Assigning a Soviet official the task of fine-tuning the economy by using money supply and tax policy measures would be like assigning a railroad engineer who has never flown before to fly a Boeing 747. It is not impossible, but it has its risks.

There is also the question of whether Soviet citizens will be responsive to less paternalistic economic stimuli. For over six decades now, Soviet workers have learned to live with a system that has discouraged initiative. A system that requires more responsiveness on the part of the individual workers is likely to meet with resistance. Admittedly, the growth of the second, or underground, economy in the Soviet Union indicates that there are still many Soviet citizens who have no trouble adjusting to a market environment. Yet success in the second economy does not necessarily entail an ability to cope with the market system as a prevailing norm. As a minimum, it is likely that the

¹³ *Pravda*, October 2, 1984, p. 2.

transition period would be difficult and lengthy, which means that Gorbachev would need patience and persistence in the face of confusion, qualities that his predecessors have not shown.

Nor can it be assumed that if agriculture were to be decollectivized, as in China, the Soviet peasant would respond as positively as the Chinese peasant. Unlike the Soviet peasant, the Chinese peasant uses very little machinery, chemical fertilizer or other capital inputs; Chinese agriculture is much more labor intensive. This means that it is not enough simply to unleash the Soviet peasant. For there to be a meaningful change in Soviet agriculture, something will have to be done simultaneously to "unleash" the market so that the newly motivated Soviet peasant will be able to obtain the necessary machinery, seed, fertilizer and storage facilities.

IV

So far our discussion of the reform measures Gorbachev must undertake has focused primarily on how he must increase managerial and worker initiative. That is essential, but nonetheless only a first step. If Gorbachev intends to make the Soviet Union a contender in the world of rapidly changing high technology, he must also alter the way capital is accumulated and allocated. In effect, he must open the Soviet Union's capital markets. This is so far-reaching in its implications that even the most thoughtful Soviet economists have avoided discussion of its ramifications. This may be because of their inability to appreciate the need for such a step or because they are worried about the ideological implications.

The Soviet system of centralized capital mobilization and allocation is counterproductive in the new age of high technology. The best way to generate greater flexibility, faster response time and an emphasis on service is to create a large number of independent decision-making bodies. But if this were done in the U.S.S.R., it would mean the breakup of the state monopoly over capital resources. Even that might be tolerable if it were still possible to retain control over the subcontractors. In all likelihood, however, once local authorities gained actual control over capital, the power of the central authorities would weaken. As this happened, priorities would be likely to change.

It is unlikely that the local authorities would continue to place so much emphasis on heavy industry and military expen-

ditures. Having been deprived for six decades of material conveniences, local decision-makers both in industry and agriculture will find it hard to resist self-indulgence if they have the opportunity to make their own investment decisions. This is what seems to be happening in China. Professor Nicholas Lardy of the University of Washington reports that, now that the peasants have money to invest, 50–60 percent of their funds are going into peasant housing, rather than into production. Stalin warned Bukharin in the 1920s that there would be a similar diversion of resources if the peasants were not collectivized.

Decentralized investment in turn would be likely to spawn decentralized efforts, as in China and Hungary, to raise capital. This could lead to the creation of a capital or even a stock market to facilitate the generation and channeling of those funds. As ideologically far-fetched as it may be, the Hungarians have already established a rudimentary bond exchange associated with the state development bank; the Chinese are debating the implications of reopening the Shanghai stock exchange and have already had two public stock offerings.¹⁴

Once a communist country has embarked on a course of far-reaching economic reform, it is hard to see how such ideologically distasteful measures can be avoided for long. If for no other reason, a financial market is needed to provide a balancing or rationing function. One problem continually plaguing communist countries without a developed financial market is the overexpenditure of capital funds. Again, this is not a malady unique to communist countries, but it seems to be more of a problem for those economies without developed financial markets than for those with them. Granted, as recently as five years ago there were few who would have suggested seriously that Hungary and China would even be discussing such steps today. Nevertheless, in its role as defender of the faith, the economic and ideological implications for the Soviet Union of taking such steps are reason enough to question whether the Soviets will ever even attempt such heretical measures.

V

The Soviet bureaucracy is perhaps the greatest obstacle to economic reform because such reform threatens their hold on

¹⁴ *The Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 1984, p. 34, November 15, 1984, p. 36, July 12, 1985, p. 26; *The Boston Globe*, May 7, 1985, p. 4.

power and their economic well-being. Any reform which attempts to separate economic activity from state administrative control promises to be particularly disruptive. Vast power, heretofore the domain of the bureaucracy, would be transferred to the market and individual enterprise managers. Consequently, the natural temptation on the part of the presiding bureaucrat is to obstruct rather than facilitate such a transition. Short of some radical purge or institutional upheaval, the likelihood is that party and bureaucratic interference will continue as before. Gorbachev will not find it any easier to deal with the Soviet bureaucracy than did his predecessors.

It is instructive to examine how the Chinese and Hungarian bureaucrats behave when confronted with an encroachment on their prerogatives. Resentful of the new power and wealth of the small entrepreneur, local Chinese authorities in Manchuria, for example, have begun to impose a multitude of taxes on the newly created private enterprises.¹⁵ The new taxes include levies for the care of drunkards, for colored lanterns and for gardening. However ennobling the purpose, these taxes eat away at the incentives for the newly established entrepreneurs and thus undermine the whole effort. Hungarian bureaucrats have adopted similar tactics. On the one hand, party and state officials "enunciate new policies" and, on the other hand, they "interfere with their implementation" by "siphoning off the profits" or by "the expropriating of local tax revenues."¹⁶

János Kornai, a Hungarian economist, has emphasized how bureaucratic interference subverts the effort to give greater independence to enterprise managers. He finds that the more the bureaucracy interferes, the less willing managers are to assert their independence and respond solely to market mechanisms. There is a critical point beyond which too much administrative interference negates the effect of the market, which in turn then renders meaningless price and other economic stimuli.

Even if the market were to operate unimpeded, there is no guarantee that Soviet managers would respond properly. Few of them have ever experienced a market environment. To operate in a centrally planned system requires one set of skills—

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, September 15, 1984, p. 2. The Chinese say, "It is like having too many mothers-in-law."

¹⁶ Rudolph P. Tokes, "Hungarian Reform Implications," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984, p. 10.

the ability to procure supplies and produce quantity, whereas to operate in a market environment requires another—the ability to cater to and generate demand, and to produce quality and variety. There is no reason why those with one set of skills should necessarily have the other. Thus, those who have succeeded within the Soviet system, which prizes the ability to produce quantitatively, have reason to fear that they will be unable to succeed in a system that prizes the ability to produce qualitatively. Consequently, their opposition to change and the unknown is understandable.

In addition to losing political power, both enterprise managers and party and state bureaucrats have reason to fear a diminution in their relative status as consumers. Heretofore, only the *nomenklatura*, or elite, have had access to the special shops of the communist world. There they find the best the state has to offer at officially set low prices. The other members of society generally do without or on occasion worm their way through the second economy.

With an open economy, the special shops will lose their meaning. Access to quality goods will no longer be a question of status but of money. In all probability, the higher-quality and more imaginative goods will find their way to the private markets and fetch higher prices. This is already the case in China and Hungary, where there is resentment at the ill-gotten gains of the “money-grubbing” and newly rich shopkeepers.¹⁷ As one member of a leading cadre family in Beijing complained to me last summer, as a result of the reform “the poor have become rich, and the rich have become poor.” Such a reversal of roles has obvious potential for political disruption.

VI

Finally, there is the problem of how any Soviet economic reform will deal with foreign economic influences. It is hard to see how the Soviets can continue to isolate themselves if they hope to keep abreast of current technology and export something other than raw materials. Any thoroughgoing reform is likely to involve much more interaction with the outside capitalist world than has been the case thus far. More interaction, however, will expose Soviet products to enormous competitive pressures—something they have been spared. To an economist

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9; *The New York Times*, October 14, 1984, p. 3, October 21, 1984, p. 1, and April 10, 1983, p. 12; *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 1984, p. 37.

interested in significant change, that is not such a bad thing. Indeed, a meaningful reform will seek to use the stimulus of foreign competition to generate improved quality and cost reduction among domestic producers. However, since the Soviet market until now has been completely sheltered, such an opening, even if made gently, would undoubtedly come as an enormous shock that would be reflected in numerous plant closings. This may explain why the Soviets have given so little thought to such foreign interaction when discussing economic reform.

Then there is the issue of foreign ownership. Will the Soviets allow joint ventures? This has proved to be one of the best ways to transfer and upgrade technology. It also spares the host country having to put up all the investment funds. So far, however, the Soviets have been the most rigid of all the communist countries in rejecting foreign input. Unlike Hungary, which allows foreigners to hold up to 49 percent ownership, or China, which now even tolerates 100 percent ownership, the Soviets have been hostile to the joint venture concept. In the 1970s, Soviet authorities, including several members of the Politburo, debated long and hard about entering into a joint venture with the Bendix Corporation to make automobile parts. Ultimately, they decided against the venture.

To allow foreigners to establish even partial ownership or management of Soviet facilities would make it much more difficult to insulate the population from foreign ideas and practices. The number of foreign businessmen and technicians would increase, and they would be much more intimately involved with the native work force. The KGB already has problems enough simply tolerating the presence of foreign salesmen. In a 1981 article in the journal *Kommunist*, the former first vice chairman of the KGB, S. Tsvigun, attacked one foreign businessman, who at the time was serving as a representative of the Burroughs Corporation, for trying to subvert the interest of the state.¹⁸ Imagine what would happen if manufacturers roamed around the Soviet Union looking for customers and suppliers. As it is, the custom of offering gifts and/or bribes in exchange for foreign trade contracts is already troublesome.

¹⁸ S. Tsvigun, "O proiskakh imperialisticheskikh razvedok," *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1981, p. 94.

VII

The challenge of high technology and what it represents is both a threat and a stimulus for Gorbachev and his generation. If the Soviet Union is to continue as a world economic power, the Soviets must master the new technology; but mastery will necessitate a fundamental change in the existing incentive and central planning process that will bring with it a host of economic, political and social consequences that are likely to threaten the very essence of the Soviet system. Yet because of the nature of the new high technology, the longer Gorbachev waits, the harder it will be to catch up.

Until recently it was widely accepted that there were advantages to being industrially backward.¹⁹ Let someone else make the costly mistakes that come with innovation, then import the latest technology and leapfrog ahead. That seemed to work in an era when technological changes came slowly and did not generate as much change as the computer and microprocessor industries do now. Given how the new fast-moving technologies complement one another, it becomes dangerous to fall too far behind. The Soviet Union runs the danger of becoming caught in what might be called a “systems trap”: it is as if the rest of the world has accommodated itself to an AC electrical system while the Soviets are still on DC—conversion to the AC system requires a complete overhaul, not just the installation of one or two AC appliances.

The “systems trap” helps to explain why the Soviets have had a hard time keeping up with the computer and information revolution. Computer use and mastery works best when computers are interactive—i.e., when they communicate with one another. But such interaction requires a good communications system, particularly via telephone lines. In turn, an advanced telephone and communications system requires the extensive use of computers in the servicing of that network. It is not surprising, therefore, that neither has flourished in the Soviet environment. Since neither has been properly updated, it is now difficult to bring in one advanced component because it will be incompatible with the rest of the system.

The same “systems trap” helps also to explain the Soviet lag in developing a copier industry. Copiers in the Soviet Union

¹⁹ Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness In Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 362–363.

are limited in number and are almost all of an early vintage; they are largely mechanically operated, with few if any of the electronic components that now govern the operation of modern-day copying systems. The mechanical machines serve Soviet short-run needs very well, because repairs can be made with non-electronic engineers. However, their dominance means that very few engineers are being trained to deal with machinery with electronic components and the support systems that prevail elsewhere in the world.

In addition to the economic complications, there are also ideological and security obstacles. Soviet authorities have closely regulated the use of computers and copiers for fear that they might lead to the creation of underground communications networks outside their control.²⁰ Given the present political system, it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to install a communications network and expect it to be system-friendly for computer and copier use.

In sum, Gorbachev will probably continue to hold out the vision of fundamental economic reform, but the likelihood is that he will have to settle for considerably less. He should be able to arrange for somewhat more private activity on the farms. He should also be able to manage an increase in the resources set aside for consumption, and he may also be able to increase the decision-making powers of the factory managers. But such reforms are unlikely to impinge on, much less transform, the central planning system and make it more responsive or innovative. As a consequence, the Soviet Union is likely to fall further and further behind.

The lack of far-reaching economic reform does not mean the system will necessarily collapse. With piecemeal reform the Soviets can anticipate a moderate economic growth. However, this growth will most probably be limited to the domain of the old technology, which even by Soviet standards will leave a lot to be desired. But unless the food supply system breaks down, the Soviet Union should be able to avoid political unrest and will probably continue to limp along as it has for the last decade or so. The fact that the Soviet Union has a rich raw material base should help finance such improvements and also allow the Soviets to buy some of the technology they themselves are unable to innovate.

²⁰ Loren Graham, "The Soviet Union Is Missing Out on the Computer Revolution," *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1984, p. C1.

Yet the fact remains that, without fundamental change in the existing incentive and central planning process, there is little likelihood that the Soviets will even be capable of the kind of product enhancement that the East Asian countries have achieved. This may be tolerable to the Soviet people, particularly if the rest of the world should experience an economic slowdown. But if the outside world—both capitalist and socialist countries, and especially China—shows vigorous growth and technological advancement, the pressure on the Soviet government to do something more far-reaching will grow.

Even so, while it may be acceptable for Gorbachev to allow experimentation by his satellite, Hungary, the Soviet Union, in its perceived role as “defender of the faith,” will be under pressure to hold itself to more orthodox standards. That does not rule out change, but at the least it makes it more difficult to adopt the kind of radical reform being attempted by the Chinese. Moreover, the fact that the Chinese have acted first is awkward. Under the best of circumstances, it will be difficult for Gorbachev to follow the Chinese path, particularly if that path leads to what the rest of the world views as capitalism.

Gorbachev can probably settle for considerably less than the fundamental reforms he seems to envision. However, the longer he waits to transform the Soviet system economically and technologically, the larger the gap between the Soviet Union and the rest of the industrialized world is likely to grow, and the more difficult and traumatic the reform process will ultimately be.

Susan Kaufman Purcell

DEMYSTIFYING CONTADORA

Contadora is the code word used to mean the pursuit of peace in Central America through negotiations. Its main alternatives are widely believed to be a U.S. invasion, a regional war or both. Like motherhood and apple pie, Contadora is liked and supported by everyone.

Why, then, has a negotiated settlement within the Contadora framework proved so elusive? Critics of U.S. Central American policy argue that a diplomatic solution requires support from Washington and that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, Washington opposes Contadora because a Contadora treaty would prohibit unilateral action by the United States in protection of its interests. The facts are more complex than this reasoning conveys. The U.S. government remains divided, with some saying that an imperfect treaty is better than no treaty and others arguing that no treaty is better. For their part, the countries of the Contadora group—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama—are divided in their interests and strategies. Some of them share the fears and ambivalence of the United States, though they have taken great pains to conceal this fact; the domestic political costs of agreeing with the United States in Central American matters are not negligible.

The impression that the United States and the Contadora Four have few shared interests leads to two opposite conclusions: either the Contadora process is a waste of time, since the United States will ultimately impose its own solution on Central America, or Contadora still offers a good solution, if only the United States would support it. The reality is somewhere in between. Over the past two and a half years, the Contadora Four have been obliged to move beyond empty rhetoric to deal with the complexities of designing a treaty that takes account of the interests of the Central American countries and the

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United States. In the process, despite all the significant obstacles that remain, they have increased the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Central America.

II

Contadora refers to both a regional grouping and the negotiating process in which it is engaged. The Contadora group was originally created in January 1983, at the initiative of Colombian President Belisario Betancur, as a diplomatic alternative to the conflict escalating in the region. Nicaragua was aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas. In response, the United States organized the "contras," who were increasing their forays into Nicaragua from Honduras. The U.S. military presence and activities in the region were beginning to expand. The Contadora countries feared that the Sandinistas would retaliate against the contras and draw Honduras, and then the United States, into open armed conflict that might eventually spill over into the rest of Central America.

Contadora aimed to fill a diplomatic vacuum. The Sandinistas have preferred not to work with the Organization of American States (OAS) since they believe the United States still controls its members, despite considerable evidence to the contrary. They favor the United Nations, where the dominant Third World coalition is sure to favor Nicaragua over the United States. For this reason, the United Nations has been an unacceptable mediator for the United States, which strongly advocates hemispheric solutions to hemispheric problems.

By joining forces under the Contadora umbrella, the regional powers believed that they might be able to constrain the United States from its habitual unilateral actions and thereby enhance their own role. They also hoped to offer a different interpretation of events in Central America. They believed that the United States, as a global and non-Latin power, tended to impose an East-West perspective on conflicts that essentially involved such North-South issues as poverty, inequality and exploitation. Their de-emphasis of the Soviet threat was understandable, since the United States, not the Soviet Union, had traditionally been seen as the danger to the countries of the region.

Finally, the Contadora countries had a record of successful joint efforts. In 1976, Omar Torrijos of Panama had enlisted the support of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, as well as Costa Rica, to generate Latin American support for the Panama

Canal treaties. Three years later, these same countries persuaded the not-yet-victorious Sandinistas to commit themselves to political pluralism, a mixed economy and international non-alignment in return for their support. In 1981, Torrijos again brought the group together, shortly before his death, to pressure the Sandinistas to abide by their commitment.

In January 1983, the presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama met on the Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss the deteriorating situation in Central America. Their meeting marked the formal beginning of the Contadora group.

The Contadora Four were not interested in protecting U.S. security interests in Central America. On the contrary, they were reluctant to acknowledge publicly that the United States even had legitimate security interests in the region. They had no such qualms about speaking publicly of the legitimate security interests of Nicaragua. In fact, the regional powers had joined forces precisely to counter a real or imaginary U.S. military threat against Nicaragua.

Since then, observers have repeatedly pronounced the Contadora process dead or dying. They take at face value the frustration of the participants who keep encountering new, seemingly intractable problems each time they solve old ones. They fail to understand that Contadora's mere existence is useful. It allows the four participating governments to affirm that they have kept the United States at bay and have avoided a regional war. This makes it difficult for any of them to desert the negotiating process. At the same time, the costs of failure are relatively low. If diplomacy leads nowhere, the Contadora countries can say that they did their best, but the hegemonic pretensions of the United States made their best not good enough.

III

The Contadora Four had first become active in Central America in the late 1970s. Venezuela, Colombia and Panama had helped arm Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza's opponents and all four had worked hard to isolate Somoza internationally. Yet the Four's familiarity with Central America remained limited. Contadora has helped teach them about Central America and about each other. It has also shown them that it is far easier to call for a diplomatic solution than to create one.

Contadora has forged a consensus around a number of objectives that could constitute the basis for a negotiated settlement. These are embodied in the 21 points of the Document of Objectives of September 1983, calling for democracy and national reconciliation, an end to support for paramilitary forces across borders, control of the regional arms race, reduction of foreign military advisers and troops, and prohibition of foreign military bases. These goals were incorporated into the draft treaty or "Acta" of September 7, 1984, which Nicaragua quickly accepted and the United States just as quickly rejected. These starkly different reactions created the impression that Nicaragua favored a negotiated settlement and the United States did not.

In fact, the United States rejected the Acta because it was a vague statement of goals without concrete limits on Nicaraguan action. Its provisions for verification and enforcement were totally inadequate, and it deferred negotiations on foreign military and security advisers and arms and troop reductions until after signature of the treaty. On the other hand, it required the United States upon signature to cease military exercises and support for the contras. Further military aid to El Salvador and Honduras was frozen, while Nicaragua was allowed to maintain its military advantage over these two countries. The provisions for democratization and internal reconciliation were hortatory and unenforceable as drafted. They would have allowed the Sandinistas to claim that the Nicaraguan elections scheduled for November 1984 were in compliance with the Acta despite charges by the democratic opposition, led by Arturo Cruz, that the electoral process was rigged.

Nicaragua accepted the Acta as a final document, not a draft for discussion, because it asked little of Nicaragua immediately and left no possibility for Nicaragua to be pressured in post-signature negotiations. Accepting the Acta also improved Nicaragua's image internationally, just as the U.S. Congress was to vote on aid for the contras and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega was to address the U.N. General Assembly.

When Nicaragua surprised U.S. friends in Central America by accepting the Acta, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica began drafting what became the Act of Tegucigalpa of October 1984—a substitute draft that sought to correct what they and the United States had seen as the main problems of the September 1984 Acta. The timetable for disarmament and demilitar-

ization procedures was changed to produce more simultaneous action on these issues, and the role of the Central American governments in the verification and enforcement processes was enhanced. The Nicaraguans immediately rejected the October draft and repeated that they would not accept any substantive changes in the September Acta. That is still their position at this writing.

With the process at an impasse, the Contadora countries looked to the bilateral talks in Manzanillo, Mexico, between the United States and Nicaragua to achieve a breakthrough. In the penultimate round in late 1984, Nicaragua hinted that it was willing to be flexible on key security issues in a strictly bilateral agreement. The United States pointed out that Nicaragua logically could not enter into two contradictory agreements, and eventually concluded that Nicaragua was proposing at Manzanillo the substitution of a limited bilateral agreement on security issues for a comprehensive Contadora agreement. It therefore suspended the bilateral talks in January 1985 to emphasize multilateral discussions within Contadora.

This worked for a time. In April 1985 an agreement in principle was reached on revised verification procedures involving concessions by both Nicaragua and the Central American drafters of the Tegucigalpa Act. But the negotiations bogged down again in the summer of 1985, when Nicaragua once more tried to substitute a series of bilateral security agreements for Contadora's comprehensive agenda. Nicaragua favors such an approach to avoid the issue of democratization and internal reconciliation, a shorthand term for talks between the Sandinistas and the armed and unarmed opponents (including the contras) leading to their eventual incorporation into a democratized political process.

Democratization and internal reconciliation may well be the most difficult issue of all, because it would, in the words of President Reagan, "overthrow the Nicaraguan government, in the sense of changing its structure." The Sandinistas, however, say it is a non-issue; they will not deal with the contras and Nicaragua is already democratic.

The democratization/internal reconciliation issue is also at the heart of the division within the U.S. government. While there is consensus that a more democratic Nicaragua would be more likely to abide by a negotiated settlement, the debate is over the more fundamental question of whether it is possible to democratize Nicaragua at all. Some argue that Nicaragua

can be made to accept democratization and internal reconciliation under pressure and want the United States to hold firm for such an outcome. Others doubt that the Sandinistas will ever incorporate the rebels and democratize. They believe that the United States should therefore accept a treaty that deals with the conventional security issues but not with democratization and internal reconciliation.

The so-called Reagan Peace Plan of April 4, 1985, came out squarely in favor of continuing to press for democratization and internal reconciliation. President Reagan was not about to abandon the Nicaraguan "freedom fighters"; he called for a cease-fire and talks between the Nicaraguan government and the rebels. At the same time, he asked Congress to release an appropriation of \$14 million in humanitarian aid for the rebels, which the United States would only make available if the talks did not succeed by June 1, 1985. The plan failed to obtain sufficient backing from Congress, which denied aid at that time, and from the Contadora Four, who wanted nothing to do with a plan that included aid for the contras. The Reagan Administration continues to emphasize the need to include democratization and internal reconciliation in any treaty. Progress thus depends on whether the Contadora process can devise such a treaty.

IV

The Contadora Four enjoy an image of unity. They oppose a military solution and unilateral action by the United States. They seek a negotiated settlement to end the fighting. They also believe that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is here to stay and that its future, particularly its international alignment, can be influenced by outside actors. Beyond this consensus, however, there are important differences among the Four, which reflect their particular historical experiences as well as the political constraints they face domestically.

Mexico. Mexico's position has been most at odds with that of the United States. Although critical of Washington for supporting right-wing dictators in Central America and for failing to help eradicate poverty and injustice, in policy terms Mexico has not behaved very differently from the United States. Mexico has not actively supported right-wing dictators, but it did nothing to undermine their rule until the late 1970s, when it withdrew recognition from the disintegrating Somoza regime. Nor did Mexico pursue an active or generous aid program

toward the area. In fact, Mexico “discovered” Central America at about the same time the United States did, belying the myth that Mexico knows and understands Central America better than the United States does.

Mexico’s policy toward the Sandinistas has been protective and empathetic. As a country that had experienced its own modern revolution, Mexico could not condemn other revolutions. Mexico had also suffered multiple U.S. interventions and lost half its territory to its northern neighbor. It therefore sympathized with the Sandinistas’ fear of a U.S. invasion or intervention in their affairs. Precisely because of its historical relationship with the United States, Mexico had earlier adopted a foreign policy based on the principles of nonintervention and self-determination. It applied them to the Nicaraguan revolution when it occurred in July 1979.

Mexico’s definition of nonintervention, however, was tailored to its policy preferences. Mexico did not consider itself to be intervening in Central American affairs when it withdrew recognition from Somoza or joined in the Franco-Mexican declaration of August 1981 that recognized the Salvadoran rebels as a “representative political force.”

Mexico’s support of the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran rebels reflected its belief that revolutionary governments in Central America, including communist ones, would not threaten Mexico’s interests. It felt confident that it could establish friendly relations with such governments, as it had done earlier with Cuba. Mexico might even gain influence if left-wing governments triumphed in Central America. The United States would have little, if any, influence over such governments; Mexico, in contrast, could work with them and possibly replace the United States as the most important power in the region.

Finally, Mexico rejected the theory that it was the “last domino” that would fall if Marxist revolutionaries were successful in Central America. Mexico correctly viewed itself as different from its southern neighbors, considerably larger and more developed, with a more differentiated social structure. And, with the exception of Costa Rica, its political system was more effective and responsive than those in Central America.

Mexico’s actions were, nevertheless, marked by a gap between rhetoric and reality. The Mexicans pursued a very different policy toward the right-wing military regime of Guatemala than toward other right-wing governments in the re-

gion. Mexico has neither broken with nor publicly criticized the government in Guatemala City; nor has it called Guatemala's Marxist guerrillas "a representative political force." Also, despite Mexico's rejection of the domino theory, it has reinforced its military presence along its southern border and implemented the so-called Plan Chiapas to help improve the standard of living of Mexican peasants in the lands bordering on Guatemala.¹

Over the past year, the perception has grown that Mexico's policy toward both the Sandinistas and Central America in general has changed. The presence of Mexico's foreign minister at the inauguration of President José Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador is often cited. The fact that Mexico no longer supplies petroleum to the Sandinistas on terms more favorable to Nicaragua than to other clients is another example. Mexico also has become less tolerant of the political representatives of the Salvadoran guerrillas operating in Mexico. President Miguel de la Madrid has also begun to balance references to U.S. intervention in Central America with references to Cuban intervention.² And he seems less eager than his predecessor, José López Portillo, to engage in high-level meetings with Fidel Castro.

Mexico claims that its policy has not changed, but that circumstances in Central America and Mexico have changed. Yet the policy has also evolved. Under López Portillo, Mexico's initial unquestioning support for the Sandinistas, as well as its de-emphasis of the need for political pluralism in Nicaragua, had made Mexico ever more isolated within the Contadora group. Also, as growing numbers of refugees crossed the border into Mexico, Central America increasingly became transformed from a foreign policy issue to a domestic one. Ministries other than the Foreign Ministry became involved, weakening the previous consensus behind the government's approach and pushing it to adopt a more balanced policy toward Central America.

This shift does not mean that Mexico has abandoned the Sandinistas. Mexico does not want to drive the Sandinistas out

¹ For a fuller discussion of the Mexican military's role in southern Mexico, see César Sereseres, "The Mexican Military Looks South," in David Ronfeldt, ed., *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment*, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1984, pp. 201-13.

² Miguel de la Madrid H., "Mexico: The New Challenges," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, p. 71.

of the negotiating process and into total isolation. Mexico was therefore critical of the October 1984 treaty drafted by the Central American allies of the United States because it feared that Nicaragua would abandon the Contadora process if it did not get favorable treatment. Mexico also supported the Sandinistas' stress on the importance of having bilateral talks with the United States. The Manzanillo talks were in part the result of a personal initiative by President de la Madrid during his visit to Washington in May 1984. Mexico therefore continues to work for a balanced settlement in Central America.

Venezuela. The Contadora country whose position has been most at odds with that of Mexico, and closest to the United States, is Venezuela. Unlike Mexico, Venezuela does not consider itself a revolutionary country; instead, its sense of identity is strongly based on its evolution into one of the most important democracies of the hemisphere. Support for the principle of democratization has been considerably more important in Venezuela, therefore, than it has been in Mexico. Venezuela has also been much more distrustful of Marxist revolutionaries than Mexico, since for years Marxist guerrillas had threatened the survival of Venezuela's democracy. Venezuela believed that democratic government could not develop in El Salvador if the guerrillas remained unchecked.³ Venezuela also has been wary of Cuba because of Havana's earlier support of Venezuelan guerrillas.

Unlike Mexico, Venezuela admitted from the beginning that the Central American conflict had implications for Venezuelan security and required a strategic, as well as an economic, political and social, response. For this reason, Venezuela sent military advisers to El Salvador. (The decision was facilitated because Christian Democratic presidents were in power in both Venezuela and El Salvador.) This policy became politically unsustainable after the United States sided with Britain during the 1982 Falklands War. Nevertheless, even after the transfer of the presidency to a Social Democrat, Venezuela's policy toward Central America did not change dramatically. Venezuela distanced itself initially from the interim government of Alvaro Magaña in El Salvador, when right-wing elements seemed ascendant. But once Christian Democrat Duarte was

³ Margaret Daly Hayes, "Regional Perceptions of the Central American Situation," working paper for the November 8, 1983, meeting of the Study Group on Central America, Council on Foreign Relations.

elected president, even Venezuela's Social Democratic regime supported him.

Venezuela also favored the incorporation of the Salvadoran guerrillas into the electoral process and, like the United States, opposed negotiated power-sharing. Venezuela had, after all, successfully incorporated its own guerrillas into its electoral process, and some had even been elected to important public offices.

As the Sandinistas became more authoritarian and closely tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union, Venezuela became more openly critical of them. More recently, it has terminated shipments of subsidized petroleum to Nicaragua and has increased its assistance to democratic elements in the labor movement, the church, universities and the private sector in Nicaragua. Former President Carlos Andrés Pérez, a prominent leader of the Latin American Social Democratic movement who has been highly critical of U.S. policy in the region, refused to attend Ortega's inauguration as president of Nicaragua to express his displeasure with the path that the Sandinistas were taking. Still, Venezuela has not yet given up on the possibility of some degree of political pluralism in Nicaragua.

The dramatic differences between Venezuela and Mexico demonstrate the fallacy in the judgment that the Contadora Four are united in opposition to the U.S. approach to Central America. Venezuela, in fact, shares some of the basic premises that underlie U.S. policy toward Central America.

Yet neither Venezuela nor Mexico wishes to see the United States return to the highly interventionist role it played in Latin America in the past. Both would like a solution that would avoid U.S. military intervention or other forms of unilateral U.S. action. The main differences between the Venezuelan and Mexican positions is that Venezuela seems more willing and able to cooperate on military-security dimensions with the United States than is Mexico, and Caracas places more importance than does Mexico City on the need to democratize the Nicaraguan government. At the very least, Venezuelans are divided over whether a Marxist regime poses a security threat and if so, whether Venezuela should play a military role in changing or containing it.

Colombia. The country whose attitudes and behavior changed most substantially with a change of governments is Colombia. Under former Liberal Party President Julio César Turbay, Colombia was supportive of U.S. policy toward Central Amer-

ica. In part, this reflected a traditional tendency on the part of his party to work closely with the United States. Turbay himself distrusted the Sandinistas' expansionist inclinations, particularly toward a number of Colombian islands claimed by Nicaragua. President Reagan backed Colombia in its conflict with Nicaragua, which reinforced cooperation between the two governments.

Colombia is the only Contadora country with an immediate guerrilla problem. Turbay had promulgated a National Security Statute less than one month after his inauguration in 1978. The attempted military solution to Colombia's guerrilla problem failed and so Turbay's successor, Belisario Betancur, tried a completely new tack when he took office in 1982.⁴

Betancur's goal was to negotiate amnesty for the guerrillas in return for their peaceful incorporation into the political system. The new president believed that such a deal would not be possible while Colombia continued to align itself with the United States, whose Central American policy seemed to emphasize defeat of guerrillas by military means. On his inauguration day, he distanced himself from the United States by announcing that Colombia would apply for admission to the Non-Aligned Movement, chaired at that time by Fidel Castro. He also called for the restructuring of the OAS so as to exclude the United States and include Cuba. These steps paved the way for a new strategy for dealing with the guerrillas at home.

In pursuit of his new domestic policy, Betancur successfully engaged the services of Nobel Prize laureate Gabriel García Márquez, who was close to Castro as well as to the Sandinistas. The idea was to get Castro and the Sandinistas to encourage Colombia's guerrillas to negotiate the terms of an amnesty with the Colombian government. If successful, the strategy would end Colombia's guerrilla problem and neutralize Cuba and Nicaragua, in the sense of ensuring their noncooperation with guerrilla groups in Colombia.

Betancur was trying to "Mexicanize" Colombia's foreign policy. By pursuing a "progressive" foreign policy that included friendly relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, Betancur hoped

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of Colombia and Contadora see Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, "Contadora, Colombia y Centroamérica," a paper presented at a conference on Regional Approaches to the Central American Crisis, co-sponsored by El Colegio de México and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in Toluca, Mexico, May 1985.

to discourage their support for the Colombian guerrillas and encourage them to cooperate with his government.

Betancur paralleled his domestic strategy toward the guerrillas with a more active role for Colombia within the Contadora group. Attracted to the role of international peacemaker, Betancur traveled incessantly throughout the region, engaging in marathon talks with governments and rebels, as well as with the other three Contadora countries and the United States. The last such effort ended in Washington, D.C., in April 1985, the same day President Reagan announced his peace plan. President Betancur endorsed the plan, but qualified (or some would say retracted) his endorsement several days later by stating that he could not side with the United States in supporting the contras. Since the plan clearly included a role for the contras from the beginning, Betancur had either endorsed it before reading it carefully or was persuaded to distance himself from the United States once the other Contadora countries objected to it.

Betancur's domestic policies continue to be debated within Colombia. Critics contend that they are failing. Although Betancur succeeded in signing truces with Colombia's two main guerrilla groups, one of them subsequently changed its mind. There is also evidence that some of the guerrilla groups used the amnesty to regroup and rearm. Betancur has so far rejected the use of force or pressure to achieve his objectives at home and abroad. The guerrillas, however, have not. Their use of force and negotiations has therefore put the Colombian government at a disadvantage.

Presidential elections are scheduled in Colombia for 1986. If guerrilla violence continues to increase, Colombia will probably return to a more hard-line policy toward the guerrillas after the election, whoever is elected. Colombia's role and posture within Contadora would also probably change, toward a lower profile and a more centrist approach.

Panama. The fourth Contadora country, Panama, resembles the Central American countries themselves; it is small, poor and weak. Yet Panama has never regarded itself as part of Central America, and neither can it be considered a regional power like Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. Its membership in the Contadora group is mainly a reflection of the leadership qualities of Omar Torrijos, who regarded Panama as too small a stage for his ambitions and talents, and so played an active role in regional politics. Since his death, Panama has been

governed by four different presidents, a symptom of the domestic political instability that has focused Panama's attention inward.

Panama's diminished role in Contadora also reflects ambivalence regarding developments in Central America and in its relationship with the United States. On the one hand, Panama does not wish to see the Sandinistas extend their influence in the region. The traits that Panama shares with its Central American neighbors, in addition to its geographical proximity, make it more immediately vulnerable than are its Contadora partners to the destabilizing impact of regional conflict. Furthermore, the Panamanian National Guard shares many of the anti-communist sentiments that underlie U.S. policy toward Central America.

On the other hand, Panama does not want to appear too closely aligned with the United States for fear of fanning domestic anti-U.S. sentiments. The United States has been a kind of colonial power in Panama, where its ownership of the canal gave it extraordinary influence, if not control, over the course of events. Despite a reduction in the U.S. role in Panama since the signing of the canal treaties, the United States remains very involved. The U.S. Southern Command is headquartered in Panama and has grown considerably during the course of the Central American conflict.

Panama has resolved these tensions by focusing within Contadora on getting an agreement that would increase Panama's international prestige. Consistent with this goal, its position on specific issues has been flexible and pragmatic.

In view of these differences among the four Contadora countries, how could they claim to be united in support of the September 1984 Acta that the United States and the Central American countries found unacceptable? Mexico took the lead in pressing for a draft treaty prior to the U.S. presidential election. It hoped that if a draft treaty were in place prior to Ronald Reagan's expected reelection, the chances for unilateral action by the United States would be diminished. Colombia agreed. Venezuela believed it important to have a treaty prior to the Nicaraguan elections, which were also scheduled for November 1984; after the elections it would be difficult to press Nicaragua to democratize. Nicaragua also wanted to move before its elections so the result would seem to be blessed by Contadora. There was no time to work out a perfect treaty before November. The decision was made, therefore, to leave

the most difficult problems, such as arms negotiations, a timetable of withdrawal for security advisers, verification and processes for implementation, for later negotiations. Meanwhile, a treaty ending U.S. military exercises and support for the contras would protect Nicaragua and reduce the chances of direct intervention.

This strategy involved a decision to win Nicaragua's support at the expense of that of the United States, a reasonable decision in view of the fact that there was considerable doubt among the Contadora Four that the United States would ever find any draft treaty acceptable. Obtaining Nicaragua's acceptance of the draft, however, could probably be counted on to increase international pressure on the United States to go along as well. This is exactly what happened.

The Contadora Four did not accept the idea that an unenforceable treaty would threaten their security. This highlights a major problem that confronts the United States in the search for a negotiated settlement in Central America. Underlying any negotiations is the assumption on the part of the Contadora Four that if their security is *really* threatened, the United States will do something about it. Thus, they can take risks in the negotiating process that the United States is unwilling to take.

V

But there are, of course, players beyond the Contadora Four. Any negotiated settlement in Central America would have to win the approval of the Central American countries. Yet these countries do not see eye to eye with the Contadora countries, and the latter, especially Mexico, virtually ignore them in the mediating process. Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador are pitted against Nicaragua; Guatemala is also, but it seeks to project itself as more neutral than the other three.

Because the positions of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador are congruent to the United States' position, the conventional wisdom is that the United States has pressured these small, weak countries to do its bidding. This is, at the least, an oversimplification.

The views of the governments of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador reflect the common reality they face. They all feel vulnerable to the activities of Marxist guerrillas operating in Central America and accept the much-maligned "domino theory." They do not trust the Sandinistas and, together with the United States, fear that Nicaragua will continue to support

radical insurgents throughout the region. Their support of the contras is due to their belief that the Sandinistas will change only under outside pressure. A negotiated solution to the conflict that requires the United States to stop providing military assistance to them is unacceptable because they need U.S. military, economic and political support to survive. Thus, they agree with the United States on the root of the problem and its solution.

Nevertheless, these countries are ambivalent toward Washington. The United States cannot be too closely supported without undermining the still fragile domestic legitimacy of their governments. They also view U.S. policy toward the region as erratic and undependable. For these reasons, they need to hedge their bets in order not to irreparably damage their relations with the Sandinistas or the Contadora Four.

Toward the Contadora Four, their attitude is quite negative. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama have little understanding of Central America, they feel, and are more interested in protecting their own interests and assuring the survival of the Sandinista government than in protecting them. Like the Contadora Four, these Central American countries want to avoid a regional war, but they doubt that the way to do it is by siding with the Sandinistas against the United States.

As the Contadora Four have become more involved with the specifics of a negotiated settlement, the Central American countries have become more resentful of what they regard as unwarranted intervention in their internal affairs. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras believe that current trends are in their favor; Contadora, therefore, is seen as increasingly obstructionist. This resentment is directed most against Mexico, which is their "Colossus of the North."

Despite the general consensus that Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador share, there are some differences. As with the four Contadora countries, these variations grow out of the different historical experiences and current realities of each country.

Costa Rica. Costa Rica is unique in Central America as the only institutionalized democracy without a military establishment. Costa Rica also has a tradition of distrust of Nicaragua, stemming from Somoza's repeated attempts to intervene in his neighbor's internal affairs. Anti-Somoza sentiments ultimately led Costa Rica to join with Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Mexico to help oust the dictator. Costa Rica, however, soon

found the Sandinistas to be authoritarian and interventionist as well.

Officially neutral toward the Central American conflict, Costa Rica is not ideologically neutral; it is profoundly anti-communist. This helps explain the unofficial support that Costa Rica has given to Edén Pastora, the former Sandinista and current leader of the Nicaraguan rebel group that operates in the border region between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Costa Rica also supports the need to democratize the Nicaraguan government and incorporate the rebels into the political system. It does not want a Contadora agreement that allows the further consolidation of a communist regime in Nicaragua. Costa Rica distrusts the ability of any treaty to contain the expansionist tendencies of the Sandinistas and believes, as does the United States, that democratization and internal reconciliation are the best guarantors against the export of revolution by the Sandinistas. Finally, without an agreement that integrates the contras into Nicaraguan politics, Costa Rica fears it will receive thousands of refugees in addition to the approximately 40,000 that it already hosts.

El Salvador. The government of El Salvador is engaged in a civil war and needs uninterrupted military assistance from the United States in order to hold its own against the guerrillas, let alone defeat them. The government also needs to prevent the Sandinistas, the Cubans and their other allies from supplying the rebels with training, munitions and other supplies. Therefore, the Salvadoran government is most concerned with the security-related issues of the Contadora process. It supports an end to arms trafficking and is against provisions that would limit military assistance from the United States to El Salvador.

El Salvador also supports the need for internal reconciliation and democratization in Nicaragua. It opposes a double standard implicit in much of the Contadora discussions: the belief that pressure is legitimate if used to get the Salvadoran government to democratize, but is interventionist and illegitimate if applied to the Nicaraguan government. Although the process has not yet gone far, the Duarte government has held talks with the Salvadoran guerrillas and sees no reason why the Sandinistas should not be required to do the same with their guerrillas.

Honduras. As the only immediate neighbor of Nicaragua with a military establishment, Honduras is the one most concerned with the strength and size of the Nicaraguan armed

forces. Thus, Honduras took the lead in Central America in opposing the September 1984 Acta, which provided for a freeze of military force levels. Honduras does not want a freeze, since that would freeze Nicaragua's military superiority over Honduras. It wants reduction.

A reduction would also assuage Honduran fears over the growing strength of the Salvadoran military. Although Honduras and El Salvador are currently cooperating with each other, they have traditionally been competitors, if not enemies. The perception of a common threat from the Sandinistas has enabled them to bury their differences for the moment. The Hondurans believe, however, that the chances of Honduran-Salvadoran cooperation enduring would be increased if El Salvador's armed forces were not allowed to become vastly superior to those of Honduras. As the country from which most of the contras operate, Honduras is also strongly supportive of a treaty that does not abandon the Nicaraguan rebels. Like Costa Rica, it supports talks between the contras and the Sandinistas leading to the eventual incorporation of the former into the Nicaraguan political process.

Finally, like El Salvador, Honduras fears a treaty that would deprive it of U.S. military support, and has thus sought a bilateral military agreement with the United States. At the same time, Honduras does not wish to be taken for granted, and so periodically attempts to negotiate more favorable terms of cooperation with the United States.

Why had the Central American allies of the United States originally seemed willing to accept the September Acta that Washington opposed? In part, they were posturing. They had serious problems with the Acta, but they chose to adopt a positive stance in order to impress favorably a group of European foreign ministers scheduled to meet in San José, Costa Rica, on September 28, 1984, to discuss economic assistance for the region. They believed that their objections to the Acta could be concealed for the time being, since they were convinced that Nicaragua would reject it. They were wrong. Nicaragua's unexpected acceptance of the Acta, on the condition that it not be changed in any way, led them to withdraw their support and to draft the Act of Tegucigalpa, which more accurately reflected their interests.

Guatemala. Since October 1984, when Honduras called together the other Central American governments to draft a substitute treaty, Guatemala has sought to distance itself from

the others. Appearances are deceiving. The Guatemalan government is as anti-Sandinista as the other three Central American governments. It also does not want to freeze arms levels within Central America at current levels, thereby giving Nicaragua an advantage. It too wants an end to arms shipments to guerrilla movements, and it does not want the United States to withdraw from the region. Furthermore, although Guatemala sent only a vice minister to the October meeting of foreign ministers and failed to endorse the draft treaty publicly, the vice minister participated actively in its drafting.

Guatemala's ambivalence is explained by its unique situation. It is the only Central American country that shares a border with Mexico, the country that has been most sympathetic to the Sandinistas. Relations between Guatemala and Mexico have never been easy. The Guatemalan government's anti-guerrilla campaign created a serious refugee problem in southern Mexico. Because some refugee camps were used as safe havens for the Guatemalan guerrillas, Guatemala wanted the camps removed from the border. To achieve Mexico's cooperation, Guatemala needed to improve its relations with its neighbor.

The Guatemalan government also had been upset with the United States for some time, largely because of U.S. criticism of its human rights performance and the related cutoff of economic and military assistance. Although Guatemala basically agrees with the United States on Nicaragua and its potential threat to the region, it wants the United States to pay a price for its cooperation with the other Central American countries.

Finally, the behavior of Guatemala's military rulers has made the country a pariah within Latin America. The civilian governments of Latin America all publicly supported the efforts of the Contadora Four and regarded the opposition of Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador to the September Acta as an obstructionist move masterminded by the United States. By withholding public support from the October draft treaty, Guatemala could partially reintegrate itself into Latin America.

VI

Nicaragua has consistently preferred bilateral over multilateral negotiations to resolve the conflict in Central America. It has believed it could better protect its interests by dealing with its neighbors individually and avoid the issues of democratization/national reconciliation and regional arms control. A series

of bilateral agreements would also make it more difficult for the United States to coordinate its policies with its Central American allies. Facing a Central American refusal to accept bilateral negotiations, and therefore a choice between multilateral negotiations or nothing, Nicaragua reluctantly joined the Contadora process. Negotiations would help forestall a U.S. invasion, which the Sandinistas regarded as otherwise inevitable. And multilateral negotiations could possibly produce a treaty that would legitimize the Sandinista regime and formally circumscribe the U.S. military role in Central America.

The Nicaraguan government, however, does not have faith that a multilateral treaty would constrain Washington. It therefore demanded bilateral talks with the United States, toward the goal of a separate U.S.-Nicaragua treaty that would, among other things, prohibit the United States from invading Nicaragua. When these talks began in Manzanillo in June 1984, Nicaragua's purpose was to preclude U.S. support for the contras. Nicaragua was willing to make a number of concessions to achieve that goal; it saw the contras as the main obstacle to the rapid consolidation of Sandinista rule. In the course of the talks, Nicaragua therefore agreed in principle to send home its Cuban advisers, refrain from supporting guerrilla movements in neighboring countries and prohibit the installation of foreign bases on its territory.

The issues of internal reconciliation and the democratization of the regime were raised by the United States in the first meeting. The Sandinista position, however, was that internal reconciliation between the government and unarmed opposition groups was already occurring, and that the government would never talk with the contras, who were traitors. They added later that there was no need to discuss democratization since Nicaragua already had a democratically elected president and a pluralistic political system. Finally, the Sandinista government argued that the current internal reconciliation and democratization demands went beyond those that former Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders had originally stated to the Sandinistas in August 1981. At that time, the United States had not insisted on talks between the Sandinistas and the rebels. Enders had demanded that the Sandinistas stop sending arms to El Salvador, cease their own military buildup, loosen their ties with Cuba and the Soviets, and generally increase political and economic pluralism. In exchange, the United States would resume economic aid and not help the rebels.

The United States ultimately suspended the Manzanillo talks in January 1985, after the ninth session. It argued that Nicaragua was using the talks to extricate itself from Contadora and was exploiting fears among Washington's Central American friends of a separate deal between the United States and Nicaragua. Finally, the United States argued that it was demanding more from the Sandinistas than Assistant Secretary Enders had because Nicaragua had become more authoritarian and allied with the Soviet Union since 1981.

The Nicaraguans claimed that the United States suspended the Manzanillo talks because progress toward an acceptable treaty *was* being made, and the United States had no intention of negotiating a settlement of its conflict with Nicaragua. Since the suspension of the talks, Nicaragua ostentatiously sent 100 Cuban soldiers home and agreed to halt both the military draft and the acquisition of new weapons systems. It hoped that these gestures would keep the U.S. Congress from supporting the contras and pressure the United States to resume bilateral talks. President Ortega's trip to Moscow undermined the strategy; Congress voted in favor of humanitarian aid for the contras, and Nicaragua then reversed its positions on the draft and the acquisition of new weapons systems.

Within Contadora, Nicaragua holds firm in its support for the September 1984 Acta, as originally drafted, and continues to press for a resumption of bilateral talks with the United States. In the meantime, it has intensified its military campaign against the Nicaraguan rebels. Nicaragua continues to refuse to talk with the contras or consider additional steps to democratize its political system. Instead, the Sandinistas have tightened their control over the country. They also continue to argue that they have the right to ally with the Soviet Union, Cuba or any other country and to take whatever steps are necessary to protect themselves against their enemies. Nicaragua has reversed its position before. Whether it will do so again will depend on internal and external pressures on the regime.

VII

Contadora is stalemated once again. The immediate stumbling block concerns timing; Nicaragua first wants an end to U.S. support for the contras, and then it would be willing to negotiate both the terms and timetables of other issues such as a reduction in the number of military advisers, arms control and maneuvers.

The other Central American countries want "simultaneity." Agreement must first be reached on all outstanding issues and all should then enter into effect simultaneously. The Nicaraguans do not like the Tegucigalpa draft treaty because they do not want to negotiate under military pressure. The other Central American countries do not like the September Acta because they are convinced that the Sandinistas will not negotiate in good faith if the contras are first disbanded and the U.S. military presence in the region is reduced.

Even if the disagreement over timing could be resolved, much work remains to be done to convert agreement on principles into the detailed provisions of a negotiated settlement. To their credit, Contadora's numerous working groups are already giving serious attention to the question of how to stop arms trafficking and outside support for so-called liberation movements of the right and left. The negotiators are also grappling with the problem of how to verify arms levels, military reductions and the like.

Even if these details are worked out, the problem of what happens if and when treaty provisions are violated still remains. None of the Contadora countries wants the United States to act unilaterally. On the other hand, the regional powers have traditionally been reluctant, if not opposed, to taking collective action, including military action. They cannot have it both ways.

If the Contadora Four want a negotiated settlement in Central America that will be more than cosmetic, they must be willing to take responsibility for assuring compliance with the treaty. They cannot continue to hide behind the principle of nonintervention. They must be prepared to intervene collectively, including militarily, against violators of the treaty.

Once a treaty draft is available that resolves the timing issue and deals adequately with the problems of verification and enforcement, the problems of internal reconciliation and democratization will remain. At that point, what happens at the negotiating table will depend on what is happening on the ground—and in Washington.

If the Sandinista government is able to resist pressure from the contras, either because it has won the timing issue or because of its own military capabilities, it will also be strong enough to maintain political control of Nicaragua and to refuse to sign a treaty providing for democratization and internal reconciliation. In such a situation, the U.S. government would

be hard put to justify an invasion and the casualties and high political costs that it would entail. More likely, the United States would eventually decide to drop its demand for democratization and internal reconciliation and settle instead for the kinds of security arrangements that are currently being worked out by Contadora. It would not be an ideal solution. Contadora would have produced a negotiated settlement of the Central American conflict, but the United States would have accepted the consolidation of another communist regime in the Western hemisphere.

Lloyd N. Cutler

W

THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE

e face many foreign policy decisions—how to respond to the fighting in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Salvador, Angola, Kampuchea, the Philippines and soon, perhaps, South Africa—that involve the legality of intervening in a civil war. The international law journals are full of scholarly discussions on this subject. They are hard for non-scholars to follow. They disagree sharply, as scholars are wont to do, in their argumentation and conclusions. For readers who are not scholars of international law, this article tries to explain how the rules have evolved, where they now stand, and how they might be clarified to relieve the rising tension between the principle of nonintervention and the human rights of self-determination and open democratic elections.

Does it matter whether our military interventions in civil wars, or those of the Soviet bloc, violate international law? Only the U.N. Security Council has the legal power to enforce international law, and it in fact has no such power against the Soviet Union or the United States if either chooses to exercise its right of veto. The columnist George Will has suggested that Americans ought to care less about whether we have the legal right to intervene than whether intervention in a particular civil war is the right thing to do.

But it does matter whether our actions comply with international law. It matters precisely because we are a practicing democracy with both philosophical and geopolitical reasons to encourage the democratic aspirations of all peoples. Democracy cannot flourish in a lawless climate; it depends on widely accepted principles of law for its survival. That is obvious with respect to national law. It is equally important with respect to international law, especially our treaty commitments under the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of Amer-

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ican States. No democratic nation—least of all a democratic superpower—can afford to act in a manner that admittedly flouts international law. To sustain free-world support of our leadership, our actions must be confined to steps we can justify as consistent with a principled interpretation of the law as we see it.

There is another reason why it matters that we comply with international law. One price of being a democratic superpower with worldwide responsibilities is that no course of action abroad can be sustained without broad popular support at home. A broad segment of the American public is uneasy about any step that may put us in violation of our international obligations. The legislation passed by Congress approving non-lethal aid for the Nicaraguan contras bars the executive branch from taking any discretionary action, not expressly authorized by Congress, that is contrary to international law.

II

International law on interventions goes back more than two centuries. A good place to begin is Vattel's *Law of Nations*, published in 1758:

If a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid. . . .

To give help to a brave people who are defending their liberties against an oppressor by force of arms is only the part of justice and generosity. Hence, whenever such dissension reaches the state of civil war, foreign Nations may assist that one of the two parties which seems to have justice on its side. But to assist a detestable tyrant, or to come out in favor of an unjust and rebellious people, would certainly be a violation of duty.¹

Vattel's rules would have suited the Reagan Administration's view of the world to perfection. These rules would support the legality of military aid to the Duarte government, the Nicaraguan contras and the Afghan freedom fighters. They would provide no legal comfort for the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Soviet-Cuban support of the Sandinista regime, or Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan aid to the guerrillas

¹ Vattel, *Law of Nations*, Vol. III, Chap. IV, p. 131, 1758, English translation by Charles G. Fenwick; reprinted by Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1964.

in Salvador. Aid to democratic forces in or out of power would be lawful; aid to tyrants or would-be tyrants would not.

But Vattel's rules are out of fashion. They differ markedly from the established rules of international law today. Vattel wrote at a time when war itself was a lawful act, so long as the initiator could point to a just cause. Self-defense was not the only just cause. Recovering lost territory, preserving the balance of power, assisting royal relatives on other thrones, converting the heathen, defending the established church, avenging a slight to national honor—all were just causes. So was helping an oppressed people to overthrow a tyrannical regime. It was in Vattel's era that France, a superpower of that time, could claim just cause for sending the forces that helped the American insurgents win the decisive battle at Yorktown against France's main rival, Great Britain.

After the horrors of World War I, the community of nations sharply limited the expansive legal theory of the just war. The Covenant of the League of Nations, signed by the leading powers of the day and ratified by all but the United States, outlawed all war except in self-defense. The league finally collapsed, of course, but its basic ideas were renewed and refined in the U.N. Charter.

Article 2(4) of the charter is short and deceptively simple. It deals not only with war, but all resorts to force even when war is not declared. It says:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The only exception to this prohibition is Article 51 of the charter, which exempts any action taken "in individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . ." Even this exception is permitted only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

The United States is also a party to the Charter of the Organization of American States. The revised OAS charter contains a similar provision in Article 18:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any

other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

Over the four decades since these charters were adopted, there have been innumerable armed insurgencies. In most of them, third states have provided arms, training, transport or armed forces to the government or the insurgents. A short list would include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Hungary, Kampuchea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen and Zaïre.

All the states that have furnished such assistance—including all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—have maintained that their actions did not violate the U.N. Charter or, where applicable, the OAS charter. A majority of the Security Council has often disagreed, but one of the permanent members has usually blocked action by a veto to protect itself or one of its client states. Until Nicaragua's pending complaint against the United States, the International Court of Justice has not had occasion to pass on the legality of any of these interventions.

III

On their face, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and Article 18 of the revised OAS charter do not refer to civil wars. Nor do they refer to particular types of intervention (money, civil supplies, transport, arms and military training) that fall short of threatening or using armed force. However, the U.N. General Assembly and an authoritative international legal body have adopted resolutions that specifically address these issues.

The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1970 without objection by any of the permanent members, states:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law. . . .

No state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subver-

sive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.

In 1975, the Institut de Droit International adopted a resolution on "The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars." The institute is the "college of cardinals" of international law scholars, with about 60 members including judges of the World Court. It defined a civil war as "any armed conflict, not of an international character, which breaks out in the territory of a State and in which there is opposition between . . . the established government and one or more insurgent movements whose aim is to overthrow the government or the political, economic or social order of the State." The resolution condemned any of the following acts:

- a. sending armed forces or military volunteers, instructors or technicians to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be sent or to set out;
- b. drawing up or training regular or irregular forces with a view to supporting any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be drawn up or trained;
- c. supplying weapons or other war materiel to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be supplied;
- d. giving any party to a civil war any financial or economic aid likely to influence the outcome of that war.

Ironically in the light of current U.S. positions, American delegates, concerned by Soviet bloc interventions in Eastern Europe and Latin America and in the colonial wars of liberation, supported all these formulations.

International legal scholars, relying on state practice, have recognized several exceptions to these categorical rules of nonintervention:

- Most scholars agree that when an insurgency has produced internal chaos and a breakdown of public order in a state, other states may forcibly enter its territory to bring in food and medical supplies or rescue diplomats and nationals (as in the Congo in 1964 and, in somewhat more dubious circumstances, the Dominican Republic in 1965).
- Some scholars believe that a state may always supply armed forces or other military aid at the request of a government fighting an insurgency. The theory is that aid to the government in power cannot be directed against "the territorial integrity or political independence" of the state whose government is being assisted. This theory would

cover aid to the Duarte government in El Salvador or to the Marcos government in the Philippines.

—A majority of scholars, including the longtime general counsel of the United Nations and Columbia Law School professor, Oscar Schachter, believe that once any state assists either the government side or the insurgent side in a civil war, this is a violation of the charter that entitles any other state to assist the opposite side.

As Schachter puts it:

Despite the danger [of internationalizing a local conflict], the law does not proscribe such counterintervention. It is not that two wrongs make a right but that the grave violation of one right allows a defensive response.²

The Institut de Droit International recognizes this exception for counterintervention, but “only in compliance with the Charter and any other relevant rule of international law, subject to any such measures as are prescribed, authorized or recommended by the United Nations.” On the Reagan Administration’s view of the relevant facts, this exception would probably cover our aid to the Nicaraguan contras and the Afghan freedom fighters as well as to the Duarte government.

The net of all this is very murky. There appears to be some authority for banning military assistance to either side of a civil war, some for allowing military aid to the government side but not to the insurgent side, and some for allowing such aid to either side if another state is already giving military assistance to the opposite side. When the World Court decides the current Nicaraguan case, some elements of this legal muddle may be clarified. But after the withdrawal of the United States and absent a full presentation of the factual and legal aspects of the U.S. position, the authority of the court’s decision will be considerably weakened.

IV

The most significant thing about how modern international law treats interventions is that Vattel’s standards of oppression and justice are not even mentioned. The law, as now formulated, appears to treat the democratic or dictatorial nature of the government in power as wholly irrelevant. Aid to a demo-

² Oscar Schachter, “The Right of States to Use Armed Force,” *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 82, 1984, pp. 1620, 1642.

cratic government, or to insurgents trying to overthrow a tyranny and create a democratic government, appears to stand on the same footing as aid to a tyrannical government, or to insurgents trying to overthrow a democratic government and create a tyrannical one. Vattel's rules were based on the principle of the just war, and the U.N. Charter now limits the scope of just wars or other uses of armed force to individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack on a member state. Help to a "brave people" seeking to overthrow a "detestable tyrant" does not fit within that narrow window.

Many Western legal scholars and political leaders feel uncomfortable with this indifference toward democratic principles. But others justify it as a necessary deference to another important principle: the principle of "minimum public order" among states that disagree widely about the values of personal freedom and democracy and even as to the meaning of these terms. Minimum public order is a principle recently formulated by international legal scholars, based on the need to maintain the stability of the international system and to avoid a general nuclear exchange.³ In the opinion of these scholars, minimum public order requires that each state, whatever its character, be protected from the intervention of other states in its internal affairs.

Is there a principled way to distinguish between the legality of aiding the democratic side and the illegality of aiding the tyrannical side? I believe there is, but it must include specific limits on when a policy of aiding the democratic side may be pursued.

Our Declaration of Independence, influenced by Vattel, Locke and other apostles of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, proclaimed the right of any people to rebel by force against a tyrannical regime. This principle has inspired many such revolutions. It had achieved worldwide acceptance, at least until the coming of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

It is not a right under domestic law, in the sense that citizens who take up arms against their government would be immune from domestic punishment if the revolution fails. Our own forefathers wrote a constitution that makes treason a high crime, and many of those who fought and lost in Shays' Rebellion and our Civil War had to pay the consequences. The right

³ John Norton Moore, "The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict," *Virginia Journal of International Law*, Vol. 9, 1969, pp. 205, 252.

to rebel against a tyrant is really a right asserted under natural law. It includes the right to seek the support of other states on behalf of a just cause and, if the regime is overturned, to be recognized as the lawful successor government.

Is there a parallel right to rebel by force against a democratic regime that gives all its people the opportunity to vote in free elections open to any candidate? John Locke thought not. In his *Treatise on Civil Government*, he argued: "Force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man." There may be an exception for a colonial people, as in Algeria when it was part of metropolitan France, or for an ethnically based secession movement, as in Nigeria. But these cases aside, no one has ever attempted a principled articulation of such a right. Instead, the issue has usually been sidestepped, as the Bolsheviks did in deposing Kerensky's provisional government, by claiming that the regime in power was not truly democratic. Of course, there have been countless military coups d'état in which the national armed forces have deposed a democratic civil government, but they are never defended on the articulated principle of a popular right to rebel. They are justified by the "duty" of the military to correct a breakdown of public order, and the bitter pill is usually sweetened by the promise of early new elections.

The case for denying any right to rebel by force against a democratic government was strikingly put a century ago by a leading Russian terrorist party. When President James Garfield was assassinated in 1881 just after Russian terrorists had assassinated Tsar Alexander II, the People's Will Party published this message of condolence to the American people:

The Executive Committee, expressing its profoundest sympathy with the American people on account of the death of James Abram Garfield, feels it to be its duty to protest in the name of Russian revolutionaries against all such deeds of violence as that which has just taken place in America. In a land where the citizens are free to express their ideas, and where the will of the people does not merely make the law but appoints the person who is to carry the law into effect, in such a country political assassination is the manifestation of a despotic tendency identical with that to whose destruction in Russia we have devoted ourselves. Despotism, whatever may be the parties or whoever may be the individuals that exercise it, is always blame-worthy, and force can be justified only when employed to resist force.⁴

⁴ Quoted in *Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence*, Vol. 8, Washington: G.P.O., 1969, p. 439.

In modern idiom, People's Will was saying that no group with a political grievance has the right to depose a democratic government by shooting its way into power.

If there is a popular right to rebel only against a tyrannical regime and not against a democratic one, Vattel's principles of intervention should retain their validity. They justify military aid to insurgents who rebel against a repressive regime but not to those who rebel against a democratic government. They justify military assistance to a democratic government but not to a repressive one.

v

Can Vattel's principles be accommodated within the framework of modern international law? As Yale University Professor Michael Reisman and other distinguished scholars have argued, there is room for accommodation in two of the "Purposes" of the United Nations set forth in Article 1 of the charter. These are "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all."⁵

Self-determination is a broad concept. In the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant, it probably meant the right of a "people," however defined, to be free of foreign rule. But in a 1966 resolution, the U.N. General Assembly construed Article 1 of the charter more broadly. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right *they freely determine their political status*" (emphasis added).

In the name of self-determination, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions upholding the rights of blacks in South Africa and Rhodesia against discriminatory white-dominated regimes. It has even urged third states to assist the black populations in their struggle. The Security Council also called for its members to impose economic sanctions against both states because they denied self-determination to their peoples.

Does self-determination include the right to vote in free elections open to all candidates? One can powerfully argue that it does. How else can peoples "freely determine their political

⁵ Michael Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 78, 1984, p. 642.

status?" In any event, free elections have now achieved independent recognition as one of the "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" that the charter is intended to promote and encourage.

Article 21 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts:

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

The U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and several regional human rights agreements also affirm the right to vote in free elections. These human rights resolutions also recognize the essential civil liberties necessary for the rule of law and the dignity of the individual.

But a state's duty to hold free elections and maintain the rule of law does not necessarily give other states the individual right to use force to compel the offending state to perform that duty, or to assist an insurgent group trying to overthrow the offending regime. Article 2(4) does not permit individual states to threaten or use force against another state for any purpose except self-defense against an armed attack. In all other cases, force can only be threatened or used by collective action of the United Nations or a regional peacekeeping body. Something more is required before such a unilateral right can arise.

Michael Reisman has advanced a theory to provide this something more. He points to the duty of the United Nations to promote and encourage self-determination and human rights and the failure of the organization to take collective measures that would bring the anti-democratic regime to heel. In the light of this failure, by analogy to citizen self-help when law enforcement breaks down, Reisman argues that other individual states are entitled to uphold these rights by intervening to enforce them. He contends that in such cases Article 2(4) should not be construed to bar unilateral actions against repressive regimes that themselves violate the purposes of the charter.⁶

Reisman's views have been strongly challenged by other scholars, including Oscar Schachter:

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 643.

It is difficult to extend [Reisman's] argument to justify an armed invasion to topple a repressive regime. . . . The idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy and human rights would not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands an Orwellian construction of those terms. . . . It would introduce a new normative basis for recourse to war that would give powerful states an almost unlimited right to overthrow governments alleged to be unresponsive to the popular will or to the goal of self-determination. . . . That invasions may at times serve democratic values must be weighed against the dangerous consequences of legitimizing armed attacks against peaceful governments.⁷

VI

I come down between Reisman and Schachter. I agree with Reisman that Article 2(4) must be reconciled with the stated purposes of the United Nations to promote self-determination and free elections, and also with his point that the U.N. machinery has not been able to take effective measures against governments which repress these rights. But I agree with Schachter that, despite Reisman's points, Article 2(4) cannot be read to give other states an unlimited right to topple a repressive regime by force.

I would therefore interpret Article 2(4) as permitting a third state to intervene only when two conditions exist: first, an indigenous pro-democratic insurgency is engaged in a civil war with the repressive regime; and, second, some other third state has been giving military assistance to the repressive regime. As a corollary of this proposition, other states are also entitled to provide military support to a democratic regime engaged in a civil war against an anti-democratic insurgency, but only if the insurgent forces have been receiving outside military support from another third state.

A right of counterintervention on the democratic side splits the difference between the Reisman and Schachter wings of the community of international law scholars. It states the one case in which the views of the two wings intersect. For different reasons, both wings would support the legality of such a counterintervention—Reisman more because it is on the democratic side than because it happens to be a *counter*intervention, and Schachter more because it is a *counter*intervention than because it happens to be on the democratic side.

⁷ Oscar Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 78, 1984, pp. 645, 649.

It hardly needs adding that this right to counterintervene in a civil war would not entitle the United States to arm and train an antigovernment group to start a civil war. The existence of a democratic insurgency independently capable of creating a state of civil war is one of the essential conditions precedent to our legal right to provide military aid. The right disappears if, as in the Bay of Pigs incident, we ourselves take part in bringing the civil war about. That, of course, is what the Sandinista regime charges us with doing (and the United States denies) in Nicaragua's case before the World Court.

This right of counterintervention on the democratic side states a principled position which the United States can staunchly defend. It respects the rule that no state should be the first to intervene in another state's civil war so long as that war is a purely internal affair. It respects the right of any people either to defend a democratic government or to rebel against a tyrannical one. It allows another state to assist the democratic side if some other state is assisting the anti-democratic side. It has solid roots in the principles of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment that inspired the democratic ideal and remain valid today. It gives meaning to the reaffirmation of this ideal in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter. It does so without emasculating the principle of nonintervention set out in Article 2(4).

Reisman and some other legal scholars would go further. Like Vattel, they would affirm the right to intervene on behalf of the democratic side in a civil war whether or not some other state has provided military aid to the opposite side. I do not see how the Article 1 rights of self-determination and free elections can be pressed this far without overriding Article 2(4)'s principle of nonintervention entirely. If the goals of the two articles are to be harmonized rather than reading either one as superior to the other, the right to intervene on the democratic side must be limited to a right of counterintervention *after* another state has intervened on the anti-democratic side.

Many international legal scholars would support a right of counterintervention on the democratic side, but would add a corresponding right, *mutatis mutandis*, of counterintervention by other states on the anti-democratic side. But the Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars adopted by the Institut de Droit International permits counterintervention "only in compliance with the Charter and any other relevant rule of international law." A corresponding right to intervene on the anti-

democratic side does not comply with Article 1 of the charter setting out the purposes of the United Nations. It does not comply with Vattel's ancient rule that "to assist a detestable tyrant . . . would certainly be a violation of duty." To uphold the natural human rights of all peoples to self-determination and free elections open to all candidates, it makes sense to interpret the charter and other rules of international law to bar outside military aid to the anti-democratic side in a civil war under any and all circumstances.

However, the point is not of much practical importance. If the democratic states restrict themselves to *counterintervention* under the formulation set forth above, the issue of a right to *counterintervene* on the anti-democratic side will never arise. While anti-democratic states sometimes justify their intervention on the ground that other states have previously intervened on the opposite side, these claims are usually as far-fetched as the Soviet claim that the United States and Pakistan had intervened first in Afghanistan. In our time, anti-democratic states have rarely waited to intervene in a civil war until after other states have come to the aid of the democratic side.

Some will argue that this formulation of the right to *counterintervene* is merely a democratic mirror image of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is not. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union asserts the right to prevent any "socialist" state by force from leaving the "socialist" camp. This asserted right does not depend on the existence of a civil war or on prior military assistance by other states to the insurgent side. It contradicts the universally accepted right of any people to rebel against a tyrannical regime in order to create a democratic one. It overrides the human rights of self-determination and free elections open to all candidates. The conditional right of counterintervention I have described would do none of these things.

Could we justify the legality of current and proposed American interventions under the foregoing principles? We could clearly justify our military aid to the Duarte government. We could justify furnishing military assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, although their own commitment to create a democratic government in Afghanistan may require further demonstration. We could justify military assistance to the Nicaraguan contras, provided they establish their credentials as an indigenous pro-democratic insurgency and we publish our evidence of the regime's anti-democratic intentions and the aid it has long been receiving from the Soviet bloc. (Without such

evidence before it, the World Court may well hold our past actions unlawful.)

While our general support of Philippine forces for external defense would not be affected, we would have difficulty justifying military assistance to the Marcos regime for specific use against the rising Philippine insurgency, since evidence is still lacking as to significant foreign assistance to the insurgents, the anti-democratic nature of the insurgency, or even the regime's own commitment to democratic values. Whether we could justify aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgent forces in Angola would depend on whether the incumbent regime can fairly be branded as significantly less democratic than UNITA itself. Aid to the Kampuchean rebels would present a similar question.

The proposed right of counterintervention, of course, would not entitle the intervening state to decide who will take power after the civil war is over. At most, the counterintervening state could assist in the holding of free elections under appropriate international supervision. At that point, the right of counterintervention would end.

VII

In proposing this conditional right of counterintervention, I, of course, do not suggest that it should be automatically exercised every time the specified conditions exist. We cannot apply John Kennedy's soaring rhetoric—"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall . . . support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty"—every time some people's liberty is threatened anywhere in the world.⁸ As we subsequently learned in Vietnam, we need first to weigh whether we are financially and logistically capable of delivering enough assistance to have a significant effect on the outcome, and whether the perceived threat to our vital interests is grave enough to sustain public support for a policy that may risk American lives.

We must also weigh whether our action is likely to provoke a shooting confrontation with the other nuclear superpower. When all these factors were taken into account, we did not provide military assistance to the Hungarian and Czech peoples

⁸ *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States*, Washington: G.P.O., 1974, p. 268.

in the 1960s, and in a similar crisis I doubt that we would give military aid to the Polish people today.

I would also suggest other precautions before exercising this right of counterintervention. I agree with McGeorge Bundy that we ought not to intervene covertly.⁹ In our robust kind of democracy, we are not capable of hiding our role in operations of any significant size. When they are exposed to public view, they are much harder to justify on legal principle, because there is an implicit admission of illegality in having tried to conceal them in the first place. Moreover, the Bay of Pigs and the Angolan intervention mission suggest that our military and intelligence skills do not run toward covert operations. We are rather clumsy in planning and executing surprise surgical strikes or in providing covert support to an insurgency. We are far more skillful in open applications of overwhelming force that leave a large margin of error for bad luck, equipment breakdowns and premature news leaks.

To maintain the credibility of our commitment to the democratic side, we also need to be discriminating in identifying which side, if either, has the better claim to that label. While there will always be problems in drawing such a line, our traditions and values and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights provide clear benchmarks: respect for civil liberties and free elections, and commitment to democratic methods of government. If we base our right to counterintervene on these values, we should limit its exercise to cases where the two sides differ significantly in their respect for democracy.

In the real world, neither side of a civil war is likely to be the clear-cut choice; the opponents usually come in shades of gray. The color of a regime can be judged by its conduct in office, but it is much harder to judge an armed insurgency professing a democratic goal. The insurgency usually consists of a broad spectrum united only by a common desire to overturn the repressive regime. After gaining power, its colors often change. The French Revolution evolved into the Terror and then into a military empire. The provisional democratic government that replaced Tsar Nicholas became a dictatorship within a matter of months. The Administration views the pattern in Nicaragua after Somoza's fall as similar, but if the contras overturn the Sandinista government with our help, we may some day be equally disappointed in the successor regime.

⁹ *The New York Times*, June 10, 1985, p. 19.

Anti-communism cannot always be equated with democracy. A legal theory based on the human right of democracy cannot support aid to any regime or group, however repressive, simply because it is on the anti-communist side of a civil war.

Finally, we should be especially cautious about engaging American armed forces in a sustained combat role. Ever since Vietnam, when we first saw the ugliness of a foreign war on our television screens, we have developed a profound aversion to getting into shooting wars. Our standards of necessity grow higher every year. Of course, they continue to cover the defense of our territory and that of our treaty allies against an external invasion. But it is highly doubtful whether they extend to fighting in any other nation's civil war.

The principle of allowing counterintervention on the democratic side accommodates Vattel's rules to the modern rejection of the just war and to the provisions of the U.N. and OAS charters that we are treaty-bound to respect. It is faithful to the fundamental values of self-determination and free elections. It leaves adequate room for intervention on the democratic side when these values are put at risk by outside assistance to the other side. In cases where the specified conditions are not met, a prudent democratic superpower ought not to be intervening anyway.

Postscript. Although this article deals with intervention in civil wars, it may be worth a brief postscript to consider the legality of using force on the territory of another state to rescue hostages or to take reprisal against hostage-takers, whether or not that state is involved in a civil war. These questions were squarely presented by the hostage crises in Iran in 1979–80 and in Lebanon earlier this year.

In a 1952 article, Sir Humphrey Waldock, later president of the World Court, laid down three conditions for the legality of using force on the territory of another state in cases such as hostage-taking:

- (1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals;
- (2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them; and
- (3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them against injury.¹⁰

A rescue mission to Teheran or Beirut would satisfy all three

¹⁰ Humphrey Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law," *Recueil des Cours*, Vol. 81, 1952, pp. 451, 467.

of Waldock's tests, but a reprisal action would flunk the third test. It would also run afoul of the World Court's 1949 ruling in the *Corfu Channel* case.¹¹ A reprisal action would be lawful, however, if the permission of the territorial sovereign were obtained. An arguable case for legality might also be made if the territorial sovereign adopts the hostage-taking as its own act, as in Iran, or if a state of chaos exists and the nominal government is incapable of apprehending and punishing known participants in the hostage-taking, as may be true in Lebanon. But it is at best an arguable case.

The United States would be free, however, to indict identified hijackers and hostage-takers under American law, pursuant to the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 and the Hostage-Taking Act of 1984, and to seek their extradition from any country in which they can be found. Neither statute would have applied to the Teheran incident, which was not a hijacking and occurred before the Hostage-Taking Act of 1984. Both statutes would apply to the recent Beirut incident, but unfortunately we have no extradition treaty with Lebanon. However, as a party to The Hague Anti-Hijacking Convention of 1970, the government of Lebanon would be under an international legal obligation to find and try the identified hijackers in Lebanon or deliver them for extradition to the United States.

¹¹ In the *Corfu Channel* case (International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, p. 4), the court upheld the United Kingdom's right of innocent passage for its warships through a channel within the territorial waters of Albania, but ruled that Britain's sweeping of mines from these waters was an illegal use of force under Article 2(4), notwithstanding the claim that the mines were an "international nuisance" which Albania had failed to remove.

Ernest van den Haag

THE BUSYNESS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Recently an Irish friend suggested that the United States send a special envoy to get all the parties to settle the Ulster problem peacefully. At first, I thought the idea absurd and unrealistic, since no specific American interest is involved. To be sure, we are concerned with the peaceful and just solution of problems. Yet America is not in charge of solving all the problems of the world and does not have the expertise, the wisdom, the resources or the power to solve them.

On second thought, the idea, still absurd, no longer seemed so unrealistic: American foreign policy makers have been easily persuaded to involve the United States even when no specifiable American interests were at stake. They appear to share a native belief that American ideals and ideas can and should solve all the problems of the world and that it is their mission to actively apply these ideals abroad. This notion springs from popular misconceptions about foreign policy, to which the State Department is not as immune as one might wish.

When stated explicitly and starkly these misconceptions will not be defended. Yet they have considerable explanatory power, more explanatory power than attempts to explain American foreign policy on the basis of American interests. Perhaps this is so because foreign policy, conceived as the defense of a specific American interest abroad and of American security, is still relatively new to the United States. Until the twentieth century we scarcely had serious security concerns; indeed, alliances would have been "entangling." Foreign policy was perceived as the pursuit of lofty concerns—international peace, self-determination, democracy, human rights—which were national ideals more than national interests.

Nuclear missiles have irrevocably changed the underlying reality. But the perception persists. Our ideals and our foreign interests remain conflated. And many Americans still are under

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the impression that a benevolent deity has made sure that there is a just solution for every problem, a remedy for every wrong, which can be discovered by negotiations, based on good will and on American moral and legal ideals, self-evident enough to persuade all parties, once they are revealed by negotiators, preferably American.

Reality is otherwise. Just solutions are elusive. Many problems have no solutions at all, not even unjust ones; at most they can be managed, prevented from getting worse or from spreading to wider areas. Other problems are best left to simmer in benign neglect until the parties are disposed to settle them. Untimely negotiations often are counterproductive. Further, many immanently American problems may never become imminent enough to require our intervention. Finally, international problems hardly ever are solved by the sedulous pursuit of legal and moral principles, so often urged by the lawyers who help shape our foreign policies.

American policy should aim at preventing problems from becoming American problems. Yet we have been ready, sometimes eager, to Americanize problems by active intervention—even when the American interest was hard to specify and the primary interest of allies was patent. The cost has been heavy in prestige, in money and even in American lives. Elsewhere we have refused to see that American interests are involved, and that at least indirect intervention could be useful and effective. Unless one of the parties was able to appeal to a democratic American constituency, it has been hard for the United States to intervene, directly or indirectly. Indeed, we seldom stress indirect intervention—yet that is what diplomacy ought to be all about. Often the fact that none of the parties directly involved lived up to American ideals has blinded us to our interests. When we intervened nonetheless, we had to pretend that the party we supported was, after all, not just better than the party we opposed, but actually decent. Thus, when we decided that it was in our interest to support Stalin against his former ally, Hitler, we had to persuade ourselves that Stalin was not so bad and could be handled by our foreign policy makers. We are still paying the price for this unjustifiable self-deception.

A realistic foreign policy would be guided by specifiable national interests and by the means we have, and are willing to use, to actually pursue them. It need not be inconsistent with principles of law and morality, but it should not confuse any

principles with our national interests. History is not explained by moral or legal principles, although it is, after all, the result of past foreign policies. Yet our interests do not readily explain our activities in many of the world's trouble spots, and much of our discourse is scarcely related to awareness, let alone pursuit, of our actual interests.

II

Consider now, albeit fleetingly, two popular principles of foreign policy which have been important in forming general attitudes and in justifying policies: isolationism and the domino theory.

Interventions have been justified recently by the "domino theory," and earlier by the "collective security" theory, occasionally expressed by the slogan "peace is indivisible" and reformulated less abstractly as "containment." "Collective security" was vigorously promoted by Maxim Litvinov when Stalin felt threatened by Hitler prior to his alliance with him. In contrast, current Soviet foreign policy rests on national liberation theory, modified when convenient by a spheres-of-influence concept. This concept is applied to Eastern Europe, but not to Cuba or Latin America. The national liberation theory is aggressive rather than defensive and rationalizes the Soviet expansion we seek to contain. Both the old and new theories reflect a correct perception of Soviet interests by those in charge of pursuing them: protection of Soviet power before, and expansion after, the defeat of Hitler.

A national liberation theory, however, never took hold in the United States, although as much can be said for "liberation" by American as by Soviet ideas and forces. The idea opposed to collective security was isolationism, which justifies nonintervention. Isolationism, certainly not an aggressive theory, was not quite a defensive one either. It could be interpreted to deny the need for any foreign policy. A reasonable version of isolationism (seldom so labeled) helps to warn us against overextension of our resources. Isolationism defines our interests narrowly and specifically, yet favors a strong United States. Isolationists oppose American involvement, unless there is a clear, major and present American interest, and a specific range of desirable outcomes as well as cost-effective means to achieve them.

Reasonably interpreted, isolationism scarcely differs from a nonmechanical version of the domino theory. However, less

reasonable versions of isolationism may discount the importance of our alliances and of denying power over our allies, or over neutrals, to the Soviet Union.

The domino theory—a clearly defensive theory, as it was when still called “collective security” and sponsored by the Soviet Union—continues to prevail, although the label is now shunned. As is often the case with encompassing ideas, this theory is not much affected by contrary empirical evidence.¹ Thus, our intervention in Vietnam was most often defended in terms of the domino theory. After our intervention failed and all of Vietnam fell to the communists, though they did invade Kampuchea, the major Southeast Asian dominoes, such as Thailand, Burma or Indonesia, did not fall, contrary to what had been feared.

Our military intervention in Vietnam, costly yet halfhearted as it was, could be justified only by an overly mechanical interpretation of the domino theory, which pays too little heed to local and regional alignments and conceives of all local conflicts as ipso facto involving American interests, to be defended by American intervention. Thus, the domino theory is prone to lead to errors of commission, just as isolationism may lead to errors of omission.

While considering Vietnam, it may not be amiss to mention an unexpected and important development which should warn us further against overeagerness. Once communist, Vietnam became one of many bones of contention which now exacerbate the conflict between China and the Soviet Union and hinder an alliance between the two communist powers. In the light of this development, it is not altogether clear that, if American intervention had been militarily successful, it would have served American interests (as distinguished from human rights in Vietnam). Conceivably, an American-supported Vietnam, which would have followed an American victory, could have become a bone of contention between the United States and China. Worse Sino-American relations and better Sino-Soviet relations would have been the unwelcome result. Victory, then, might not have served us better than defeat. However, had we not intervened at all, we might have achieved costlessly what victory could never have achieved for us at great cost.

Less mechanical interpretations of the domino theory, while

¹ Peace is quite divisible, as Iran and Iraq are showing. Local wars (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Israel vs. Egypt or Lebanon) can, but often do not, become worldwide.

stressing the importance of defending allies and even neutrals against attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its power directly, through its satellites or by domestic subversion, do not call on us to intervene automatically to prevent, at all costs, any gain by the Soviets. To do so would indeed allow our antagonists to choose all the battlefields to our disadvantage; we might be led to intervene where the returns are likely to be small compared to the costs, or where we are unable to intervene without excessively weakening ourselves elsewhere, or finally, where we have more to lose by intervening than our antagonists could gain if we did not. Not least, the domino theory often is interpreted to assume (although this is not logically inherent in the theory) that we best safeguard our interests by direct intervention, instead of merely encouraging and helping those primarily and directly interested to defend themselves.

Although we should try to prevent increases of Soviet power by supporting those who resist it, it would be counterproductive to pursue even this general interest at all costs, anywhere, anytime. To do so would weaken our ability to actually intervene where and when it matters most. Our interests cannot all be of equal importance. We must have priorities and defend our interests selectively and ad hoc, by different means and, most often, by relying on others. Passivity, even retreat, are as important ingredients as activity and attack in pursuing our interests in war and peace. Support of our allies by means of arms sales and grants, provided it does not lead to our taking over the operation, frequently is most proportionate to our actual interests.² Direct intervention should be a rare and final resort. Too often we have discouraged allies and neutrals from playing the role they could play, by eagerly replacing their potential efforts.

III

Let us consider now the American role in some recent trouble spots (leaving aside for the moment Latin and Central America).

Cyprus. The Turkish-Greek conflict over Cyprus and other issues is making NATO less effective in the area than it could

² Thus, we certainly should support Afghan anti-Soviet guerrillas, without attempting to control them. The interim aim should be the depletion of Soviet resources. The ultimate aim should be the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the neutralization of Afghanistan.

be. Yet we have realized that we can do little to settle the conflict, and therefore we have left the matter to the United Nations—i.e., swept it under the rug. The problem has not been resolved; neither has it become worse, or led to American expenditures of men or money. It may not be resolved for quite a while. But we have not increased the damage by futile activity.

Lebanon. We heavily implicated our prestige in mediation efforts and even provided a military presence in the hope of reconciling Lebanese factions and stabilizing the country under a central government. Nobody identified a specific American interest in Lebanon that would justify our risk and our investment. We did not succeed in stabilizing the area. Our failure was harmful to our prestige and reduced our regional influence, for the time being. It was costly as well. Nonintervention could not have harmed our interests or damaged our prestige and influence.

One can only speculate on the purpose of our intervention in Lebanon. Was it to limit or reduce the power of Soviet-armed Syria? We did not prevent an increase in Syrian power nor, finally, a dominating Syrian presence in Lebanon. Yet, we could have done so readily had we not intervened to prevent the Israelis from attacking Syrian forces, as they were about to do during the invasion of Lebanon. Syria's defeat, or retreat, would have discredited not only Syria but its Soviet sponsor as well, and increased the prestige of friendly Arab governments. The future historian, who must try to decipher which American interests led us to prevent the Israelis from defeating Syria, is not to be envied.

Israel. We have—for better or worse—made a commitment to Israel. It is unthinkable, both for domestic and foreign policy reasons, to renounce this commitment. Yet despite this costly commitment, we have tried to defeat attempts by Israel to increase its regional power. The apparent purpose of our policy was to ingratiate ourselves with Israel's Arab enemies, to strengthen our role in producing agreements between them and Israel, and to prepare a role in defending the oil-rich Arab governments against Soviet encroachment. None of these purposes has actually been achieved, nor was there reason to believe that they could be. On the contrary, it was obvious that removing the Israeli threat would lead to a dominant role for Syria in Lebanon. The Lebanese factions probably did us a service by helping us leave. The matters in question are best

handled by the Lebanese and by Israel. But one must question a foreign policy that benefits from its defeats.

Iraq, Iran and the Persian Gulf. The shah and his generals lost power when they followed American advice and did not resist the Iranian revolution by military means early on, when that was still possible. They cannot be exonerated, for they did not have to follow our advice. But why did we dispense it? Our ambassador told the Iranian martial law commander: “. . . that these rumors [that we favored a military takeover] are baseless. [We] favor progressive democratization as the only way to solve the crisis. . . . The effect of a military coup . . . would be disastrous.”³

A military takeover would have been the only way of resisting the Ayatollah Khomeini. But American policymakers seem to be convinced that a government cannot remain in power without popular support. Apparently they have never heard of the Soviet Union or, say, Romania. Alternatively, policymakers seem to be so opposed to dictatorships, however pro-American, that they end up fostering anti-American ones, as in Iran.

In any case, we were on bad terms with both Iraq and Iran when they went to war. This is fortunate, for had we been on good terms with Iran, had the shah still ruled, we would undoubtedly have made costly efforts to defend Iran against Iraqi aggression. Luckily, it is unlikely that we will intervene diplomatically or militarily in the war. In this respect, Khomeini may have done us a service by mistreating our diplomats.

It will serve our interest if neither party emerges totally victorious or totally defeated. A totally defeated Iran might fall prey to Soviet domination. A totally victorious Iran might destabilize the (comparatively) pro-American Arab states. A totally victorious Iraq might similarly destabilize Arab governments and threaten Israel. So far our interest in a stalemate has been protected without any cost to us. Perhaps it pays not to have diplomatic relations; it restrains our overeager diplomacy. Diplomatic relations with Iraq have been resumed. But the climate has not, as yet, encouraged aid, and we should not provide it. If aid be necessary to prevent an Iranian victory, Iraq's neighbors have a far greater interest in providing it than we do.

We reacted to Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz by counterthreatening to intervene with military force. The

³ Anthony Parsons, *The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974–1979*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1985.

Iranian threats, or bluffs, have since subsided. Suppose they had not. The only justification for our counterthreats was that Japan and Europe depend on oil shipped through the strait; we depend on it only to a small extent. The closing of the strait would be serious for our European allies, Japan and, above all, the Arab oil-exporting states. Why did we take a leading (rather than a supporting) active role in preventing the closing of the strait? Why did we hover about, offering support? Did we fear that those primarily interested lacked the will—they have the ability—to defend their interests? If so, our doing it for them would not have strengthened that will. However, there was no evidence that our allies lacked the will to defend their interests. We gave them no chance to demonstrate as much, having made it clear, with undue haste, that we stood ready to take their place.

Suppose, now, our allies had failed to protect their interests, and the Strait of Hormuz was temporarily closed. Would that not be just the lesson Japan and Europe need to increase the pace of their rearmament? And the lesson our Arab friends need to understand: that America is an ally willing to help those who help themselves, but unwilling to help otherwise? It is hard to think of anything more salutary for Japan, for NATO and for our Arab friends, than to learn that the United States will hang back unless and until its allies back their own interests. We have never given our allies a chance to learn this lesson.

Africa. In the past we have supported hostile governments in Africa and harassed South Africa because we disapprove of its domestic policies, although South Africa is drawn to us by common geopolitical interests and is the only stable and major military power in the region. Irrational domestic pressures have influenced policy toward South Africa. No administration has tried sufficiently to resist them.

One pertinent reason given for hostility to South Africa was that the country is unpopular among African governments and that cordial relations with it might make us unpopular too. But popularity is a legitimate aim of foreign policy only if foreign policy is confused with public relations, which are, at most, an adjunct. Foreign policy must achieve its goals through using existing power distributions or through changing them. It is unlikely, moreover, that the actual policies of African governments toward the United States will be adversely affected by cordial relations with South Africa. Rhetoric apart, the policies

of African countries are determined by the perceived interests of their governments.

By using its power, South Africa has actually loosened the Soviet grip on southern Africa, particularly in Mozambique and Angola.⁴ South Africa is doing so in its own interest, which here coincides with ours, and the Reagan Administration began, very cautiously, to recognize as much. Still, our anti-South African policies, though easy to explain, are hard to justify. While the Soviet Union was sufficiently interested in a Marxist Angola to dispatch 30,000 Cuban troops to defend its government, the U.S. Congress prohibited help to the rebels led by Savimbi in their continuing attempt to overthrow that government.⁵ South Africa did help. But the Congress refused to sell arms to South Africa.

When Somalia switched to our side, motivated largely by fear of, and hostility to, Ethiopia, which had obtained Soviet backing, we refused to support Somalia's attempt to take the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Soviet military aid, Cuban troops and our refusal to support our new friends enabled Ethiopia to resist successfully. The refusal of U.S. support was justified by then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: "... although our agreement in principle to provide defensive arms to Somalia still stood, their involvement in the Ogaden prevented its implementation. . . . We also would not approve transfers to Somalia of U.S.-manufactured arms in the hands of third countries while Somalia was involved in Ogaden."⁶ To a further appeal from Somalia, Vance responded: "As long as Somalia continued its invasion of Ethiopia. . . . We had to direct our efforts to limiting the conflict and getting Somalia out of the Ogaden so we could provide assistance without serious damage to our African policies."⁷ In effect, Vance supported the Ethiopians and the Soviets for the sake of principles of international legality which have been enforced nowhere, at no time, and certainly were never taken seriously by either the Soviet Union or Ethiopia. Foreign policy and American interests were replaced by legal principles.

⁴ Lately, suggestions have been made that we help the Marxist government of Mozambique, thereby encouraging a more friendly attitude toward the United States. That more friendly attitude will be more readily produced by letting that government simmer for a while longer without U.S. assistance. Meanwhile, let them consolidate their relations with South Africa.

⁵ The Cuban troops are paid by the Angolan government with dollars earned by the sale of oil pumped by the Gulf Corporation in the Cabinda enclave.

⁶ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 73.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

IV

Europe. To contain Soviet expansion, we allied ourselves to Western Europe and placed American troops there. The alliance was needed, and so were our troops, after the Second World War. However, our failure to diminish our military presence as Europe became prosperous and capable of self-defense has weakened Europe's defense forces more than it has strengthened them, by discouraging European military efforts. We also united European pacifists and nationalists in opposition to our military presence. The unification of these antagonists is a major negative accomplishment. Nationalists, who in the past supported national defense, currently oppose American military efforts because they are American, pacifists because they are military.

It can never be in our interest to control, or appear to control, the defense of an independent foreign country—whether Japan or West Germany. We may want to support such a defense. But control basically means that we weaken and partially replace the defense efforts of the country whose defense we control by making it depend on us and by being perceived to be taking care of the matter.⁸ Our control of European defense, produced by our excessive eagerness to continue to shoulder European military burdens, has created nearly insoluble political problems for us and the European governments. Our eagerness has not led to the net increase in European conventional defense efforts that is sorely needed, but to a replacement of European by American forces. The same may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, about Japan. Our eagerness has now cooled, but it is hard for us to extricate ourselves from the situation we have created.

Disarmers have been quite ineffective in France, but comparatively persuasive in West Germany, England and other NATO countries. France is not part of the military arm of NATO, therefore its military effort does not appear American-dominated. Elsewhere, military efforts, labeled American, must bear the heavy political burden of being foreign-dominated.

From a military viewpoint, our ground forces in Europe may

⁸ The only place where our presence and control have done little damage is South Korea. Even there it would be better to help the South Koreans by selling them the arms to defend themselves than to station 40,000 troops in their country, as we do now. In the long run, American control will always be resented. It will also be used by one domestic faction against the other.

well be useful *in loco*; and it would not cost much less to station them in the United States. Yet, politically, their presence in Europe is unlikely to strengthen European self-defense efforts and may weaken them.

Immediate withdrawal may not be the best remedy now, though a phased partial withdrawal may. Clearly, the most important task of the future is to de-Americanize all regional defenses against the Soviet Union. Probably the best way to achieve this is to increase the control of Europeans and Japanese over their own defenses and to replace the substance and the visibility of the American effort abroad. Ultimately, reduction of actual American control and initiative is unavoidable anyway. It should become an American initiative.

Nuclear Weapons. France and England were able to build their own nuclear weapons. Germany was prohibited from doing so. This increased Germany's uneasy dependence on an American military defense; Germans feel that the Americans may not always operate mainly in the German interest as seen by Germans. That feeling is unavoidable and strengthens opposition to American nuclear defense.

National nuclear defenses can no longer be based on the scary and incredible threat of mutual destruction of population centers. Owing to the greater accuracy of nuclear weapons achieved in the last ten years, nuclear defense will consist of the ability to launch nuclear attacks on troops and on military targets. This makes it possible for regional nuclear defense to become the task of the nations on whose territories American missiles and nuclear weapons are now stationed. All tactical (battlefield) weapons, including nuclear ones, therefore should be controlled by the nations on whose territories they are stationed. They are part of national defense and should be de-Americanized.

Tactical use of a limited number of highly accurate nuclear weapons in a localized conflict would not necessarily lead to a strategic exchange between the superpowers. But if such battlefield use occurs under American control, it is much more likely to lead to a world conflagration than would be the case if the weapons were under the control of the nations under attack. Battlefield use may well be perceived as rational, while strategic use could be perceived as irrational. At any rate, there is no way in which the United States can retain for long control of tactical nuclear weapons. Strictly strategic weapons are a

different matter and should remain reserved to the superpowers, wherever technically possible.

V

We now turn to our involvement in broader international endeavors.

Foreign Aid. Another case of indiscriminate intervention is "foreign aid," which, with few exceptions, has not served identifiable American interests and may even have been counterproductive. (I exclude military aid from this discussion.) It also illustrates our habit of spreading ourselves too wide and, therefore, too thin.

Humanitarian reasons may justify aid to foreign populations by private persons, foundations or religious bodies, regardless of foreign policy considerations. But aid by our government to a foreign one should not be inconsistent with our foreign policy aims. It is especially hard to see how our government can justify taxing American citizens to support governments hostile to the United States, and harder still to see why our government should want to do so. Yet this has been our practice. Our foreign aid was proclaimed to be independent of foreign policy. To this day, American agencies allocating foreign aid are reluctant to coordinate their efforts with our foreign policy. Thus, we have not stopped aiding countries even when they have declared themselves to be communist and obtained Soviet military advisers. And we have supported a host of hostile "neutrals" hoping to earn good will and induce a more friendly foreign policy. There is no evidence to suggest that we have succeeded.

As for friendly neutral governments, economic aid was thought to stabilize them and to discourage threatened dependence on the Soviet Union or reduce the anger of pro-Soviet groups taking power. If these were the aims, selective and effective help might have achieved them. But our aid has been neither selective nor effective. No acceptable purpose or effect can be detected in our subsidies to Tanzania, Mali, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia or Ghana (before and after the revolution). What consequences detrimental to U.S. interests did we expect if we failed to aid? What advantages did we expect from our aid? What has our experience taught us?

The Marshall Plan has shown that economic aid can be effective, but except for Taiwan and South Korea, our foreign aid to underdeveloped countries actually has been counterpro-

ductive. It merely helped to perpetuate the bureaucratic elite, often anti-American, of the country aided, and policies which, by restraining local productivity through government regulations, hindered the development they were supposed to foster. In most African countries agricultural production was reduced and cities became crowded because the government compelled farmers to sell their products to it at prices too low to keep farm production profitable. In no small measure, the famines in African countries are due to these policies—in which our government acquiesced and which it subsidized.

Obviously, our aid has depended neither on the effectiveness of its use or on the conduct of a friendly foreign policy by the recipient. It is not clear what it depended on or how the expenditures can be justified. Our foreign aid has not even served temporarily to bribe the governments of underdeveloped countries. For, even in the short run, bribes cannot be effective unless they are conditional. Our aid was not. When the governments of underdeveloped countries did not conduct a foreign policy friendly to us, we did not reduce, let alone eliminate, aid. Independent of the foreign policy of the countries we helped, our aid became independent of our own foreign policy as well. This self-imposed impotence is hard to understand. Our aid to India is one of many possible illustrations. We spent many billions of dollars, whereas the Soviet Union helped very little. Nonetheless, there has been a steady improvement in Soviet-Indian ties, while Indian-American relations have not improved. Perhaps they could not improve for reasons independent of our aid (i.e., our links to Pakistan). But if so, why the aid? What did we hope to achieve? What did we achieve?

The United Nations. The United Nations and its many affiliates were largely a U.S. creation. It has come to haunt us. The veto power of the major powers in the Security Council, instituted reluctantly at Russian insistence, is now what makes it possible for the United States to continue in the United Nations. The majority of the assembly is unlikely ever again to be helpful in the pursuit of American goals, interests or ideals. It may be too much even to hope that it will be neutral. This is true as well for the international organizations related to the United Nations. Yet it is hard to persuade the State Department to see the United Nations as what it has become: a public relations agency working for the other side and doing us no good.

It is not clear what the organization could ever have hoped to achieve, even if it had not fallen into unfriendly hands. By its very nature, the United Nations could not be more than an ill-conceived public relations gesture.

Neither the United Nations nor any of its affiliates are supranational bodies. They are simply the governments of various nations under a different (and ironic) name: the United Nations. This comprehensive group of nations cannot make decisions binding and enforceable *de facto*, or even *de jure*, on any member—since each nation remains sovereign, independent of any superior authority whatever its name. International, as distinguished from supranational, authorities must rely on consent to apply their decisions. If their decisions are reasonable, the unreasonable will not consent. If their decisions are unreasonable, the reasonable will not. Often they are neither.

The International Court of Justice (the members of which are elected by the anti-American assembly), UNESCO, even the Security Council itself, the decisions of which will be increasingly vetoed by the United States—all are likely to be basically opposed to American interests, ideas, ideals and policies. Given the voting procedures of these bodies, their resolutions are not representative of populations or power distribution in the world. Still, the United Nations is often treated as a superior authority, almost a substitute for an independent American foreign policy. This has helped to confuse our foreign policy.

The idea that conflicts should be submitted to the International Court of Justice for decision is still widespread in the United States, because the function, the authority and the power of that court are mistakenly seen as similar to those of a domestic court of law. However, a domestic court has compulsory jurisdiction that the defendant party cannot avoid; it is independent of the parties and it has actual enforcement power. The International Court of Justice has none of these attributes and is at best an arbitration authority to which the parties submit when they feel it convenient.

Although the facts just noted are hardly secret, we continue to bolster the prestige of U.N. affiliates, such as the International Court of Justice, by submitting disputes to them—for instance, the recent American-Canadian fishing dispute. The court could make a reasonable decision in this case, since it did not involve any East-West confrontation; therefore we could accept the decision. However, our submission was inconsistent with the policy we should have of discrediting the court, which

will remain stacked against us. In anything that matters, it will make decisions we cannot accept. The Canadian-American dispute could just as easily have been submitted to an ad hoc arbitration arrangement.

Nicaragua has recently complained against the United States about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. We should have rejected the court's jurisdiction by a priori refusing to defend ourselves in that court. Instead, we tried (vainly, of course) to persuade the court to reject its own jurisdiction. By litigating the matter, we unnecessarily increased the prestige of a court, only to reject its jurisdiction after we had argued against it and the court, predictably, had decided against us.

VI

Finally, we come to Latin America—the current focus of speculation about intervention.

If there has not been as yet a communist takeover of a country, as in Cuba and Nicaragua, our experience appears to have demonstrated that the status quo ante is better than any status quo post brought about by revolution. Although there has been no exception, we are reluctant to learn this lesson, which is that we must support, by appropriate means, any non-communist government against any guerrilla movement. Second, experience teaches that once there has been a communist takeover in Latin America, however disguised initially, all hopes for endogenous democratization or pro-American developments are vain, and there is no point in being conciliatory. No exceptions are known. Yet we are, once more, reluctant to learn from our experience.

On the other hand, right-wing dictatorships can, under favorable conditions, endogenously become democracies without violence, as demonstrated in Argentina and Brazil (and Portugal, Spain and Greece in Europe). We should act accordingly toward Chile, Uruguay and other Latin nations, such as Paraguay, which in time may democratize their institutions.

In Chile and Uruguay, right-wing dictatorships replaced left-wing presidents. In Argentina, right-wing terror was actually sponsored by the military for several years and succeeded in destroying the preceding left-wing terror, which had become quite dangerous, but did so at the cost of many innocent lives. Argentina is now run as a democratic state; so will be Brazil, which underwent a similar though less violent evolution.

In some of the most important countries, such as Mexico, we

have no alternative but to support the existing government, however corrupt and dictatorial. Subversion of the Mexican government is certainly against our interests. But there is no reason to give Mexico economic aid beyond normal trade relations. Such aid is not likely to raise the living standards of anybody but Mexican government officials. We have an interest in a stable, neutral Mexican government, which means that we have an interest in less corruption and more efficiency in Mexico. However, there is nothing much we can do to pursue that interest; economic grants are not likely to produce efficiency or honesty. There is a good case for a passive U.S. policy.

In many Central and South American countries, leftist guerrilla movements are trying to overthrow governments. They did overthrow the dictatorial government of Nicaragua and they presently threaten the democratic government of El Salvador. The situation is similar, if less acute, in Colombia, Guatemala and Peru. In all these countries, the right and left wings terrorize each other, with the government in the middle, unable to control either faction—or, in most cases, its own military forces.

We have no option but to support the governments in question and to help them to gain control of the violence. Experience in Cuba and Nicaragua has shown that a victory of left-wing rebels, over however corrupt and brutal a government, does not decrease human rights violations or lead to democracy. Rather, such a victory merely puts in power a different, usually more totalitarian and politically effective, government—one that is likely to be anti-American as well.

In El Salvador, we are trying to help the elected government to avoid a communist dictatorship, which, like others, might try to export revolution. So far, we have had the wisdom to leave the actual military actions to the local forces primarily concerned. We might do more to support them, but cannot, because of domestic opposition that does not want to support any government that is less than perfect.

In Nicaragua, we encouraged the opposition to Somoza, an old-style corrupt dictator guilty of many human rights violations. Whatever our purpose was, we did not achieve it, as demonstrated by the fact that we are now financing guerrillas (contras) to oppose the Sandinistas who overthrew Somoza. It may well be in our interest to do so, although our purpose here too has been left murky. At a minimum, we seem to be aiming

at paralyzing the Sandinistas, so that they cannot engage in adventures outside Nicaragua; at a maximum, we want to overthrow the Sandinista government. It is unlikely that the minimum interest can be effectively sustained as long as the Sandinistas are in power. Hence, we are stuck with the unavowed maximum.

Although the use of American troops, which would be counterproductive, has not been proposed, we have not been content simply to finance the contras.⁹ We have insisted on controlling them. That Americans are trying to teach native guerrillas how to fight their own war strikes me as plain silly. It demonstrates once more that, even when we leave others to fight for what is primarily their cause, we have an unfortunate tendency to attempt to control them. Our policy should be to support their fight, not to direct it.

VII

Foreign policy is not like a tea party to which one need invite only persons of whom one approves. We had to support the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler—not because Stalin was preferable to Hitler, but because, at the time, Hitler seemed more dangerous. Similarly, we may have to support other dictators against the Soviet Union. Like it or not, this is what we must do if our aim is to safeguard, in Samuel Puffendorff's words, *pax et securitas nationis*. There is no more important aim for our foreign policy. This aim may not require that we kiss hostile dictators, as one of our presidents has done, or that we accept and approve of their domestic arrangements. But it does require that we pursue our interests, with the help of those who share them, and be willing to act in a mutually beneficial way, regardless of whether or not we approve of their domestic conduct.

⁹ Support for the "contras"—until the present pro-Soviet dictatorship is domestically weakened enough to give up its monopoly of power—at, say, \$20 million a year, would be entirely justified even if it took more than ten years to achieve its aim. (The Soviet Union currently spends \$4 billion a year on Cuba—we would spend \$200 million in ten years.)

Jacob K. Javits

WAR POWERS RECONSIDERED

W

e live at a juncture where U.S. foreign policy is at higher risk than at any point since the end of the Vietnam War. Great and sometimes confused and countervailing interests are at stake in Nicaragua; indeed, across Central America. The Persian Gulf is a tinderbox, which could be engulfed in the flames of Islamic fundamentalism. And we have seen the Middle East's coastal plain torn and fragmented to the point of anarchy in Lebanon.

Beirut, once the Paris of the Middle East, today gives full and paradoxical expression to all of the tensions that threaten to rip apart the structures of colliding civilizations. We sense, somehow, that society as we have known it since the Enlightenment is under siege by forces beyond our comprehension. There is no place on earth, whether along the East German border, the dividing line between North and South Korea, or even south of the line between Mexico and the United States, in which we do not sense uncertainty and the potential for violence. It is because we have reached this point, at which conflict threatens to overwhelm the comity that marks civilized society, that we must ensure that steps taken to protect ourselves and our institutions do not, in themselves, become violations of what we are and wish to continue to be.

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 remains one of the firmest supports of our determination that the American people will decide their own fate. I am grateful to have played a central role in the formulation of that resolution. It was the first legislation in our history to establish a statutory framework in which Congress and the president could function so as to give meaning to the constitutional authority over war.

In one sense it was—and is—a question of the paramountcy

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of the civilian over the military; the power of Congress to declare war, which is civilian, and the power of the president, as commander in chief, which is military. We cannot place the great question of war or peace in the hands of a single human being, not even our president. But we are so crowded by our sense of assault that the temptation is great to turn to an individual surrogate to shield us.

Indeed, the President, as I write, is under extraordinary pressure to take action—some kind, any kind—that will validate the effectiveness of U.S. power to protect our citizens in the world beyond these shores. The spotlight now shines with dreary intensity on the aftermath of the hostage crisis involving 40 Americans taken by terrorists in Beirut. There can be no more critical, no more agonizingly difficult political vantage point from which to examine the question of who makes war.

II

Our Constitution's Founding Fathers could have had no grasp of the enormous changes and frightening potential of uncontrolled armed conflict in the late twentieth century. But, much to their credit, the statesmanship they exercised produced a document that has lived for two centuries beyond its conception. No other written constitution has survived in such good health over anything approaching a similar span of time.

Those eighteenth-century farmer-politicians had a sense that the fundamental values of a republic can be given effective expression only if the mechanisms of government interlock in such a way as to assure a system of checks and balances that permits action, flexibility and—in grave matters—the bedrock expression of the common will. That is why, among all the other splendid architectural structures within the Constitution, we find the president accorded the powers of “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” (Article II, Section 2) and the Congress empowered with the constitutional responsibility “to declare war” (Article I, Section 8).

The constitution-makers thus divided the responsibility for engagement in armed conflict between the executive and legislative branches of the government. There can be little doubt that their objective here, as elsewhere, was to maintain an unresolved tension between the institutional authority of the two branches, the executive and legislative, thereby leaving the political decision to the people.

The Founders, being men of the eighteenth century when

monarchy still flourished, recognized the power of the intense symbolism that would be attached to the office of the president. The person who occupied that post, although designated as the head of a single branch of government, would be accorded recognition as the expression of the nation. In the presidency, fellow citizens would see themselves as "a people." For over 200 years, this extra-constitutional dimension to the president's authority has tipped the scales whenever there has been an issue between Congress and the president over the authority to engage in armed conflict. There can be no doubt, however, that the constitutional intention was to endow the president with all the powers that ultimately adhere to a military commander but, at the same time, to withhold from him the ultimate authority on the gravest political decision of whether to "declare war."

One can certainly make the case that the restrictions on the power to make war, in the actuality of committing the nation to war, have been successfully flouted by presidents from the days of the Barbary pirates to yesterday's headlines. On most of these occasions, Congress has backed away from a confrontation with the chief executive as to the constitutional settlement of the question.

One can also make the argument that these violations of constitutional principle have, in and of themselves, changed the meaning of the Constitution. Certainly, if one actually subscribes to the notion that "to declare war" is simply a formality and was so regarded when it was written into the Constitution as a guiding principle, there is little to discuss about the power to declare war. In this case, we are then, constitutionally, citizens of a republic in which the chief executive may risk American lives at any time, at any place on earth, at his own discretion.

I believe the weight of our history strongly implies just the opposite. Further, and of even greater consequence, the presidential incursions on the war powers of the Congress have always been covert and gradual—strongly implying that the men who have violated this congressional power were uneasy over the right and the consequences of their actions. In the 200 or so instances of exercise of presidentially ordered force against foreign enemies, we have yet to see an acknowledgment by the chief executive that he is committing the nation to war. We have had "police actions"; we have had "surgical strikes"; we have had "invitations to assist." We have had, in other

words, a bad case of euphemism-itis. For war is war; and the loss of life, the expenditure of treasure and the agony of the people, as we all have good reason to know, is occasioned by acts of war and not by anything else.

I noted earlier that the Constitution's flexibility was one of the most important gifts made to posterity by the political craftsmen who shaped our institutions. Unfortunately, we have seen that flexibility used to far greater effect in this arena by presidents than by Congress. The manipulative potential in the presidential office is so large that to challenge it under the international gun has taken political courage beyond that of the Congress as an institution through much of our history. The legislative branch has, time and again, been reactive to events as shaped by outside forces, and by presidential initiatives and responses as a function of the president's self-perceived authority as commander in chief.

III

Progress has been made in reestablishing congressional authority, although the constitutional struggle continues.

In 1973, an undeclared war in Vietnam that caused greater agony in the United States than any event since the Civil War was drawing to an unhappy and grotesque conclusion. We were forced for the first time in our history to acknowledge a military defeat. Fifty thousand American lives, and countless numbers of Vietnamese lives, bled away in Indochina.

It was this tragic war that finally forced Congress to a succession of acts that limit the president's power to impose his military writ as he so chooses. The culmination of that effort was the War Powers Resolution, which passed both houses of Congress in November 1973, but only after both houses overrode President Nixon's veto by the requisite majorities of two-thirds. This veto was symptomatic of the position of presidents who resist any curb on their power to commit the nation to war. The veto was overridden because of the urgent need of the people to establish some restraint on the presidency and to safeguard the constitutional responsibility vested in the Congress to declare war, a power to be exercised by the Congress alone without any presidential consent or signature.

Under the War Powers Resolution, the president must consult with Congress "in every possible instance" *before* introducing the armed forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the

circumstances.” Under Section 4(a)(1), the president must report to Congress on the status of U.S. troops in such situations. Section 5(b), perhaps the engine of the resolution, requires the president to withdraw such troops within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes their continued presence. He must, in any case, withdraw them immediately if directed to do so by a concurrent congressional resolution, which is not subject to a presidential veto. Recently, however, the Congress did make such action subject to a presidential veto when in October 1983 it gave President Reagan authority to keep the marines in Lebanon for up to 18 months.

The War Powers Resolution did not, and does not, guarantee the end of presidential war, but it does present Congress with the means by which it can stop presidential war if it has the will to act. The resolution does not represent an effort to tie the president’s hands or to deny him his rightful powers—as previous presidents have charged. Rather, the legislation provides the method by which the Congress and the president can render a collective judgment on the question of whether to risk war.

IV

Nevertheless, I must express my misgivings as to the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution thus far: the resolute will of Congress is the issue here.

The fact is that the last three Presidents—Messrs. Ford, Carter and Reagan—have consulted with the Congress on occasion, sometimes reluctantly and even grudgingly; the consultations have varied greatly in quality from good to superficial. Also, the record shows that presidents took military measures without the effective prior consultation with Congress that is required under the resolution.

President Ford’s actions in the Mayaguez incident in 1975 cost the lives of 40 U.S. marines. In the event, it developed that the ill-fated rescue attempt was unnecessary. In this case the President consulted with a mixed group of members of the House and Senate foreign relations committees after the orders had been issued to the marines to engage in combat and while they were on their way to Southeast Asia. The President did, however, report to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution on this occasion.

In connection with the actions of President Ford in 1975 when U.S. troops and American, Vietnamese and Cambodian

civilians were evacuated from Saigon and Phnom Penh, again there was a pass at consultation. It is fair to add that the situation was dire and that statutory law gave some accommodation to the use of troops for these evacuations.

President Carter's unsuccessful rescue attempt of our hostages held in Iran was also undertaken with no real prior consultation with Congress. It was said only that a guarded reference was made on the subject to Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), the majority leader, a day before the action took place. This was justified on the grounds that secrecy was vital to the operation and that it was humanitarian. But secrets have been kept in the Congress; for example, the Manhattan Project, which invented the atomic bomb; and the danger of leaks is just as real in the White House as it is in the Congress, as history has shown.

President Reagan's deployment of U.S. marines to Beirut in 1982 and 1983 involved substantial disregard of the War Powers Resolution, when viewed in its totality. When the President first acted in August 1982 to deploy the marines in Beirut to assure the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization fighters, there was real consultation with the House and Senate foreign relations committees. But when the marines were redeployed after the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon and the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps, the avoidance of the War Powers Resolution began, until a final showdown with the Congress when the marines began to suffer casualties in August of 1983. When the President spoke to the Congress during this latter period, he was careful to skirt the War Powers Resolution in defining his authority, and rather referred to his "constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief."

There was considerable comment in the press and in Congress regarding the President's distinct avoidance of the impact of the War Powers Resolution in his communication with Congress. The actions he was taking were clearly subject to the operative section of the resolution which gives the Congress the power to compel a withdrawal within 60 to 90 days of U.S. armed forces who were obviously engaged in hostilities due to military necessity. The Congress could have compelled such action by itself in invoking that provision of the resolution. In fact, the foreign relations committee chairman, Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.), and the ranking member, Senator Clai-

borne Pell (D-R.I.), wrote the President specifying such action. It was only the force of public opinion that finally made the President come to terms on this subject with the Congress.

Then, in reporting to Congress, the President did cite the War Powers Resolution, but took care not to cite the section of the act under which he made the report. In so doing, the President refrained from triggering the time clock that would give him only 60 to 90 days to keep the troops in Lebanon without congressional authority. In this case, public opinion and congressional will compelled the President and the Congress to work out a compromise.

The President was given authority by Congress by a joint resolution in October 1983 to keep the U.S. marines in Lebanon for up to 18 months; he also accepted the fact that if Congress wanted them to be withdrawn sooner, he would have to sign an appropriate resolution to that effect (the Congress could also override by a two-thirds vote of each house). On the other hand, the President conceded that the War Powers Resolution was applicable.

It is significant that an amendment to limit the time to six months was narrowly defeated in committee. The delay in getting the use of the War Powers Resolution and the length of time given in the compromise resolution was inordinately long for such an operation, considering the limit of 60 to 90 days.

This compromise resolution showed congressional reluctance to invoke the War Powers Resolution in a timely way, and according to its terms. Looking back on the death of 241 U.S. marines, because of a suicide truck bombing by terrorists, one wonders whether that tragedy of October 23, 1983, might have been averted if the legislative clock under the War Powers Resolution had been running.

President Reagan's actions with respect to Nicaragua have caused great concern about compliance with the War Powers Resolution. U.S. troops in substantial numbers have engaged in war exercises in Honduras with Honduran troops on the border with Nicaragua. Mines have been sown in Nicaraguan waters and the ships of other nations endangered, and "contras," rebels fighting Nicaraguan forces, have been supported under the commander in chief's authority. Here, too, is a mixed bag, as Congress has voted non-military aid for the contras.

Perhaps the clearest example, thus far, of presidential indif-

ference to the statutory obligation to consult with Congress on war has been our action in Grenada, desirable as this may have been. Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (D-Md.), a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has noted that “congressional leaders were simply called to the Oval Office and told that the troops were under way. That is not consultation. The Prime Minister of Great Britain was advised about the invasion before the President told the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the Majority Leader of the Senate.”

If a president had treated the Congress in such a preemptory fashion with regard to any other constitutional mandate, he would have faced an angry legislature jealous of its prerogatives and refusing to allow them to be whittled away. But, in the matter of the greatest power of them all—the authority to put our people at war—Congress has been relatively reluctant in asserting its rightful obligation.

I can bear witness, myself, to the inadequate resolve displayed in such matters by well-intentioned legislators. The pressure of the threat of armed conflict is such that even I found myself willing to compromise, to lean in the direction of the presidency, by giving either more time or a wider latitude of discretion to presidential actions than warranted by the specific provisions of the War Powers Resolution. I was one of those who endorsed President Ford’s Mayaguez action, although at one level I had to know that there was no rationale in the context of the War Powers legislation that should justify a president’s dispatching marines into a combat situation and *then* reporting to Congress. In the dispute over the use of marines in Lebanon, the effort once more was to put the onus on those who would restrain a president. The President resisted invoking the War Powers Resolution, but Congress threatened to withhold funds. The resulting compromise was too favorable to presidential incursion on congressional war powers.

I recall all of these episodes with deep sadness, for they underline the overweening power of the presidency in periods of crisis. The reluctance to challenge the president is founded in an awareness that he holds, in large degree, the fate of the nation in his hands. We all wish to assist and sustain the presidency. But I have come to the conclusion that the awesome nature of the power over war in our time should require us to withhold, in relevant cases, that unquestioning support of the presidency. This, despite the fact that when U.S. troops are

under fire it may appear that a legislator is foot-dragging when he or she questions whether a particular legal requirement has been observed. Such a legislator runs the risk of being attacked for "nitpicking." The overwhelming temptation is to wait and see, to let the dust settle. I believe that this dust will never settle.

V

The threat to the congressional war-declaring power continues.

A bill to repeal the War Powers Resolution has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who opposed it originally in 1973, and by Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.). Though the bill is not expected to go anywhere, it evidences a determined effort to eliminate the resolution if possible.

Developments beyond the congressional/presidential relationship also have threatened it. When the Supreme Court decided in a 1983 case, *Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization vs. Chadha* (unrelated to the war power), that Congress constitutionally could not employ the legislative veto, many concluded that the legal basis of the War Powers Resolution had been fatally undermined. The fact of the matter is that a large part of the act is totally unaffected by that decision. The 60-to-90-day limit on the use of troops overseas is untouched. Provisions constraining the growth of forces and the change of mission also remain untouched by the legislative veto aspect of the court's dictum. Also, the provisions for reporting and consultation and the legislative priorities for considering measures under the War Powers Resolution remain unaffected.

In this connection, I should note my own strong belief that the War Powers Resolution is founded on levels of constitutional power in the Congress so broad that they raise a political question which the Supreme Court will not review.

Some further efforts to strengthen the resolution may be worthwhile. A rewriting of the original resolution is at present before the Senate in a bill introduced by Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) with the co-sponsorship of Senators Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and John C. Stennis (D-Miss.). No hearings have been called on this bill; it would attempt to bring the resolution back to the form adopted by the Senate in 1972, which the House in conference would not accept. The War Powers Resolution, as originally passed by the Senate, specified

affirmatively the powers of the president with respect to war. These were: to defend against any attack on the United States, its territories and possessions; to repel any attack on U.S. armed forces abroad; to protect endangered U.S. citizens abroad for purposes of evacuation; and pursuant to specific statutory authorization by Congress.

Cyrus Vance, secretary of state under President Carter, gave a magnificent analysis of the constitutional validity and public-interest benefit of the War Powers Resolution, in delivering the Owen J. Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in February of 1984. Mr. Vance also made certain specific recommendations for amendment. He called, for example, for the appointment of a defined group of congressional leaders with whom consultation under the War Powers Resolution would be authorized. This group would include the House and Senate leaders of the majority and minority and the chairmen and ranking members of both foreign relations committees and of both armed services committees. Should the Congress undertake to amend the War Powers Resolution, it should consider such a provision, though the Senate and House foreign relations committees are the appropriate bodies established by Congress for such consultations as are called for by the War Powers Resolution.

VI

The victory on the War Powers Resolution in 1973 was hard-fought and hard-won. At a time of strain between the United States and the Soviet Union it should not be jeopardized. It is most significant that in 1982, when the question arose in the Senate of passing a resolution involving Cuba similar to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution against North Vietnam, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) moved to reaffirm the War Powers Resolution. His motion carried by a vote of 97-2.

Congress, no matter how great the pressure to knuckle under, must find the will to bring the people to conscious and active support of the War Powers Resolution. This might be done, among other actions, by congressional hearings on the resolution specifically targeted on U.S. policy regarding Nicaragua and any comparable areas of danger.

Congressional will is the issue. It is much more difficult for 535 individuals to sustain a single course of action than it is for a determined president to have his way. That is why Congress must disregard the differences among its members and fight

for its constitutional prerogatives. The struggle must be waged on the ground that the interests of the people who suffer and die and pay for war are safeguarded best by joining the Congress in the war power.

Advanced technology, instantaneous communications and super-weapons are an ever-increasing threat to the stability of international relationships. Living on such a quake-filled fault, we are entitled, at least, to an expression of our collective will as to the way we survive—or whether we survive.

UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL: ISRAEL'S SECURITY OPTION

Through nearly four decades, the circumstances of its creation and existence have forced the modern state of Israel into a deep-seated preoccupation with security, the precondition for its survival. As the nature of the threats to its continued existence changed at various junctures between 1947 and the present, so have the military and security doctrines guiding national policy. Israel now stands at another turning point, and the time has come for a new security doctrine, a strategy resting upon long-standing principles, but significantly modified to meet the circumstances of 1985 and beyond.

At the start, Israel's security doctrine was basically defensive. Firmly established by David Ben-Gurion, it reflected the lessons learned from the 1948–49 war for independence and the physical realities which existed thereafter. Security policy changed dramatically, however, in the wake of the triumphant 1967 war. Israel then confronted new borders, conquered territory, an emerging Palestinian nationalism and, within the country, the birth of a dangerous spirit of annexationism. The rise of Menachem Begin's Likud government in 1977 and the elevation of Ariel Sharon to minister of defense in 1981 marked another sharp shift in the security concept of the state, a doctrine nakedly offensive in nature that would end in the creeping disaster of Lebanon.

My aim here is to propose a new security policy that suits the conditions of the late 1980s, that offers a pragmatic way to confront the Palestinian issue constructively while ensuring the security of Israel's eastern frontier. It is a policy that draws upon concepts advanced (prematurely, as it turned out) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In brief, it calls for a unilateral withdrawal of Israel's military and administrative occupation forces from the West Bank, coupled with boundary modifica-

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tions to satisfy Israel's security needs, and the establishment of an autonomy area by the local Palestinian population. The policy is incremental, dealing with the facts on the ground, uninhibited by the somnolent prospects for peace treaties with the surrounding Arab states.

II

The salient and unchanging fact of Israeli security is that Israel cannot survive the loss of a war. This is the basis of all Israeli security doctrines, beginning with the 1948–49 war for independence. For Ben-Gurion it meant that the next war would be fought in Arab territory. Indeed, territory has been the chief concern of Israel's military and political planners since the foundation of the state.

In 1955, Moshe Dayan, then chief of staff, said the term "frontier security" had little meaning in the context of Israel's geography. "The entire country is a frontier, and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of neighboring states."¹ Security for Israeli generals and military planners meant a strategy of tactical offense in order to preserve the strategic defense. The armed forces of the new state were pointedly named the "Israel Defense Forces" (IDF), and for close to two decades the military establishment lived up to its name.

The struggle for survival became a matter of territory and cease-fire lines, a fight for political and physical space. Ben-Gurion, after all, had accepted the partitioned state (as others, including Menachem Begin, had not) and sought only to dominate those parts of Palestine which were either unpopulated or already populated by a heavy Jewish majority.

The Six-Day War of June 1967 was consistent in its conduct with the Ben-Gurion strategy of the tactical offense. Its aftermath, however, altered Israeli security thinking in a massive way. The war radically changed the strategic map of the Middle East; Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Sinai—all of historic Palestine, and more. On June 10, 1967, a satisfied General Dayan called the new extended borders "ideal." Israel's defense perimeter stretched from the Suez Canal to the Jordan River and the heights above the Sea of Galilee.

¹ Major-General Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955, p. 250.

Dayan's enthusiasm was premature, as he himself came to realize in his last years. The new borders presented a whole new set of problems, fraught with contradictions and dangers which were not immediately apparent.

The euphoria of the moment dictated a new defensive strategy which would no longer be even tactically offensive. There was no longer a need to penetrate Arab territory; there was no longer any need to defend internal strategic lines and targets, nor did the physical security of the Israeli populace seem threatened. For the first time, Israel had achieved physical and territorial security while allowing the IDF the space and use of external lines of defense. The entire country was no longer a frontier.

As in 1947, the political challenge was to implement a satisfactory territorial partition, to bring an end to the frontier mentality and conduct a foreign and defense policy built on the strength of a victorious war. Instead of taking the initiative to honor its long-standing commitment to a secure but partitioned state, the Labor Party government fumbled the opportunity.

Indolent and unimaginative Labor leaders failed to establish peace with any Arab country, nor did they deliberately confront the issues raised by the suddenly acquired territory on the West Bank and Gaza. They were slow to recognize, and then failed to respond to, the emerging Palestinian nationalism embodied in a newly coherent Palestine Liberation Organization. In 1970, for instance, the cabinet of Prime Minister Golda Meir refused to consider a partial settlement with the new post-Nasser Egyptian government of Anwar Sadat that would have reopened the Suez Canal. Meir and her colleagues failed miserably to respond to the rising power and reputation of the PLO among the Arabs and on the international scene.

The Meir policy, and Israel itself, suffered a rude awakening in October 1973 when Egypt and Syria surprised the IDF, as well as Israel's entire political elite, with a sudden and initially effective assault across the new borders of Israel. The lines drawn in 1967 were shown to be far from "ideal." But the central political and ideological conflicts between Israel and the Arab world were not altered by the 1973 war, nor did the aftermath of the fighting immediately change Israeli strategy toward the West Bank. The next fundamental change in security doctrine came only with the 1977 election.

III

The Likud coalition government which came to power in July 1977 was totally dedicated to the realization of historical Palestine in its entirety, uncontaminated by talk of any partition. The new prime minister, Menachem Begin, and his Likud supporters legitimized the strategy of annexation not only in the name of security, but in the name of national religious messianism.

Begin, a devout disciple of Revisionist Zionist founder Ze'ev Jabotinsky, wanted to fulfill his mentor's two basic dreams: to extend Israel's territorial boundaries to the Jordan River and eventually to claim sovereignty over the provinces of Judea and Samaria, known to others as the West Bank. More ominously, Begin was determined to delegitimize Palestinian nationalistic aims by extending the security doctrine of settlements, laid down by Labor, perverting it to aim toward an unvarnished, naked policy of annexation, and bring about a Palestinian exodus from the West Bank.

From the beginning, Begin sought peace with Egypt in order to be free to deal with the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the PLO in Lebanon. There is no question that Begin was sincere in his desire to have peace with Egypt; after all, such an accomplishment would loom large in the history books. He could claim that although Ben-Gurion may have built the state, he, Begin, made peace. The treaty was indeed a revolutionary event in Middle East history and it appealed to Begin's sense of vanity. Thus, he was quite willing to surrender what turned out to be economically crucial Egyptian territory, especially the oil fields of the Sinai.

But on the Palestinian question, he would not budge. All the protracted, legalistic machinations which Begin practiced at Camp David were designed to dilute, confuse and complicate the controversial provisions known as the autonomy plan, which relegated the Palestinian question to solution at a future date.

The signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty on September 23, 1979, marked a new stability and security. The goals of historical Zionism and Israel seemed to have been fulfilled. The territory was now secured in the sense that Egypt, by signing the treaty, recognized the physical and political reality of Israel in formal writ—the first Arab nation to do so. In real terms, Israel's southern borders were now secured by treaty.

The long eastern borders with Jordan had been ipso facto pacified by a pragmatic and tacit understanding with Jordan.

The only prospect of a challenge to Israeli power came from the existence of the PLO and its state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon. It was a threat that could not be ignored. Ariel Sharon, once he became defense minister in 1981, defined a new offensive strategy, ambitious in both military and political terms. Starting in Lebanon, the military target was the destruction of the PLO state, but this would be geared to a far-reaching political objective: to make Lebanon a Christian, non-Arab state dominated by the Gemayel family, Israel's shaky political allies. Once this was fulfilled, so the doctrine went, Israel would proceed to reconstitute Jordan as a Palestinian state, even to the point, if necessary, of supporting Yasir Arafat in overthrowing King Hussein.

Sharon's plans were built on sand. The war he initiated in 1982 in Lebanon drew no new map, only the old divisive jumble of a Lebanon dominated by Syria. Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, while the Druze and Shi'ite minorities, the latter especially anti-Israel, joined to fill the vacuum left by a declining Christian president. Lebanon once again became an Arab state wracked by civil war; the peace instrument, signed by Israel, Lebanon and the United States, was rescinded four months after it was signed. Israel's pre-1982 security zone in the south of Lebanon was once again untenable. The offensive strategy was an abject failure.

IV

The conventional wisdom in Israel and America still is that Israel is a frontier, and that the Arabs are capable of crippling, even destroying, the state. Extremists argue that if Israel were not occupying the West Bank it would become an outpost of the Soviet Union. Does this habitual viewpoint coincide with today's realities?

Could it be that a state with one of the most modern and efficient armies in the world is an insecure frontier state? Does Israel really fear a threat coming from a PLO now torn asunder and virtually impotent? Does Israel really need an intermediary to settle its eastern frontiers and solve the Palestine problem? Does Israel need a formal peace treaty with Jordan, whose border with Israel has been pacified since 1967?

The actual circumstances of today suggest a basic, though perhaps unpopular, truth: whatever their ideological yearnings,

however accustomed Israelis have become to their domain over Judea and Samaria, an occupied territory populated with a million Arabs is no strategic or ideological asset. Furthermore, Israel now is powerful enough to initiate political and military steps that will meet its security needs and purposes.

The focus of any future security policy for Israel must once again be the eastern front, the Jordan River and a solution to the Palestinian problem.

My proposal is a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank by the IDF military organization and occupation administration. In its place would be the establishment of an autonomy area administered by the local Palestinian population. Finally, Israel would declare the Jordan River to be its security frontier.

Seventeen years of military occupation have taken a heavy toll on Israeli society, and they have utterly failed to quell Arab aspirations. On the contrary, Israeli occupation only stimulated Palestinian Arab nationalism; it became a target for Palestinian anger and militancy. Israel stands to achieve greater security by ending a military occupation that only exacerbates Palestinian nationalist feelings; the termination of Israeli bureaucratic and military domination cannot help but lower the level of antagonism to Israel in the West Bank.

Removing the burden of governance would give Israel a sudden freedom to maneuver, freedom to establish its own security zone on the Jordan River, freedom from the pressure of public opinion at home and abroad that rightly denies the Jewish state the dubious luxury of maintaining an alien occupation. Withdrawal can be accomplished on Israel's own initiative, for its own good reasons, even if there is no readiness to negotiate among the Arabs.

The next phase, an autonomous Arab administration, would be something different from the so-called Accord B of the Camp David arrangements, which became known as the "autonomy plan." This plan was cumbersome, verbose, unnecessarily legalistic and unrealistic. It required a four-party procedure for negotiation: Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestinian Arabs would all have to agree on the process. The negotiations already held on Accord B in 1979 and early 1980 lasted for less than a year—and they involved only two parties, Egypt and Israel.

My proposal, by contrast, means that local Arabs would simply replace the withdrawing Israeli administration with an administration of their own. Autonomy means freedom of

political, economic and social actions; freedom to elect mayors and village councils. It does not mean a program for the establishment of a Palestinian government. An overall autonomy administration elected by the Palestinian population of the West Bank may indeed be the first stepping-stone toward political sovereignty, but no Israeli government in the foreseeable future will have the capacity or willingness to accept Palestinian Arab sovereignty over a territory between Israel and Jordan.

This proposal may not sound all that new or novel, and in fact it is not. It is a considerably modified and updated version of a familiar concept known as the Allon Plan, proposed by the late Yigal Allon and refined with the mature wisdom of Moshe Dayan.

v

Yigal Allon, then deputy prime minister and minister of education in the Meir cabinet, conceived his security plan on July 13, 1967, almost immediately after the military victories of the Six-Day War. His strategy was rooted in the Labor movement's traditional pragmatism, optimism and liberalism. The Allon Plan defined the Jordan River as Israel's defensive eastern frontier. It sought to ensure Israel's security by establishing a string of military settlements on the Jordan River, the Golan Heights and Gaza.

The cabinet approved the installation of military settlements stretching 15 kilometers along the unpopulated, arid desert areas of Judea and the Jordan Valley. Jerusalem and its environs were annexed outright and protected by new settlements, an Israeli *fait accompli*. The IDF position was moved forward to the Jordan River, backed by the strategic concept that the IDF henceforth would deter any Jordanian invasion and would be in a position to threaten the state of Jordan. Thus, the Israeli defense perimeter was brought from the older border close to the Mediterranean all the way to the Jordan River, ending the threat of a divided Israel as presented by the old pre-1967 borders.

The Allon Plan aimed to deal with the Arab states and the Palestinians from a position of strength, but it aimed to deal in the liberal tradition of the Labor Party. The plan called for "immediate negotiations with Arab leaders of the West Bank with the idea of forming an Arab autonomous district in all the area not included in the Jewish territory that would be linked

economically with Israel and buttressed by a mutual security pact.”

Even though the creation of military settlements in the occupied territories represented a form of annexation, Allon himself rejected annexation per se. His plan envisioned negotiations, albeit with a mailed fist. As Allon put it, “from the position of strength and reasonableness we will hopefully awaken the Arabs to meet the real world.”²

Dayan, by then one of Israel’s most imaginative strategists, seemed to sum up the attitude of the time by saying that: “We shall not go to Cairo nor to Beirut. We want to halt Palestinian terror anywhere in depth and in all the unexpected places. Above all the doctrine of IDF from now on must be ‘defensive,’ that is to defend the Jordan River. We must not return to the old map.”³

But Dayan’s thinking did not stop there. In an interview with *The New York Times* on June 21, 1969, he said that “Israel’s greatest problem is to find the means of being able to live with the Arabs. There are 2.5 million of us and 100 million of them. We can fight them, kill them, and they can kill us, but in the final analysis we will have to live with them. . . . Occupation is not the final word.”

My current proposal, then, is a modification of the Allon-Dayan model of a unilateral withdrawal, linked to a local Palestinian autonomy and retention of an Israeli military primacy west of the Jordan River. It is a viable alternative to two other options for dealing with the Palestinian issue that have been tried and found wanting.

The Camp David model can now be dismissed. The principal actors in any sort of Camp David-style negotiations—Jordan and the PLO—possess neither the political power nor the kind of influence in the Arab world to make the courageous and daring political stand taken by Anwar Sadat. Nor, for that matter, are the PLO or Jordan stable political regimes or organizations whose leaders can take radical steps without Arab approval. They cannot defy the so-called Arab consensus against any political arrangement with Israel that leads to peace and recognition. The PLO, especially, is too weak and divided to make such a move.

The short-lived “peace” in Lebanon, where a pact was

² Author’s interview with Allon, Jerusalem, July 20, 1967.

³ Interview with Moshe Dayan, *Ma’ariv*, July 10, 1970.

achieved primarily and temporarily under the guns of the IDF, is equally flawed: the key figures represented a divided, strife-torn political entity and state, bereft of a single unified governmental authority.

When the strategy of a unilateral withdrawal was conceived by Allon and Dayan between 1967 and 1977, domestic, regional and international politics were not ripe for its implementation. The government of Golda Meir was in no way prepared to attempt such a radical move as territorial withdrawal without gaining a formal peace treaty. The government of Yitzhak Rabin was ready for some incremental changes tied to bilateral arrangements with Egypt and Syria, but even the setbacks of the 1973 war did not make the broader concept acceptable to his government. Then, certainly, the Likud governments between 1977 and 1984 were in no way sympathetic to such an approach.

The conditions on the ground today are remarkably changed, both in the Arab world and within Israel. The Egyptian peace treaty has created a thaw of sorts in relations between Israel and the leading Arab state. The Israeli-Syrian troop separation arrangement of 1974 pacified the Golan Heights border between Israel and Syria. The PLO in southern Lebanon has been tremendously crippled and torn asunder by internal battles. The Iran-Iraq war took Iraq out of the confrontationist and rejectionist ranks. The Reagan Administration has a different approach to the Middle East, being unwilling to involve itself in protracted negotiations as Jimmy Carter did. It is also less sympathetic to the PLO than was Carter.

The political conditions in Israel and in the Arab world call for moderation and for lowering the level of their ambitious aspirations. Israel itself is politically divided, run by an interim caretaker government, exhausted politically and physically by the wrenching experience of Lebanon. In the Arab world, the oil weapon has been blunted and the Arab nations are divided over the Iran-Iraq war, over fundamentalism and secularism, Shi'ism and Sunnism, moderate and rejectionist regimes.

Today, Israel is badly in need of an end to national division and the reestablishment of a security strategy that conforms with its capabilities. The political, domestic, regional and international dynamics which exist today ought to affect the behavior of Israel's political and military elite and re-anchor them in the old wisdom. Israel after Lebanon must take the initiative. It would be to its advantage to do so.

The concept of administrative withdrawal, autonomy and an Israeli security line along the Jordan would be an excellent start. It has most of the ingredients for Israel to protect its strategic and security interests while provisionally quelling PLO aspirations for an independent Palestinian state.

The first imperative for a successful Israeli withdrawal is an assured demilitarization of the West Bank. In fact, Israel must announce that a return of radical Palestinians to the territory would be an open declaration of war against Israel. Of course there will always be a danger of guerrilla and terrorist activities in the wake of the departing military occupation. Yet the West Bank population has quickly learned that the price of terror is high. The ever-present risk of terrorist activities cannot be allowed to determine the course of Israeli security policy.

Autonomy for the Palestinians could over time evolve in three different ways. It could become the basis for an independent Palestinian state; this idea is utopian and unrealistic, and would be taken as tantamount to a declaration of war.

A second possible evolution would be a Palestinian confederation with Jordan, and this makes more sense than any alternative. The relationship between the Jordanians and Palestinians goes back to 1950, when Jordan established its rule over Arab Palestine after the partition begun by the United Nations. Jordanian political and economic involvement is deeply rooted in the West Bank. Many Palestinian officials are even now on the payroll of the Jordanian government. For all intents and purposes, there already exists an Israeli-Jordanian condominium over the area.

The third option, an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, is further in the future, and realizable only upon the prior foundation of the second option.

Why should the Palestinians accept an autonomy hemmed in by an Israeli *cordon sanitaire*? In fact, they are already hemmed in. The 17 years of occupation and settlement changed the physical map of the West Bank. Israeli settlements already encircle major Arab cities. The Allon Highway cut and isolated major Arab population centers like Hebron and Schechem (Nablus). Israeli military and settlement planners tore asunder the contiguity between the northern part, Samaria, and the southern part, Judea.

The choice for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank is

indeed very meager, squeezed as they are between expanding Israel and invigorated Jordan. But would they accept a unilateral Israeli withdrawal as the last word on the political partition of Palestine? Certainly not. Yet relief from a military government could create new conditions, new opportunities, a new mood.

What is there in the plan for Jordan? Jordan stands to gain enormously from an end to Israeli occupation, and becomes critical for a moderate solution of the Palestinian problem. The Rabat diktat that the PLO is the master of the Palestinian destiny is practically dead; Arafat's total defeat in Beirut and Tripoli strengthened the hand of King Hussein. Buoyed by Egypt, Iraq and the Gulf states, Jordan becomes Arab nationalism's linchpin. A Jordanian-Palestinian confederation would considerably enhance Jordanian influence in the West Bank and in the Arab world.

What would happen if, after an Israeli withdrawal, a PLO state or other hostile arrangements were unilaterally proclaimed? The IDF stationed on the Jordan River would be the best protection against a radical Palestinian military force.

What would an autonomous West Bank look like after an Israeli withdrawal? Israel would end its policy of settling Jews in and around Palestinian urban centers. The Arabs living in these communities would see their future tied to the concept of Palestinian autonomy. Instead of settling the heart of Judea and Samaria, Israel could thicken its security presence eastward along the Sharon Valley and around the Jerusalem environs. No government of Israel could survive on a policy of total withdrawal or abandonment of these political and strategic strongholds.

In this area—the Jerusalem concentric circle, Mount Hebron, the mountains of Samaria and the strategic strip from Beisan to the Dead Sea on the Jordan River—no political sovereignty or military power could be surrendered to the Palestinians. The western part of Palestine, a 600-kilometer front along the Jordan River to the Red Sea, is a strategic *cordon sanitaire* for Israel.

Nevertheless, Israel could abandon the Begin-Sharon commitment to the political and territorial annexation of the West Bank. The territory in question must be considered purely on strategic and pragmatic grounds. The ideology of the Land of Israel must die a national, and hopefully a natural, death. Conversely, the Palestinians themselves must abandon the no-

tion that the United States, their Arab brethren or their own military power could persuade Israel to abandon its strategic requirements along the Jordan River.

Disengaged from Arab urban centers, Israel would have to withdraw the occupation bureaucracy and bury the tacit policy, so forcefully conducted by the Likud government, of forced or encouraged Arab emigration from the West Bank. As the Israeli administration withdrew, the local Palestinian police structure already in existence could move in. Local and municipal Palestinian leaders have been freely elected for the first time under Israeli occupation. They are the leaders of the West Bank Palestinians and are, therefore, the natural inheritors of the political destiny of the West Bank.

VII

It should be obvious that the Palestinian problem is the most pressing issue facing Israel. It is not just an Arab problem, not just an international problem, but rather Israel's major strategic, political and territorial problem.

Israel's political and military requirements need careful redefinition. A new Israeli security policy must be comprehensive and take into consideration the following points:

- Israel must secure and stabilize its eastern frontiers;
- Israel must end its rule over the Palestinians and deploy its political and diplomatic efforts to help establish some form of political autonomy for an alien population;
- Israel must restore its own national consensus, a consensus dangerously disrupted by the Lebanon experience.

To achieve consensus, an Israeli government must exclude both extreme positions: territorial annexation and an independent Palestinian state. Both positions are ideological and uncompromising; neither the PLO's nor the Likud's political aspirations can be fulfilled. Implementing ideological rather than realistic foreign policy goals will only lead to a political stagnation reminiscent of that which existed in 1982—and led to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. After the Lebanon debacle, both Arafat and the Begin-Sharon-Shamir team were forced to lower their unrealistic aspirations and rhetoric.

Yet in order for a new policy of unilateral withdrawal to be seriously considered or to succeed, the domestic political alignment in Israel must be altered. The time may be approaching for a post-Lebanon referendum on future security doctrine;

security policy can no longer be the province of a few military and political elites. This means another national election.

One can hope that the Lebanon disaster has resulted in a decline in the religious messianism and radical nationalism kindled by the second Begin-Sharon government. Another Likud victory, not to be altogether excluded as a possibility, would turn back the clock and deepen the division of the nation. There can be no unilateral withdrawal under the auspices of a Likud government. Thus, unless a rejuvenated and reinvigorated Labor Party can achieve a sufficient victory to replace today's badly glued government, Israel's security policy will remain paralyzed and regressive.

The party that claims the legacies of Ben-Gurion, Dayan and Allon, that was committed throughout to the compromise of the partition of Palestine, to pragmatism and to security unadorned by ideology, is capable of addressing Israel's real security needs. In order to regain the confidence of the Israeli electorate, however, the Labor Party must abandon elitism and pioneer arrogance and integrate the Sephardim within its ranks of leadership. It must put an end to the neo-Menshevik and doctrinaire unionist practices that have alienated the younger generations.

Perhaps the party leader, Shimon Peres, is perceived as colorless, but he and Defense Minister Rabin are in the Allon-Dayan mold and tradition. It is not difficult for them to understand the need for a policy of unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. The Labor Party has traditionally rejected the fanaticism of the Land of Israel movement and the concepts of Zionist Revisionism espoused by Begin and Sharon. Labor is not committed ideologically to a bankrupt offensive and annexationist strategy, as was Begin's Likud government. But as long as Labor is linked to Likud in government, it cannot begin to make a fundamental change in the facts on the ground.

Unilateral withdrawal, especially considering the political complexion of Israel, is no quick cure-all that can be effected within a year or two. This has to be an incremental policy, although an ambitious one. But the time has come to bury the old Likud offensive strategy. It is time to return to the concept of the partitioned state. In the coming years only a change in perception, a willingness to take a bold political step while maintaining an effective security stance, can bring about a solution to Israel's long quest for national security.

W. R. Smyser

REFUGEES: A NEVER-ENDING STORY

W

hen Eleanor Roosevelt received the 1947 Nansen Award for her work with refugees in postwar Europe, she said she was depressed to know that 70,000 refugees still remained in camps. She and the other humanitarians of her times saw refugees as a transitory phenomenon caused by the great world wars, a problem that could and should be solved promptly with goodwill and appropriate resources.

Yet today, 38 years later, there are more refugees than ever, and the refugee problem has become a permanent factor of international affairs. Barely a month passes without yet another refugee flow clamoring for attention. Current concepts of refugee protection and assistance now face critical tests, as even long-term advocates of generous asylum and relief wonder whether the world will be able to care for all its refugees and their seemingly interminable needs.

Refugees have existed throughout recorded history and probably since the dawn of the human community. In 1283 B.C., Pharaoh Ramses II sought the return of refugees to Egypt in a treaty with the Hittites. Greek antiquity left us both the concept of asylum and the word (from "asylon") that expresses it. Orestes was a refugee. So were Dante, Wagner, Einstein and innumerable other creative, political or religious personalities. So were whole nations or groups, such as the Huguenots of France or the Jews of Spain.

Most cultures have traditionally offered hospitality to the stranger in need. Before the existence of nation-states, religious faith or a sense of common experience gave birth to concepts such as Christian refuge, Islamic sanctuary or African brotherhood. Temples, pagodas, churches, sometimes entire free cities represented potential havens. With the establishment of the modern state system, national governments increasingly assumed the asylum responsibility. Asylum constituted one of

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the early doctrines of international law and passed increasingly into practice to protect outcasts from forcible repatriation.

The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented explosion in the number and impact of refugees. The numbers since 1945 are estimated to be as high as 60 million, more than twice the number of the preceding 50 years and far beyond any historical experience. In many states, refugee arrivals have shifted population patterns, altered domestic politics and shaped or even determined foreign policy. No serious study of such diverse regions as central Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa or the Middle East could be undertaken without considering the impact of refugees—both on the regions themselves and on the attitudes of others toward them.

To deal with this challenge, especially as it first emerged in Europe after World War II, the international community has created a widespread system of refugee protection and assistance, centered around the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and based on two international agreements ratified by almost 100 states: the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. These documents defined refugees as persons compelled to seek asylum abroad “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted.” The 1969 Refugee Convention of the Organization of African Unity expanded that definition, for African refugees, to include those fleeing “external aggression, foreign occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.” These agreements have provided a legal foundation on which refugees can base their appeals for asylum. Internationally coordinated assistance arrangements have helped refugees survive in exile, and have enabled asylum states to sustain the impact of mass refugee arrivals, overcoming the potentially destabilizing effects of refugee crises and later permitting refugees to reestablish themselves in normal lives.

Today, however, the system designed to cope with the refugees that emerged from the debris of war, although modified and expanded in the face of subsequent crises, is strained by the dimensions of what has become an immense, tenacious and omnipresent phenomenon. The system was able to deal with one type of crisis—essentially a trans-European refugee flow—and even with many crises since, yet it is now laboring under a much wider burden, no different in its legal and humanitarian fundamentals but much broader and more complex in its dimensions and its demands.

II

Statistics reveal the basic extent of the problem. Some ten million refugees are now to be found on every continent and in virtually every country. They include not only exiled political figures, disaffected intellectuals, professionals and students, but millions of peasants, nomads, laborers and their families, fleeing for their convictions and often for their lives.

- The largest single refugee population is four million Afghans, almost three million in Pakistan and over a million in Iran.
- The next largest concentration is in the Horn of Africa, with perhaps a million and a quarter in Sudan, over half a million in Somalia and smaller but significant numbers in Ethiopia and Djibouti.
- More than a million refugees are scattered over 15 countries in central and east Africa, from Cameroon to Kenya, from the Central African Republic to Lesotho. The largest groups are in Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaïre.
- Southeast Asia's refugee population has been reduced to 150,000 as almost 1.5 million "boat people" and others who fled Indochina have moved to new homes in resettlement countries, but those who remain—and others who continue to arrive—still constitute a major problem for Thailand and other first asylum states.
- Countries in Latin America harbor over 300,000 refugees, the largest groups having fled from several Central American states into Mexico, Honduras and Costa Rica.
- Over a million refugees live in the United States and over 300,000 in Canada. Most are Indochinese intending permanent settlement in North America, but there are many from other parts of the world as well. In addition, there are tens of thousands of asylum seekers in North America.
- Another million live in various other Asian and European countries of asylum or permanent settlement. There are major concentrations in Australia, Britain, China, France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Virtually every one of those countries also faces major dilemmas dealing with new asylum seekers.
- Significant groups of refugees have found temporary asylum in dozens of other countries in north and west Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

Omitted from this enumeration are the Palestinian refugees,

numbering over two million. The United Nations and the international community at large have long considered the Palestinians as distinct from other refugee groups, and their fate has assumed significance far beyond their status as refugees.

Refugees are a reflection of our unsettled time. They spill forth out of the full range of foreign and domestic quarrels and upheavals, war, revolution, communal strife, the post-colonial struggle. Modern techniques of conflict and population control have driven more people than ever into exile because more feel or fear the effects of combat or repression. Stricter border delimitation and policing have meant that refugees now attract more attention and need more formal recognition than in the past. Refugees seem to have become an inevitable and often highly visible by-product of almost every conflict and every crisis.

The common drive that compels refugees to leave their homes is fear: fear for their lives, for their families, for their future. Their stories have a depressing, even numbing, sameness. They may have seen their houses, shops or land burned, seized, pillaged or invaded, their countrymen—often friends or relatives—taken away without explanation. They may have been expelled from their jobs or from their homes. Their lives may have been threatened. They may have been injured, raped or robbed in their escape, and that escape may have taken them over hundreds of miles and many borders. They may reach their country of refuge exhausted, emaciated or dying. They often care little what happens to themselves but will do anything to ensure a safe future for their children. They worry continuously about those they left behind.

III

What is most worrisome about the current refugee burden is not only the sheer number of refugees, however large it may be, but also the long periods of time that they have spent in asylum. The major exodus of the Indochinese refugees came in 1978 and 1979, but many still remain in camps. Most refugees in Pakistan and Iran fled between 1979 and 1981, as did those in Somalia. Major refugee groups in many other African asylum countries arrived in massive numbers as far back as the mid-1970s. Though new refugees constantly appear, the substantial majority of today's refugees have been in

exile for five years or more. Most have little immediate prospect of going home or moving on.

The long-lasting refugee presence in many countries has fundamentally altered the nature of the global refugee problem. It has kept aid requirements at a continuously high level. In 1970, the annual budget of the U.N. High Commissioner was \$8 million; by the mid-1970s, it had grown to around \$50 million. Since 1980, the budget has consistently stood between \$400 and \$500 million. Other international organizations with significant refugee assistance programs, such as the World Food Program or the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration, have also seen their budgets grow. So have a number of voluntary agencies.

Efforts to find durable solutions continue, whether by returning refugees voluntarily to their countries of origin, settling them in countries of asylum, or resettling them in third countries. In the last five years, major refugee groups have been able to return to Argentina, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Some limited repatriation has been possible in Southeast Asia. Many refugees, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands, have repatriated informally in the Horn of Africa.

Refugees have also in many instances settled permanently in their countries of first asylum, especially in Africa where numerous countries have generously offered land, permanent residence and even citizenship. Hundreds of thousands have settled in Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaïre and Zambia. During the summer of 1985, for example, Tanzania formally accepted the settlement of 35,000 Barundi refugees in the highlands of western Tanzania at Mishamo, an agricultural project almost as large as the state of Rhode Island. Most Indochinese refugees have moved to resettlement countries in North America, Europe and Asia, and for other refugee groups there has also been some, though more limited, settlement in third countries.

These steps have not, however, reduced the total world refugee population because some of the largest groups have stayed in place and even grown, and new groups have appeared. From July 1984 to July 1985 alone, about 550,000 new refugees arrived in the Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Zaïre and Zimbabwe, with smaller groups or individuals arriving in dozens of other countries. The global number of refugees has thus remained constant at

a very high level. As crisis has followed crisis, and as new conflicts have obscured old ones, the world has been unable fully to absorb the consequences of one refugee flow before being faced with yet another.

Around seven million refugees, the overwhelming majority, wait out their asylum in camps, where aid can be provided to large numbers of needy persons in a systematic manner. Yet an extended stay in a camp can have detrimental effects on refugees even if their protection, nutrition, medical and basic education needs are met.

Camp life disrupts normal patterns of existence, especially in traditional societies, disturbing or threatening established family and community roles. Men can no longer work, trade, farm or otherwise provide. Women cannot take care of their homes and gardens. Professional persons cannot pursue careers. Children cannot practice their customarily assigned tasks, such as herding, chores or handicrafts. Refugees can suffer deeply from prolonged dependency; extended camp life robs human beings of the opportunity for purposeful activity for themselves and their families, the pride of being useful. From the visible emergency of flight, camp refugees pass to the invisible emergency of stagnation.

To escape from dependency, many male refugees leave the camps, sometimes abandoning their families for long periods or permanently. Some look for employment in neighboring villages or towns. Nomads take the remnants of their herds and flee to the open countryside, relying on the camp system only for essential supplies such as medicine and care for their families. Other refugees leave for educational opportunities or to try to reach other countries. They may even go home on a temporary and clandestine basis. A growing number of men do not come to camps in the first place but immediately attempt to find asylum in distant countries. Ultimately, only the most vulnerable and most dependent remain.

The effect of large, standing refugee populations on the response to new refugee crises can be as troubling as the effect on the refugees themselves. Donors the world over may turn their attention away from old problems and provide insufficient financial support and resettlement opportunities. With available resources already stretched tightly, they sometimes must meet new crises by reallocating funds from ongoing programs. In 1985, for the first time in memory, the High Commissioner has had to make major reductions in planned relief programs

for long-standing refugee populations because funds have not been available. Since existing resources have to be used to pay for basic survival needs, less can go toward enduring solutions. Dependency is only prolonged.

IV

Not only has the nature of the refugee problem changed, but also its location. The primary concentration has moved from Europe to the Third World. The overwhelming majority of refugees are now from developing countries and have found asylum in developing countries. Forty percent are in countries listed as "least developed" by the United Nations; these societies are ill-prepared to bear the shock of refugee arrivals, with their political, economic and ecological consequences. If refugees are unable to go home or to move on, those same countries must also bear the long-term effects of the refugee presence.

A visit to virtually any refugee camp or settlement area in such a country is a sobering experience. As one approaches, one enters an empty expanse of many miles—dusty in the dry season, slick with mud after the rains—where trees, shrubs and other vegetation have disappeared as refugees have scoured for firewood. Nearby hospitals or clinics may have many of their beds occupied by refugees while national citizens have to wait. Secondary schools are crowded with refugee children. Roads or tracks in the area are cracked and rutted by heavy trucks bearing relief supplies. The area and the people around the camps feel the impact of the refugees' presence in their daily lives. When there are many camps, entire provinces and even countries can be affected.

Prolonged refugee stays deepen the dilemma. The government of the asylum country and the local population might regard a large refugee presence, with its effect on their resources, as an acceptable burden over the short run. But, even if they originally welcomed the refugees, they begin to express serious concern if they sense that they themselves are being continually crowded out and disadvantaged. They see their environment ravaged. They fear that refugees will lower wages and raise prices. They are often envious of some of the care received by refugees, especially in medicine and special foods.

The presence of large long-term refugee populations in Third World countries generates four different but related types of demands:

- The cost of refugee care in those environments is high. The asylum countries have little to share. Virtually all supplies must be brought in, often from far away and sometimes, in emergencies, by air. Food, tents, blankets, medicines, all basic necessities, have to come from abroad, because the asylum country either does not have them or they could not be made available through local markets without escalating prices. Even if the cost for each individual refugee is low, the total assistance requirement is vast. This has been a principal factor driving up refugee relief budgets over the past few years.
- Substantial resources are needed to overcome damage to the local infrastructure. Governments of the African asylum countries during the second Conference on International Assistance to Refugees in Africa, held in Geneva in July 1984, presented a number of requests for various infrastructural projects to compensate for the presence of refugees. The projects included new or expanded hospitals, schools, roads and water systems, as well as reforestation and irrigation.
- Projects for local settlement of refugees require considerable resources to get started. Although refugees need not be regarded as a permanent drain on asylum countries, since they are able as well as anxious to work once they get over the trauma of flight, they cannot become productive in developing countries without some services and infrastructure to permit them to work effectively.
- As evidenced in the current African famine crisis, refugee populations cannot be helped in isolation when the surrounding population is also suffering. Local villagers have at times settled in large numbers around refugee camps to share refugees' food and water. They have blocked relief shipments to call attention to their own needs. Concerned that refugees were carrying epidemics, they have insisted on also obtaining medicines originally intended for refugees. Such requests cannot reasonably be denied.

Long-lasting refugee problems in developing countries, therefore, engender assistance requirements that are longer in duration as well as greater in scope and complexity than those known in Europe during the postwar era or those experienced in the briefer refugee situations of the past. But the requirements must be met if the refugees are to be accepted, to remain

any length of time or to settle permanently. Moreover, the lines between aid to refugees and national development cannot be neatly drawn. Both the refugees and the nationals may need assistance, but these different forms of aid come from different sources, through separate channels, and according to a whole range of planning and implementation schedules. Coordination can be and has been a formidable problem.

v

The refugee problems in the Third World cannot, however, be confined and isolated there, with the industrialized donor nations providing aid and selecting qualified refugees for resettlement on an orderly basis while the vast bulk of the refugees remain in camps. With rapid communication and air travel, the refugee problems of the Third World are being visited on the industrialized democracies in a new and intrusive manner, in the form of a dramatic upsurge in the number of asylum applicants arriving directly from far away.

Over the last few years, and especially in 1984 and the first half of 1985, there has been a pronounced rise in the number of persons from the Third World applying for asylum in the West, particularly Western Europe. The level of asylum applicants in Western Europe had remained constant, between about 20,000 and 35,000, during much of the 1970s. It surged in 1979 and 1980, reaching a 1980 high of 150,000, largely because the world recession led a number of unemployed foreign workers to apply for asylum so as to avoid repatriation. After that peak, application numbers declined, although not to the previous level. In 1984 they leaped up again to 103,000 and have been running at an even higher level during the first six months of 1985. To help respond to the crisis, High Commissioner Poul Hartling called a special seminar on asylum seekers in Europe in May 1985.

The current applicants are not only greater in number but also different in origin from the past. Formerly, at least two-thirds of the asylum seekers in Western Europe came from Eastern or southeastern Europe. Now, two-thirds come from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, from Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Syria and Zaïre. In 1984, persons from almost 100 different countries sought asylum in France, Britain and West Germany. Many applicants fly directly to major European airports from distant countries of origin or asylum. Once in Europe, they move on by train, car or ferry. They apply for

asylum at airports or border entry points. Some attempt to make their way to North America, but few are able to afford the ticket and to obtain the documentation needed before they can get on a flight to Canada or the United States. North American asylum applicants still come predominantly from the western hemisphere, but pose problems similar to those faced by the West European asylum countries.

The number of new arrivals in Western Europe or North America is small compared to the number of refugees arriving in African and Asian countries over the same span of time, but it still far exceeds the capacity of Western countries even to process the flow, especially when asylum applicants have no documentation and come from distant places where the details of their claims are hard to investigate and even harder to substantiate. In recent times, for example, the backlog of applicants in West Germany was 100,000, in Switzerland 22,000 and in the United States 150,000.

Such backlogs only encourage further applications. Since refugees often lose everything in flight, many Western nations give asylum seekers special benefits, including temporary housing, modest living allowances, work permits and freedom of movement while their applications are being considered. Those privileges were intended as minimum humanitarian compensation to persons who had nothing left. They now often appear, however, as a magnet for migrants—all the more powerful when backlogs delay processing. Migrants know that by applying for asylum they not only improve their chances for admission but can draw on various forms of support for a long time while they try to establish a permanent foothold, no matter what may be the final decision on their asylum claim.

There have been instances in which asylum applicants have arrived in whole planeloads, deliberately destroying their travel documents before arrival, or have attempted to travel from one asylum country to another on fraudulent documentation. Public opinion in the asylum countries resents these abuses of the asylum process, suspects commercial exploitation and begins to question the bona fides of all asylum applicants.

It is important to distinguish migrants from refugees. Migration has, in itself, been one of the major phenomena of the twentieth century. Since 1900 an estimated 150–175 million persons—other than refugees—have migrated, many of them permanently but many others as temporary foreign workers in the industrialized or industrializing countries. The migrant

stream has helped fuel economic progress over the past 40 years in Western Europe, North America and the Middle East. Those regions long welcomed migrants as low-cost laborers willing to take jobs scorned by others.

With the economic slowdown in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, many industrialized countries have accepted fewer migrants and temporary foreign workers, and some of the migrants have indeed tried to enter as refugees. Moreover, many refugees, like many migrants, want to settle in the industrialized democracies of the northern hemisphere because they hope to find a safe, free and promising future there. Unlike migrants, however, refugees leave their homes because of fear, not because of opportunity. Whereas migrants travel to escape stagnation and poverty, refugees travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death. Migrants seek opportunity. Refugees seek haven. A migrant does not *wish* to return home; a refugee does not *dare*.

In recognition of this difference, asylum countries have generally made careful distinctions between migrants and refugees, trying to ensure that asylum is granted to those who need it but not to others. They base their decisions on the information provided by the asylum seekers and on their own knowledge and perception of conditions in the asylum seekers' countries of origin. Entry procedures vary from country to country, but usually include a central office that decides on the criteria for regular immigrants as well as refugees. The authorities attempt to determine if the asylum seeker, in accordance with the refugee definition, cannot return to his or her country of origin because of a "well-founded" fear of being persecuted. They are deeply conscious of the example that they set and of the standards that they have helped to establish and propagate, since the asylum nations are among the founders of the current international system for protecting and assisting refugees. They normally try to give the benefit of the doubt to asylum applicants since forcible return can have the most serious consequences.

Nonetheless, as popular skepticism has grown, national authorities have been under intense pressure to curtail entry. Asylum officials also find it easier to be convinced that persons are really in danger when they come from countries near at hand, where conditions that might expose the applicants to persecution are broadly understood and appreciated, and when asylum applicants are from familiar nationalities. Judgments

become more difficult, and more controversial, when asylum seekers come from far away. In this respect, the jet refugee is at a particular disadvantage.

Beyond migrants and traditional refugees, a third group has now begun to emerge clearly. They are persons who may not be specifically and personally targets of persecution under the terms of the 1951 convention, but who flee the random cruelties that war, civil disturbance and revolution inflict upon the innocent as well as the partisans. Such persons are often described not as refugees but as "humanitarian" cases, persons who may not be subject to the pointed fear of personal persecution but who are, indeed, at risk in the country from which they flee. Many of those persons are urban professionals, anxious to avoid the stultifying experience of a semi-permanent camp or dormitory existence while they await resettlement. They want to get directly into a Western country.

These three streams—migrants, refugees, and "humanitarian" cases—are now crossing and occasionally merging. It has become the solomonic task of overburdened immigration authorities, appeals boards and courts in the traditional asylum and resettlement countries of Western Europe and North America to establish what person fits properly into what stream and to take appropriate action.

The industrialized democracies are granting asylum to those persons who are clearly seen as victims of persecution. They are rejecting persons who are clearly seen as migrants, dismissing them by the oxymoron "economic refugees." With respect to the third category, the "humanitarian" cases, the asylum countries have reacted with some hesitation and in various ways. They may grant refugee status in specific hardship cases. They may refuse refugee status but permit the applicants to remain temporarily in a kind of legal limbo. They may deport applicants either to their countries of origin or to some other countries where the applicants stopped on the way. Since those transit countries often feel no particular responsibility to readmit the asylum seekers, the latter become "refugees in orbit," individuals or families shuttling from airport to airport and from one immigration counter to another, modern Flying Dutchmen searching for a place to rest.

Over the last 40 years, refugees have traveled farther and farther away from their countries of origin in geographic, cultural and ethnic terms. As they come from distant areas not in the public spotlight, the problems that they are fleeing are

less known or are differently perceived. The “jet people” are not accepted as the “boat people” were. Countries that were and are willing to make considerable sacrifices to support refugees abroad or to select refugees for permanent settlement are reluctant to grant asylum to all those who come directly and from far away.

A long humanitarian tradition could be in jeopardy, even in nations that have been the most generous pillars of the international system for refugee support. All applicants for refugee status may not really need asylum, but they must at least be given a fair chance to state their case and to be sympathetically heard if international refugee conventions are to have any meaning. In the backlash against all foreigners, not only could refugees risk being returned to face persecution, but the world could risk losing global asylum concepts and practices that many states, organizations and individuals have over the years worked or suffered to achieve.

VI

The nature of the refugee issue has been transformed in very fundamental ways over four decades. It has grown from a continental to a global problem, from one that could be kept at a distance to one that may be very near. The world's refugee population has expanded manyfold. It has changed from a transient to a semi-static population. Assistance requirements have multiplied. Any crisis anywhere can now produce refugees everywhere. The resulting problems now need close and urgent attention.

Solutions to these problems cannot and will not be found quickly or easily, since they have arisen out of a combination of political, sociological and technical realities that are not likely to be altered or reversed soon, if at all. Therefore, currently available measures cannot solve the problem but they should at least offer some hope for alleviating human distress. Among the steps to be taken are the following:

- making clear to concerned publics and governments how the refugee problem has evolved over the last several years. All agencies, whether private, official or international, need to make sure that their constituencies understand that long-standing refugee groups must not be consigned to oblivion by neglect or fatigue.
- organizing refugee assistance to cope simultaneously with emergencies, long-lasting refugee situations, and more

concentrated efforts at durable solutions. Given the present budgetary environment in the donor countries, this must all be done in the most cost-effective manner.

- improving coordination between agencies involved in refugee relief and those involved in other forms of assistance, from emergency to development, within and outside the United Nations.
- expanding efforts for voluntary repatriation, local settlement or third country resettlement. As part of this effort, the proportion of assistance budgets devoted to such solutions should be increased.
- introducing more productive activities for refugees where such solutions are not available, in ways that support rather than undercut the economies of asylum countries.
- assigning highest priority to the processing of asylum applications in all asylum countries, devoting the necessary resources and making decisions as rapidly as possible consistent with fairness and thorough consideration of each case. This should discourage spurious applications, enable truly needy asylum applicants to leave the state of uncertainty in which many now find themselves, and also reduce support costs for pending cases.
- examining the relationship between refugee status, as defined in internationally agreed conventions, and the status of those whose applications for asylum rest on “humanitarian” considerations. This should be done through continuous international consultations without altering the current refugee definition that has served well. It must also be done in such a way that refugees from distant countries are not regarded as less deserving of asylum merely because they come from far away.

These steps cannot in themselves solve the global refugee problem. They can, however, reverse current trends and offer some confidence that we are moving in the right direction to help those in need and to avoid stagnation. Several steps are already under way, and others should follow.

The solutions also complement and reinforce each other because the problems are linked. Reducing long camp stays by instituting durable solutions sooner can help stem refugee flight to more distant asylum countries and can help to relieve public concern in the present asylum countries about the refugee presence. Assisting the poorer asylum countries to bear the infrastructural impact of refugees can help to promote local

solutions and further reduce the number needing to look elsewhere for settlement. Helping public opinion in Western asylum countries to surmount current fears of being overrun by migrants posing as refugees should sustain the readiness of those countries and their people to assist refugees everywhere.

The entire system of refugee protection and support rests on a foundation of voluntary action and willing sacrifice. Assistance for refugees comes from voluntary funds, in part from private sources but now mainly from governments because of the immensity of the needs. Many agencies and persons from many countries and backgrounds work with refugees under grueling conditions in camps, villages, towns or settlements. Individuals, families and organizations—secular and religious—receive refugees, care for them and help to plead their cause. Young people just out of high school or college, as well as retired professionals such as administrators, doctors or dentists, reinforce the human touch that is essential in dealing with persons desperately worried about their future. The housewife in the station wagon who greets a Vietnamese refugee family in California or New Zealand, the camp worker in Pakistan or Sudan, the nurse in Thailand or Zaïre, the volunteer relief assistant in France, Germany or Sweden, all form part of an extensive, undocumented but essential chain of welcome and care for refugees. It is vital that this chain not be broken.

The new characteristics of the refugee situation have not invalidated the basic principles by which refugees have historically been received and helped. Nations have in the past found ways to respect refugees and treat them fairly. Over the last few decades, a considerable structure for protection and assistance has developed to perform the traditional tasks in accordance with the requirements of our particular age. It did not develop during times of peace and prosperity but during times of crisis, fear and mass population movements as disturbing then as those we know today. The structure has to date accomplished its mandate. It has evolved as necessary. It can evolve further to meet present and future needs. What it cannot do, and must not do, is to abandon principles and policies that have served both stability and humanity.

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

NEW ZEALAND'S NUCLEAR POLICY

To the Editor:

I read with interest Prime Minister David Lange's article, "New Zealand's Security Policy," in the Summer 1985 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Mr. Lange outlines comprehensively his government's philosophy with regard to its decision to ban nuclear weapons from New Zealand. He maintains that it is not New Zealand's intent to affect adversely the ANZUS relationship; New Zealand only desires to express frustration with the arms control progress to date by mandating "the absolute exclusion of nuclear weapons from New Zealand." In adopting this position, the Lange government ignores the heart of the issue: peace in the modern nuclear age is sustainable only through the deterrence of Soviet adventurism by strong, committed allies standing together.

We fully agree with Mr. Lange's conviction that the world would be a far safer place if nuclear weapons did not exist. The problem is the reality that nuclear weapons do exist. Effective arms control initiatives notwithstanding, nuclear weapons will continue to be an omnipresent factor in the world's strategic balance for the foreseeable future. The question then is how to keep them from being used. To date there has been only one answer: through effective deterrence. The United States, as the predominant nuclear power in the Western alliance, must maintain a continuous global deterrent stance. Such a strategic military posture is designed to confront overtly the ever-expanding Soviet military presence throughout the world, thereby reinforcing the concept of worldwide deterrence. The benefits of security, resulting from the forward-deployed U.S. presence, are extended to all members of the Western alliance, in fact, to all in the free world whether they overtly seek it or not.

In order to maintain a forward presence, U.S. military strategy, especially maritime strategy, is dependent upon a system of well-established, operable military alliances. Allies share in ensuring their own freedom and security by cultivating the capability to operate with other allied military forces. By acceding to the alliance membership, nations incur obligations to share the burdens an alliance implies. These responsibilities include supporting allied efforts which are required to maintain a posture of global deterrence.

By banning port access to U.S. Navy ships, New Zealand has demonstrated unwillingness to accept basic alliance support responsibilities. As a member of the Western alliance, New Zealand is protected by, and benefits from, the United States' nuclear umbrella. By accepting the benefits of this security, New Zealand cannot choose selectively to support some portions of the allied defense strategy while opting out of others and ignoring the realities of the nuclear age.

The stability and security of the free world are based upon the commitment and reliability of all allies. Support for common security goals cannot be dependent upon the whims of politics. We in the U.S. Navy bear directly the brunt of the New Zealand policy. The ship-visit ban not only terminates the development of tactical expertise and interoperability that has evolved from close interaction between our navies, it also reduces the effectiveness of forward naval presence in the South Pacific region. U.S. naval ships must be prepared to go anywhere at any time to carry out any of a variety of defensive and offensive missions, among which is employment of a nuclear weapons capability. We cannot tailor forces to accommodate New Zealand's nuclear sensitivities because New Zealand is only one element of the global strategic equation. Thus, New Zealand's approach profoundly and negatively affects ANZUS, despite its protestations that that is not its intent.

The ship-access ban has occurred as the strategic equation in the South-east Asia/South Pacific theaters is shifting dramatically. A permanent Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh in Vietnam has been established, enhancing greatly the U.S.S.R.'s strategic posture in the region. Concomitantly, the Soviets have accelerated efforts to gain footholds in the South Pacific islands. New Zealand has implemented its anti-nuclear policy at a time when the resolve of the Western allies in the Pacific is being tested. The lack of cohesiveness within ANZUS impacts potentially upon the resolve of our mutual friends in the region and decreases the credibility of a long-standing alliance in the face of potential threats.

Despite the effects of the ship-access ban, New Zealand remains a friend of the United States. The ANZUS alliance has been a cherished relationship among Western democratic nations that share vital interests in the Pacific, although, as I have indicated, the quality of that alliance must be seriously questioned because of the Lange government's refusal to share the yoke of deterrent readiness. What is more, it seems to me particularly pernicious that the Lange government is embarked on a course of legislating its nuclear ban, with the expressed purpose of making it "very difficult" for succeeding governments, which might not share the Lange persuasion, to reverse course. How this can be viewed as responsible action by a friend and ally is incomprehensible to me.

We earnestly seek reaffirmation of the U.S.-New Zealand friendship and a strengthening of the ANZUS alliance. But such reaffirmation and strengthening must be based on reality. The world, with all its warts, exists. New Zealand must be a part of it. However much he might want to, Mr. Lange simply cannot carve New Zealand or the South Pacific out and set it aside in some sort of utopian bliss. Living in today's world entails risk. It is our business, and we ask New Zealand to rejoin us in the commitment, to minimize in any way possible that risk. It is a responsibility New Zealand cannot rightly shirk.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEMOCRACY VERSUS GUARDIANSHIP. By Robert Dahl. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1985, 113 pp. \$14.95 (paper, \$8.95).

This is not a new plan for arms control but an inquiry as to whether democratic institutions can cope with the major problems of public policy today. Robert Dahl, dean of American political scientists, points out that decisions on nuclear weapons (or disposal of nuclear waste, reactor safety or industrial pollution, to cite a few examples) are too complex and technical for the average citizen; yet if they are turned over to an elite of experts or "wise men" or guardians, there is no guarantee that those men will have the moral and other qualities needed to serve the public good—delegated power in these circumstances tends to become alienated power. Dahl has a partial answer, if perhaps an over-optimistic one: make use of the new communications technology to raise the level of public knowledge and understanding. The entire argument is well presented and well worth reading.

SUPERPOWER RIVALRY AND THIRD WORLD RADICALISM. By S. Neil MacFarlane. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985, 238 pp.

The ideologists of national liberation, those of the world communist movement and those purporting to speak for the revolutionary forces in the Third World, have written ad infinitum on their desired (and inevitable?) goals, and the strategies required to reach them. Mr. MacFarlane has read vast quantities of this nearly indigestible literature, more than enough to make his case, and perhaps he gives ideology more than its due as the mover rather than handmaiden of policy. In any event he does a good job of summarizing the various theories, showing where the ideas of pundits and political leaders in the Third World parallel those of Moscow orthodoxy and where they diverge. It is clear that these Third World movements have found much ideological common ground with the Soviet Union, and very little with America, and that this has given the Soviet Union advantages in the superpower competition in those areas; but the author wisely cautions against concluding that they will therefore win that competition. It should also be noted that in the long run the Soviets are as little tolerant of true nonalignment as was John Foster Dulles.

WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Francis Anthony Boyle. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1985, 366 pp. \$32.50 (paper, \$14.75).

The author, who is both international lawyer and political scientist, addresses the gap between the practitioners of those two trades as they

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confront contemporary international relations and the imperatives of American foreign policy. He has little use for the "legal positivists" of the old school but even less for the Machiavellians (Kissinger, Brzezinski, et al.) whose creed is realism and the politics of power. His main argument is that international law and international organizations, far from being peripheral to foreign policy, offer the only hope for peace and security. In a lengthy critique of U.S. foreign policy on this theme he makes some telling points, but also others that are overblown and even approach the ridiculous.

DELUSION: INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL LIFE. By James M. Glass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 270 pp. \$22.50.

A *tour de force* in which the author, a political scientist, compares the inner world of the schizophrenic (who represents unsocialized or "desocialized" mankind) and the classic political theories, mainly those of Hobbes and Rousseau, in order to make a general statement about human nature and "reality." It's an interesting idea, and the author develops it with no end of ingenuity, but the links he tries to show between delusional ideas and political ideas seem, perhaps fortunately, rather tenuous. L.D.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL: REDEFINING THE NUCLEAR THREAT. By Bruce G. Blair. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 341 pp. \$32.95 (paper, \$12.95).

THE BUTTON: THE PENTAGON'S COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM—DOES IT WORK? By Daniel Ford. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985, 270 pp. \$16.95.

To many defense analysts, C³I (command, control, communications and intelligence) is the most vulnerable component of our nuclear deterrent. Bruce Blair, who once served in the Strategic Air Command as a Minuteman launch control officer and is a current Defense Department official, has written an important and valuable analysis of the physical and organizational arrangements which exist to control U.S. strategic forces, tracing their evolution over 25 years. His sensible recommendations call for (a) near-term improvements to assure that the system will not collapse under a Soviet first strike and will provide for prompt retaliation and (b) a long-term goal of delaying a retaliatory strike by at least 24 hours so as to maximize chances for survival. Daniel Ford, formerly executive director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, has written a less analytical, more descriptive (I-saw-the-machinery-and-it-won't-work) type of book, covering much of the same story. Readers will be rudely awakened to the dangers the author claims are in the C³I system, but they risk being considerably misled by his assertion that the Pentagon recognizes that "if the U.S. does not strike *first* in a crisis that develops into a nuclear war, it may be unable to strike back at all."

HAWKS, DOVES AND OWLS: AN AGENDA FOR AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR. Edited by Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Norton, 1985, 282 pp. \$14.95.

Who are owls? Unlike hawks who view weakness as a cause of war, or doves who see provocation as dangerous, owls are concerned about nonrational factors and loss of control. Nuclear war would not result from a deliberate act but from the unintended consequences of a crisis or conventional war. This lively volume builds upon the earlier Harvard book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. It includes a specific and eminently sensible list of "do's" and "don't's" covering many of today's principal arms control issues. The fresh approach to old problems should stimulate new—though not necessarily novel—thought.

NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH: LEVERAGE IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. By Robert J. Einhorn. New York: Praeger/Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985, 120 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

Not just another book on arms control, this study discusses the role of military weapons programs as instruments of leverage in negotiations. This approach has much merit, given the extent to which the debate on such weapons has hinged on their value as bargaining chips. Einhorn has many sensible comments regarding the impact of American defense programs on Soviet negotiating strategies and the way the U.S.S.R. sets its own priorities. His experience as an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has clearly placed him in good stead in examining this complicated, and most important, topic.

HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE. By Robert Jastrow. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985, 176 pp. \$15.95.

Written by a scientist with strong credentials, this is perhaps the most complete argument available in favor of Star Wars outside of official publications. The jargon-free quick pace should attract a wide range of readers, while the skeptics will remain unpersuaded, in part by the debatable assertions which are to be found in the analysis. One such of particular importance is the claim that even a leaky nuclear umbrella or shield will enhance the credibility of U.S. retaliation.

TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CSIS DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PROJECT. Chairman, Philip A. Odeen. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985, 66 pp.

Of the many proposals for defense reform over the past two decades, this one deserves to be taken very seriously. The bipartisan Steering Committee of the Defense Organization Project of the CSIS consists of an outstanding group of former Department of Defense civilian leaders, retired military officers, members of Congress and academic experts. The proposed changes are moderate and realistic in political and bureaucratic terms, although they will no doubt meet resistance in some quarters. They have been endorsed as a package by six former secretaries of defense. Among the many recommendations: strengthening the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vis-à-vis the JCS as a corporate entity in advising the president and the secretary of defense; expanding the role

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of the under secretary for defense policy; shifting the defense budget from an annual to a biennial cycle; greater prominence to programs for readiness and sustainability of forces in the field; emphasis on market incentives, in lieu of regulation, to reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of the weapons-acquisition process. With the consensus of the early 1980s on defense now broken, this pragmatic, nonpolemic report could provide the basis for a new start in revitalizing and reforming the defense establishment.

ARMS AND OIL: U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE PERSIAN GULF. By Thomas L. McNaugher. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 226 pp. \$26.95 (paper, \$9.95).

The appropriate role of military force, arms transfers, and diplomacy are carefully and broadly discussed in this excellent Brookings volume. Although focusing on American military strategy, McNaugher would encourage countries such as Jordan, Pakistan and Great Britain to continue their historical involvement in Gulf security. The American role, it is argued, should focus on protecting the oil-rich states from external threats and deterring Soviet encroachment. This requires greater "agility," i.e., improved airlift and sealift capabilities. Because it is not a cry of alarm for urgent action but a calm plea for marginal and feasible improvements, the author's recommendations are highly credible.

NATO'S FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN. By Stanley R. Sloan. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, 241 pp. \$6.50 (paper).

This is a carefully crafted, easily read, politically "mainstream" survey of the Atlantic alliance: past, present and future. As such it has much merit and should be on the reading list of what has come to be known as the "successor generation" to NATO's founders. The author, at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, has been knowledgeably tracking NATO's development for many years. The elements of continuity in the alliance are evident and well chronicled; the evolution which has occurred—greater than often acknowledged—is accurately noted; and as to the future, Sloan calls for a stronger European "pillar" within NATO to correct the mismatch between Europe's potential and current power.

FRANCE AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. By David S. Yost. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 132 pp. \$16.50 (paper).

The usual focus on France's nuclear weapons has often served to divert attention from her conventional force posture. David Yost, in this tightly reasoned and documented book, has therefore performed an important service in clearly analyzing France's non-nuclear situation. Although certainly capable of making a more important contribution in central Europe, France, thinks Yost, is not likely to do so because improving conventional forces is viewed as harmful to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. He does an admirable job in pointing out the ambiguities in the French policy of "sanctuarization" and in his analysis of the new "Force d'Action Rapide."

THE SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE: FRANCE, BRITAIN AND GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS. By Barry R. Posen. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 283 pp. \$32.50.

This is a scholarly and conceptually ambitious work which seeks to explain how military doctrine takes shape and its role in "grand strategy," defined as "that collection of military, economic and political means and ends with which a state attempts to seek security." The core of the study examines military doctrines in the interwar period, discussing the German blitzkrieg and British air defense system as successes, and the French army's Maginot Line doctrine as a great failure. Posen develops many intriguing ideas and theoretical insights, and debates those of his academic peers, in a rich volume that has to be studied as well as read.

TECHNOLOGICAL FRONTIERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. Edited by Anne G. Keatley. Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, 306 pp. \$19.95.

The impact of rapid technological advances upon international relations is, first, of very great importance, and, second, quite difficult to comprehend and analyze. This is the implicit lesson of this interesting volume, the result of a joint endeavor of the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. Some of the contributions on certain technology sectors such as telecommunications and biotechnology are specific in nature, others more conceptual. Bobby Inman's chapter on the impact of technology on East-West relations and C. W. Robinson's on its impact on North-South relations are noteworthy. Richard N. Cooper and Ann L. Hollick provide a thoughtful, sweeping analysis of "International Relations in a Technologically Advanced Future."

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1850-1980. By Lloyd G. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 469 pp. \$35.00.

Too often the past has been neglected by those who have prescribed for the present and future of developing countries. This attractive and ambitious essay in economic history surveys the growth of 41 of the larger developing countries. It provides national summaries, Professor Reynold's careful generalizations and his sharp analytic comments on political as well as economic issues. Although it cannot deal thoroughly with everything, the book is interesting on such troublesome questions as the economics of colonialism, the persistence of poverty with growth, the gains from exporting compared to the resulting dependency and the proper functions of government in promoting growth. There is a good bibliography.

TRIAD POWER: THE COMING SHAPE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION. By Kenichi Ohmae. New York: Free Press, 1985, 220 pp. \$19.95.

Multinational corporations are out of date if they are organized to deal with the world as a single economy or combination of 100-odd countries,

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says the managing director of McKinsey & Company's Tokyo office. The key to success is to have a strong domestic position in North America, Japan or Western Europe, and at the same time be an "insider" in the other two markets, often through joint ventures. Cheap labor and expanding markets in newly industrializing countries have their place, but only as they fit into the larger scheme of things. Interesting examples support the main argument of this lively book, as well as a number of other contentions, such as that Western firms have done better inside Japan than is generally thought, while the Japanese have had trouble doing as well abroad as at home.

UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: COMPETITION AND CONFLICT IN U.S.-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS. By Stephen D. Cohen. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985, 248 pp. \$28.00.

If "the inefficient and the insensitive" confront one another, where are the mutual gains from economic exchange? In this first-rate study, Stephen Cohen, who has served in the U.S. government and on the U.S.-Japan Trade Council, concludes that the two countries "understand each other only slightly better" than they did 20 years ago. For the future he sees only "marginal changes in the basic forces," some of them coming from the shift to high technology and the increase in Japanese foreign investment. Nevertheless, there are many suggestions for improving matters.

THE PROBLEMS OF PLENTY: ENERGY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By Peter F. Cowhey. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 447 pp. \$36.00.

Professor Cowhey lives up to his claim to provide a dimension to our understanding of energy problems that has been missed by economists, engineers and political scientists. He does this by investigating the "international management strategies" pursued by oil companies, governments of exporting and importing countries, and international organizations. This study goes back to 1919 but the emphasis is on the 1970s. As the author says, the complexity of the subject and his particular method "require some patience on the part of the reader," but the book is a remarkable achievement.

THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET. By Alessandro Roncaglia. Armonk (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1985, 180 pp. \$30.00 (paper, \$14.95).

IMPROVING U.S. ENERGY SECURITY. Edited by Richard J. Gonzalez, Raymond W. Smilor and Joel Darmstadter. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985, 336 pp. \$29.95.

POLITICS, PRICES AND PETROLEUM. By David Glasner. Cambridge: Ballinger/San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985, 312 pp. \$35.00.

OPEC IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY. By Abbas Alnasrawi. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985, 188 pp. \$22.50.

Professor Roncaglia of the University of Rome sees the oil world as a multilateral oligopoly but also explores other versions in a study that is full of interesting comments and insights. The contributors to *Improving U.S. Energy Security* are mostly very experienced people whose common belief is that security of supply will not be provided by formulas or devices and will elude the U.S. unless it is pursued persistently. Glasner believes that government intervention creates more problems than it solves and is usually

fostered by people who have something other than the public interest in mind. Alnasrawi's brief book is a handy and straightforward history.

THE POWER ECONOMY: BUILDING AN ECONOMY THAT WORKS. By John Oliver Wilson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985, 320 pp. \$19.95.

In this vigorously argued and well written book, the chief economist for the Bank of America provides an excellent examination of the dominant policies of Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the United States in the 1980s and shows why they failed. In his strong and sensible suggestions for improvement, Mr. Wilson joins those who deplore insufficient international coordination of national economic policies. But his basic analysis seems to emphasize other mistakes as the main source of past trouble. His sound conclusions on trade and the vital need to avoid protectionism are only weakly supported by a rather slapdash chapter of description and analysis.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. Edited by Sharon Zukin. New York: Praeger, 1985, 256 pp. \$36.95.

The strong points of this rather miscellaneous collection are half a dozen papers on changes in French policy, explanations of the problems posed for American business, several concise statements of labor views, and a report on how Michigan is trying to cope with the crisis in the U.S. automotive industry.

REVITALIZING AMERICAN INDUSTRY: LESSONS FROM OUR COMPETITORS. Edited by Milton Hochmuth with William Davidson. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985, 440 pp. \$39.95.

Chapters on countries and on industries combine to make this volume, which stems from a colloquium at the Dartmouth business school, a useful contribution to what is by now a familiar subject. There are particularly good papers by Bernard Cazes on France, Milton Hochmuth on the aerospace industry and Raymond Vernon on why the problems that are dealt with here are more complex than is apparent to those who favor the more obvious explanations.

DECLINE AND FAIL: THE AILING NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY. By Peter Stoler. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1985, 208 pp. \$16.95.

If the government had regulated the nuclear power industry more strictly instead of being so friendly to it, the industry would be better off today. Peter Stoler, a *Time* correspondent, makes a good case for this view but thinks the dying industry can and should be saved. Better management, learning from foreign experience plus more governmental concern with safety are the main prescriptions. The detailed history that occupies most of the book covers rather familiar ground.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST. By John M. Culbertson. Madison (Wisc.): 21st Century Press, 1984, 242 pp. \$17.95 (paper, \$8.95).

There is nothing new about the idea that the United States and Europe cannot sustain their high living standards if they are exposed to the competition of the cheap labor of overpopulated Asia, but one rarely finds the point systematically argued by economists. Professor Culbertson of the

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University of Wisconsin undertakes to do this. But there are many difficulties with his own proposal that governments should direct and balance trade except when countries belong to a "harmonious-trade area" where there is no "degenerative competitive process." Although Culbertson claims insistently to be using a realistic approach to economics, he does not examine the results of the policies Europe and North America actually apply to the exports of the developing countries or the efforts to improve the adjustment process for all countries.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD: AGENDA 1985–86. Edited by John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1985, 160 pp. \$19.95 (paper, \$12.95).

This year's volume begins with an interesting balance sheet of the Reagan Administration's "reassertionist" approach—redefining American policies toward developing countries. Some of the successes have come when events have forced a departure from the original approach and pragmatism prevails. There follow chapters on macroeconomic policy, finance and debt, trade, foreign aid and the handling of radical regimes in the Third World. All are full of ideas and draw conclusions for policymaking.

BASIC NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Frances Stewart. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985, 244 pp.

Under the presidency of Robert McNamara, the World Bank adopted a "basic human needs" approach to its development lending. In rich countries, some people thought this unbankerly; in poor countries, it was often seen as political intervention that might conflict with growth. All over, objective observers stressed the conceptual and practical difficulties of defining objectives, finding methods and measuring results. That these observers were right is borne out by this thoughtful and clear study in which one who was engaged in the process works out standards, tests results and suggests improvements. Three chapters are devoted to Nigeria and one to Tanzania.

DEBT TRAP: RETHINKING THE LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT. By Richard W. Lombardi. New York: Praeger, 1985, 217 pp. \$32.95.

A banker with a philosophical turn of mind sees the world economy on the edge of an abyss because development has been misconceived as concerned only with economic man instead of "rational man." His complex and slightly murky prescriptions for reform include more public aid, more internationalization of institutions, smaller banks that stick to banking, and more regional arrangements that avoid pitting the rich and poor countries against one another.

BARTER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Bart S. Fisher and Kathleen M. Harte. New York: Praeger, 1985, 293 pp. \$39.95.

Although barter is a poor substitute for money, it sometimes comes in handy, gives advantages to some people and can be foisted on others. This useful collection deals less with fundamentals than with practical matters such as law, formalities, national attitudes and policies. One of the best papers shows what a wide variety of practices, with quite different characteristics, make up the current wave of "barter."

MANAGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK. Edited by Richard J. Herring. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 235 pp. \$32.50.

MANAGING INTERNATIONAL RISK. Edited by Richard J. Herring. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 273 pp. \$32.50.

Academic experts and practitioners combine forces in these papers which range from quite technical exercises to broad and stimulating discussion of the way changes in the international economic system have altered concepts of risk and its management.

THE POLITICS OF INFLATION AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION. Edited by Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 612 pp. \$38.95 (paper, \$18.95).

Some very bright people have contributed to this large collection and, apparently, argued a good bit with one another. Although the papers go back quite a few years, they are still worth having for the emphasis they put on quite varied experience with the political and institutional processes that go along with the more familiar economic aspects of inflation in the 1970s, and before.

THE 2025 REPORT: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE FUTURE, 1975–2025. By Norman Macrae. New York: Macmillan, 1985, 258 pp. \$15.95.

Readers of *The Economist* will have a pretty good idea of how its deputy editor sees the world of 2025. Privatization and performance contracts are up, government functions are down. Shortages produce gluts; faith is high in computers, drugs and market forces; the by now rather tiresome teleconferencing among people in remote places is omnipresent. There are some new factors, including child labor in the West (with more playtime later in life) and a dash for economic freedom without democracy in the U.S.S.R. The documentary-plus-biography approach has its attraction; the style is sometimes arch but mostly amusing. There are stimulating points and the author is aware of complexity, not least in a looming Hegelian antithesis at the end of the time period.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

DETENTE AND CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO REAGAN. By Raymond L. Garthoff. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 1147 pp. \$39.95 (paper, \$16.95).

The adjective "monumental" should be used by reviewers on only the rarest occasions. This is one. The author, whose career has combined scholarship on the Soviet Union with stints as a foreign policy adviser in the U.S. government, demonstrates how much it is possible to learn about Soviet thinking and behavior if one knows Russian, has long experience, and applies energy and intelligence to exhaustive research. The book treats 15 years of crowded and complex events in meticulous detail. The large theme is the self-serving refusal of both sides to make the necessary effort

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to understand the other. The analysis and criticism of the Carter Administration—when détente gave way to confrontation and American officials persistently distorted or misread Soviet actions—is better than anything yet written on that subject. The quotation from Machiavelli at the head of the book is apt: “In order to know what is going to happen, one must know what has happened.” Anyone dealing with Soviet-American relations today should start with this book and take the many hours required to read it carefully.

ALL FALL DOWN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC ENCOUNTER WITH IRAN. By Gary Sick. New York: Random House, 1985, 366 pp. \$19.95.

The author, then a U.S. navy captain, was the National Security Council's expert on Iran during the Carter Administration. This is the best book yet to appear on the American side of the story. It is based on special access to classified sources and a scholarly understanding of the larger context as well as on unique personal experience. Sick writes without malice about the collapse of the Shah, the triumph of Khomeini's revolution, and the 444-day crisis when the Americans were held hostage in Teheran. He sees no American heroes or villains, but instead describes how “all fell down” in the attempt to find nonexistent solutions to a situation over which the United States had little control. His defense of the attempted military rescue is less than convincing.

SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION. By Stansfield Turner. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985, 304 pp. \$16.95.

Admiral Turner, director of Central Intelligence during the Carter Administration, reflects on the inevitable tension between the openness on which democracy depends and the secrecy necessary for effective intelligence and counterintelligence. Turner favors congressional oversight of intelligence activities and suggests how it can be done responsibly. The book is explicitly not a memoir or chronicle of events. There are no juicy tidbits, although the arms-length relationship between Turner and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is evident.

ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. By Hedley Donovan. New York: Bessie/Harper, 1985, 332 pp. \$19.95.

This is a perceptive, witty and informal commentary by a journalist who was editor-in-chief of *Time*, Inc. for 15 years and a senior adviser to President Carter for 12 months. The chapters on Carter's personality and on events in the White House during 1979–80, comprising a third of the book, are especially good.

SECRETS OF STATE: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE STRUGGLE OVER U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Barry Rubin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, 352 pp. \$25.00.

A lively description and analysis of the difficulties besetting the Department of State and professional Foreign Service officers during the last half century. The principal conclusion is eminently sound: identify the best people and promote them quickly to positions of responsibility.

A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION. By Loch K. Johnson. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, 317 pp. \$31.00.

The author, who teaches political science at the University of Georgia, was a senior staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the Church committee) in 1975. His book—half memoir and half scholarly monograph—is a valuable contribution not only to an understanding of that very important committee but of the Senate itself. The author chronicles the committee's flaws and problems but on balance gives it high marks.

LYNDON JOHNSON'S DUAL WAR: VIETNAM AND THE PRESS. By Kathleen J. Turner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 358 pp. \$25.00.

An outstanding study of how President Johnson believed that he could succeed in the Vietnam War if only he could overcome the intractability of the press. The sad result was a President so preoccupied with the press that he could not question the premises of the war itself. The research is based on the Lyndon Johnson papers, oral histories, and printed sources.

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT: ADVICE AND DISSENT. By Eugene Brown. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985, 171 pp.

A solid and admiring study of Senator Fulbright's views on American foreign policy, stressing the nonradical nature of his dissent against the Vietnam War.

EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND FOREIGN AID. By W. W. Rostow. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985, 342 pp. \$30.00.

The fifth in the author's series of monographs on "Ideas and Action" shows how a 1958 proposal by Senators John Sherman Cooper and John F. Kennedy for aid to India was the catalyst for acceptance by the Eisenhower Administration of the importance of extending development aid to Third World countries. The appendices include nearly 100 pages of contemporary documents. This book is an important contribution to the history of American foreign aid.

AWKWARD DOMINION: AMERICAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH EUROPE, 1919-1933. By Frank Costigliola. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1985, 379 pp. \$27.50.

This is a subtle and imaginative contribution to the increasingly accepted view that American foreign relations in the 1920s do not fit a clownish, isolationist stereotype. The author succeeds in going beyond the formal actions of governments to deal with the ambivalent European response to American culture and economic power. A basic theme is that American influence was founded on prosperity sustained by private loans. When prosperity and loans dried up, so did America's reputation for invincibility.

POWER AND POLICY IN TRANSITION. Edited by Vojtech Mastny. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1984, 271 pp. \$29.95.

These essays, "presented on the tenth anniversary of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in honor of its founder Hans J. Morgenthau," reflect the committee's opposition to détente with the Soviet Union, its support of Israel and its general neo-conservative flavor. Some of the pieces are extended political editorials, others are substantial and informative—for example, Mastny on Stalin, Rael Jean Isaac on the Insti-

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tute for Policy Studies, and Stephanie Neuman on the arms race and American national interests.

ANCIENT AFFECTIONS: ETHNIC GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Laurence Halley. New York: Praeger, 1985, 190 pp. \$32.95.

In 1975 Congress imposed an embargo on American arms shipments to Turkey because of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. The author of this rather rambling study argues that the embargo was the result almost entirely of pressure by Greek-Americans who placed ethnic "affections" above the American national interest. Thin chapters on Polish-Americans and Irish-Americans are appended.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE: CANADA AND VIETNAM, 1954-73. By Douglas A. Ross. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, 484 pp. \$35.00.

This heavily documented, argumentative book seeks to absolve the Canadian government of complicity in the American war in Vietnam through allegedly biased conduct in the International Control Commission. The author believes that Ottawa behaved prudently in the light of an overriding concern that the United States might use nuclear weapons. Mr. Ross's principal historiographical target is James Eayrs's *Indochina: The Roots of Complicity* (reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84). G.S.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDURING FRIENDSHIP, PERSISTENT STRESS. Edited by Charles F. Doran and John H. Sigler. New York: Prentice Hall, 1985, 256 pp. \$15.95 (paper, \$7.95).

Seven substantial, data-filled essays prepared for a conference convened by the American Assembly and the Council on Foreign Relations. Noteworthy are Seymour Martin Lipset's long review of the scholarly literature on cultural differences, J. L. Granatstein's analysis of political relations since 1945, and Lynton K. Caldwell's discussion of "responsibilities for a shared environment." The final report of the conference is appended; it identifies fresh water as the major long-range resource issue on the continent. G.S.

NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY. By Shirley Christian. New York: Random House, 1985, 320 pp. \$19.95.

This is the best analysis we yet possess of the fall of the Somoza regime and the rise of the Sandinistas. The author, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and foreign affairs writer for *The New York Times*, has firsthand experience and an unusually good insight into Nicaraguan culture and society. Among her conclusions: Sandinista Front leaders intended a Leninist system from the beginning, with close ties to the East; the major

Reagan policy problem is failure to address directly the most important aspect, FSLN internal policies, which in turn planted the seed for the contras; both Sandinistas and contras have broad support, but in a crunch the majority, seeking survival, would probably "go with the wind"; the bitter Nicaraguan dispute is not caused by Soviet meddling, nor by economic and social ills, but by conflict over the shaping and exercise of public power.

NICARAGUA—A NEW KIND OF REVOLUTION. By Philip Zwerling and Connie Martin. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1985, 251 pp. \$18.95 (paper, \$9.95).

Martin and Zwerling, a Unitarian minister, assess the Nicaraguan revolution through 45 interviews with government leaders, priests and others actively concerned. A few are anti-Sandinista, but they tend to be buried in the thrust of liberation theology that dominates, reflecting Zwerling's conviction that he has seen "a revolution that works" and that is "Christian, not Communist."

CENTRAL AMERICA: THE REAL STAKES. By Lester D. Langley. New York: Crown, 1985, 280 pp. \$15.95.

There is a good grasp of the ethos and its realities here, leading to the conclusion that "Central America's debilitating problems are not only beyond our solution, but are largely hidden from our view." The United States should therefore stand aside and let the isthmian nations work out solutions. Rather surprisingly in view of the historical record, the author believes in the possibility and desirability of a single Central American nation.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS: SOURCES OF CONFLICT AND THE FAILURE OF U.S. POLICY. Edited by Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1985, 240 pp. \$30.00 (paper, \$9.95).

The noted scholars who wrote these ten chapters reject the Vietnam analogy for the conflicts in Central America in favor of indigenous explanations, and conclude that the present crisis is rooted primarily in "the political, social and economic inequities that have long afflicted the region." They believe that the U.S. should accept socialist and revolutionary regimes and quietly retreat as a hegemonic power.

WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: THE AMERICAS WATCH REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Cynthia Brown. New York: Pantheon, 1985, 281 pp. \$8.95 (paper).

The emphasis is on the Southern Cone countries, Central America, Peru and Colombia, and the report is strongly critical of current administration policies. There is a preface by Jacobo Timerman and a final chapter offers recommendations.

PUERTO RICO: THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL POLICY. Edited by Richard J. Bloomfield. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 192 pp. \$30.00.

Experts from Puerto Rico and the mainland examine the existing problems of the troubled commonwealth and alternatives for corrective action.

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The book is not a plea for this or that solution but, in a final section, an exploration of means to start a political process in which Puerto Ricans can decide their status. The first step is to bring awareness and urgency to Washington. Psychological and identity aspects are well covered.

EL CASO VENEZUELA: UNA ILUSIÓN DE ARMONÍA. Edited by Moisés Naím and Ramón Piñango. Caracas: Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, 1984, 579 pp.

Many Venezuelan contributors have brought their critical insights to this large compendium of national analysis. In general they see the many problems of Venezuela as lost in a prevailing desire for a smothering harmony, and they favor broad social discussion and acceptance of conflict as the inevitable price of the learning process through which solutions can be found.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

HELMUT SCHMIDT: HELMSMAN OF GERMANY. By Jonathan Carr. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 208 pp. \$25.00.

The Bonn correspondent of the *Financial Times* has written a thin, readable account of Schmidt's extraordinary career in Hamburg and Bonn, in the party and in the government, as defense and economics minister, and for eight years as chancellor. Carr draws on his own experiences, on some reading and occasional private conversations with Schmidt; he pays insufficient attention to Schmidt's own writings. Overcoming repeated setbacks, Schmidt rose to the top by virtue of his intellect, decisiveness, versatile competence and powerful presence. He deepened Ostpolitik and Franco-German cooperation; his acerbic criticism of American policy and leadership sprang from his hope for a well-functioning Atlantic partnership. He was the first German chancellor to win an incontrovertible authority in world politics; now, as a private person, an outsider in his own party, he has remained the most respected figure in German politics and he has a preeminent place as an elder statesman on the world stage. Carr has written a good introduction; a full life of one of the great figures of postwar Europe remains to be done—and would be worth doing.

GERMANY TODAY: A PERSONAL REPORT. By Walter Laqueur. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985, 240 pp. \$16.95.

A German-born transatlanticist writes a political travelogue, impressionistic and analytical, based on his historical knowledge and on recent travel and talk in the Federal Republic. A book about mood and popular culture—important elements in German life. Laqueur catches the sober, slowly changing quality of the German scene: for all the pervasive *Angst* and "greening," the country remains relatively stable, reassuringly dull. West Germany also remains more democratic than any previous German regime has ever been; the other Germany, unfortunately, is barely mentioned, nor are West German views and aspirations concerning it.

LLOYD GEORGE, WOODROW WILSON AND THE GUILT OF GERMANY. By A. Lentin. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985, 193 pp. \$25.00.

A splendidly written account, partly based on new sources, of a largely familiar story: the liberal disappointment with Versailles, brilliantly and polemically set forth by Keynes, produced a guilty conscience in Great Britain which in turn proved to be one of the psychological determinants of Britain's appeasement policy and her willingness to allow Hitler to destroy the peace treaty.

GERMAN BIG BUSINESS AND THE RISE OF HITLER. By Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. New York: Oxford, 1985, 512 pp. \$25.00.

A seasoned historian, a master sleuth of pertinent, novel sources, reconstructs the many facets of corporate attitudes and actions vis-à-vis Nazism in the last years of Weimar. His verdict: big business, sometimes unwittingly, eased Hitler's path, but not so much by money—the Nazis raised their own money by means of small contributions—as by supporting Weimar's other gravediggers. Businessmen were unsettled by Hitler's "strategy of calculated ambiguity on economic matters," but from 1930 had to reckon with the popularity of Hitler's party. Some of them gave funds, often to individual Nazis, as protection money. Turner argues that politics, not economics, was primary. Turner dismisses all manner of facile generalities about the links between capitalism and fascism but perhaps could have described more broadly how businessmen shared with other members of the German elite a nondemocratic bias, a remarkable degree of political illiteracy, a self-assured civic amorality.

HITLER IN HISTORY. By Eberhard Jäckel. Hanover (N.H.): University Press of New England, 1985, 115 pp. \$11.95.

Five compact and competent lectures by a leading German historian on Hitler's rise to power, on his plans for war, on his responsibility for the holocaust and on his decision to declare war on the United States.

HITLER: MEMOIRS OF A CONFIDANT. By Otto Wagener. Edited by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 333 pp. \$29.95.

A close associate of Hitler from 1929 to 1933, Wagener wrote these recollections of his conversations with Hitler while he was in British captivity in 1946. Written from memory, but with undiminished adulation, Wagener's memoirs constitute an important source concerning Hitler's private life and political style, his self-assessment and his considerable pseudo-learning. There are some surprises (he had thought of a Polish-German pact long before coming to power) but mostly it is a record of often manipulative conversations that confirm received opinion about Hitler and his entourage.

PARIS-BONN: EINE DAUERHAFTE BINDUNG SCHWIERIGER PARTNER. Edited by Klaus Manfrass. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1984, 357 pp. DM 18.

The record of a Franco-German colloquium, held in Paris in October 1983 and dealing with some of the major themes of the postwar reconcili-

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ation of the two countries. A useful bilingual introduction to the many aspects of the most important relationship in Western Europe today.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE. By François de Rose. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1985, 143 pp. \$19.95.

An eminent French authority on security issues argues for new European initiatives in the face of the "danger represented by Soviet military power deployed in support of an imperialistic ideology." His proposals, including the strengthening of conventional forces without abandoning the option of the first use of nuclear weapons, are meant to give substance to President Mitterrand's declaration in 1983: "The European nations now need to realize that their defense is also their responsibility. . . ." A part of the increasingly important debate in France over defense policy in Europe.

EUX ET NOUS: LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST ENTRE DEUX DE-TENTES. By Michel Tatu. Paris: Fayard, 1985, 240 pp.

A leading French journalist, longtime specialist on East-West relations, examines the "we-they" attitudes of both superpowers. He emphasizes the weaknesses of the Soviet camp and examines the possibilities of a European defense, at a time of growing skepticism concerning existing arrangements.

LA REVANCHE DE L'HISTOIRE. By Thierry de Montbrial. Paris: Julliard, 1985, 197 pp. Fr. 75.

A collection of essays—in the style of Raymond Aron—on the political and economic prospects of Western society in the remaining years of the century. Learned and lucid, these essays mix analysis and prescription and propose new policies for France. Montbrial was the first head of the Planning Division of the French Foreign Office and in 1979 founded the French Institute of Foreign Relations, of which he remains the director.

ITALY 1943–1945. By David W. Ellwood. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985, 313 pp. \$39.50.

A rather ponderous monograph, based on new archival material and on a much earlier doctoral thesis, of the events between Mussolini's fall and the departure of Allied troops. Ellwood focuses on the interplay between indigenous developments and Allied action and wrangling. The British assumed early responsibility for Italy; in April 1945 Harold Macmillan, British resident minister, complained that London followed "childish autonomy towards the Italians," and Ellwood emphasizes British "vindictiveness. . . a kind of malevolent inertia which set the tone of the occupation."

MOUNTBATTEN: A BIOGRAPHY. By Philip Ziegler. New York: Knopf, 1985, 784 pp. \$24.95.

The authorized biography of privilege incarnate—and disciplined. The Mountbattens were a legend in their lifetime: his royal blood and dashing eminence, her wealth and good looks, their glittering presence. A seasoned biographer, mastering enviable caches of private papers, reconstructs a grand life: Mountbatten's rise to the highest posts in World War II, as last viceroy of India, as postwar chief of the defense staff. Ziegler discusses the many criticisms leveled against Mountbatten, acknowledges his many weaknesses, but is fascinated by this great man and his meteoric career. He concentrates on the public Mountbatten but understands the private life as well: the arrogance, vanity, impetuosity, vulnerability, the marriage of

trusting complexity. A rich and marvelously readable book, with a great sweep across British history of four decades. One could have wished for still greater historical depth, but he has written a luminous romance in grim times.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS. Edited by Dan Caldwell. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1985, 291 pp. \$30.00. A Center for Foreign Policy Development Study.

Soviet foreign policy in recent years, analyzed in its various segments, geographical and functional, by a battery of specialists containing some familiar names (Sarah Terry, George Breslauer, John Hardt, Lawrence Caldwell, among others). What distinguishes it from other such enterprises is a studied attempt, not entirely successful, to calculate how alternative policies on the part of the United States may influence Soviet policy and behavior. On the whole, the volume is a solid contribution to the field, reasonable in its speculation, cautious in its conclusions. The pieces on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, China and Japan are particularly good. But important areas such as Western Europe, South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America are not covered at all.

SECTORS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. Edited by Nish Jamgotch, Jr. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1985, 254 pp. \$35.00.

Essays on areas of U.S.-Soviet relations other than the military-strategic—e.g., trade, agriculture, science, space, environmental protection—reviewing the record and exploring the themes of interdependence and the influence of “functional” cooperation on the overall relationship. Fred Warner Neal contributes an introduction filled with nostalgia for détente and his own views on what went wrong.

THE SOVIET STATE: THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Curtis Keeble. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 244 pp. \$45.00 (paper, \$17.95).

Essays on the historical background, society, economy, and policymaking process of the U.S.S.R. by well-known British experts (Hugh Seton-Watson, Alec Nove, Archie Brown, Malcolm Mackintosh, among others). No surprises or new insight on the directions in which internal factors will push future foreign policy, but the book represents a distillation of current knowledge plus a dash of personal judgment on the part of the several contributors. It is the product of a Chatham House study group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and is edited by a recent British ambassador to Moscow.

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN POLICIES AFTER DETENTE. By Richard F. Staar. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1985, 300 pp. \$26.95.

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Dr. Staar is at home with organization charts, data on military forces, scheduled hours of propaganda broadcasting, lists of communist fronts and the like, all the means and instruments whereby the U.S.S.R. furthers its interests and pushes the cause of communism. His book, accordingly, is a kind of handbook, and definitely a useful one. It is not a narrative account of Soviet foreign relations "after détente." Its disquisitions on policy toward specific areas and countries, though informative, are relatively brief and are used to pound away at the author's main theme: total Soviet dedication to the spread of communism, and the inadequacy of the Western response.

INVESTMENT AND REINDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Boris Z. Rumer. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 145 pp. \$16.95 (paper).

A technical study of investment policy that illuminates many of the trends toward slowdown and stagnation in the Soviet economy. On two crucial points—the priority given to replacement rather than expansion, and the growing geographical polarization between raw material and energy sources in Siberia and manufacturing concentrated in the western regions—this study presents convincing evidence of serious structural problems.

THE DRAMA OF THE SOVIET 1960s: A LOST REFORM. By Alexander Yanov. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984, 141 pp. \$8.50 (paper).

Alexander Yanov can be counted on for stimulating interpretations of the Soviet scene which often run beyond, or counter to, the conclusions of those whom he calls the conventional Sovietologists. In this instance, illustrating his theory of the pendulum-swing of reform and counterreform in Russian and Soviet history, he describes the struggle for reform in agriculture, in which he was directly involved, in the early 1960s. After gathering steam with Khrushchev's support, it foundered on the opposition of Stalinist party cadres, unfavorable international conditions, and the removal of the key reformer, Khrushchev himself. This is a persuasive book, although there is still plenty of room for questioning and debate, not least on Khrushchev and his place in history.

SOVIET DISSENT: CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS FOR NATIONAL, RELIGIOUS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By Ludmilla Alexeyeva. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1985, 522 pp. (New York: Harper's, distributor, \$35.00).

Although the author was active in the human rights movement and forced to emigrate in 1977, this is not a personal memoir but a massive compendium of information on all the strands of opposition in the Soviet Union since Stalin. It covers the writings and activities of Ukrainian, Baltic and other nationalists, displaced nationalities such as the Crimean Tatars, religious sects, Helsinki Watch groups, independent workers organizations, champions of intellectual and artistic freedom, Jewish refuseniks and many others. It is a work of great value based on wide research in many sources, especially little-known *samizdat* literature. The volume and variety of dissent described in these pages may give the impression of a more widespread and effective opposition than exists in reality, though the author recognizes that in recent years the regime has been largely successful in stifling it.

RELUCTANT FAREWELL. By Andrew Nagorski. New York: New Republic Books/Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, 291 pp. \$16.95.

Newsweek's former Moscow correspondent reports on his 14-month tour of duty in the Soviet Union (1981–82), cut short when he was unceremoniously expelled. That outcome should have been no surprise, as he was a “problem” from the start in the eyes of his Soviet hosts, consorting with dissidents, talking with Soviet citizens from all walks of life and in places far from Moscow, and developing his own sources of information. The book is an adventure story with the author as protagonist, not a treatise on Soviet politics or society, but Nagorski is a keen observer, and in recounting his own experience as a journalist he also paints a picture of the system and how it works.

ORDINARY STALINISM: DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND THE QUESTION OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Ronald Tiersky. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985, 199 pp. \$19.50.

An inquiry into the political theory of communism and the practice of both ruling regimes and nonruling parties, pointing to unmistakable signs of immobilism and decay but also to possibilities of development within the bounds of the system. It is largely a historical study, with much space devoted to the idea of democratic centralism, which in its insistence on the supremacy of the party leadership and monolithic unity, is the essence of today's “ordinary Stalinism,” as it was of the “high Stalinism” of Stalin's own time. There is some overkill here, and perhaps a tendency to overlook the variations present, for example, in Eastern Europe. But the chapters on recent trends in the Communist Parties of France (decay and decline with Stalinist flags flying) and Italy (adaptation, reform and de-communization) are particularly good, and the entire study is well reasoned and full of original insights.

IDEOLOGY IN A SOCIALIST STATE: POLAND, 1956–1983. By Ray Taras. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 336 pp. \$44.50.

The Polish road to socialism, seen through the lens of official ideology as it has been expounded by Communist Party leaders over the years since Gomulka came to power. The key concept is “operative ideology,” the guidelines by which the permanent principles of Marxism-Leninism have been translated into policy. It is a carefully constructed, sometimes esoteric study, illustrative of the party's dilemmas and failures as well as its successful tactics and the rationale for its hold on power. But the concentration on ideology often does seem to take the reader far afield from the real substance of Polish life and politics.

POLAND 1980–81: SOLIDARITY VERSUS THE PARTY. By Nicholas G. Andrews. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, 351 pp.

The brief period of Poland's semi-freedom had many facets. Andrews chooses one, the dynamics of action and reaction, negotiation and conflict, between the Communist Party and Solidarity, without ignoring others such as the role of the church and the interests of outside powers. His account tells of choices apparently open and opportunities missed by moderates on both sides, proceeding with the inevitability of Greek tragedy to Jaruzelski's coup in December 1981. Andrews, a foreign service officer with prior

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experience in Poland and in East European affairs, witnessed these events as U.S. deputy chief of mission in Warsaw. The book reads like a report to the State Department: well prepared, informed, straightforward, impersonal, undramatic.

DAS EINSAME ALBANIEN: REPORTAGE AUS DEM LAND DER SKIPETAREN. By Paul Lendvai. Zurich: Interfrom, 1985, 118 pp. 14 Sw. Fr.

Albania is a sealed and unknown land, but Paul Lendvai, an Austrian journalist and Balkan expert of long standing, was able to make two visits there in 1983 and 1984. Although his hosts spoke only the party line, which is Stalinism as defined and refined by Enver Hoxha (since deceased), and limited his movements, Lendvai asked questions and kept his eyes open. His book gives the best picture we have of Europe's most backward and most tightly controlled country.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET UNION: ALIENATION OR RECONCILIATION? By Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, with Judith Apter. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 303 pp. \$23.50 (paper).

A survey of Soviet-Israeli relations from the time when the U.S.S.R. supported the establishment of Israel's independence in 1947-48. Although diplomatic relations have been broken since 1967, the author shows how many contacts there have been, from conversations at the foreign minister level to the visits of individuals and delegations. He takes account of the centrality of the issue of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R., and of the fact that in other respects the bilateral relationship is largely a reflection of each party's policies toward the Arab world and toward the U.S. In a text overburdened with detail, and stronger on the Israeli than on the Soviet side, the author helps clarify the picture by asking the right questions at the beginning of each chapter; but unfortunately many of them are not, or cannot be, answered.

AMERIKANISCHE NAHOST-POLITIK. By Christian Hacke. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985, 299 pp. DM 98.

This thorough study, which provides German readers with a full and highly competent account of U.S. policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward Iran since the end of the 1960s, may also provide American readers with new viewpoints on what have become all-too-familiar problems of the past and present. Henry Kissinger comes off quite well, his successors less so. The criticism of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations is often sharp, for quite different reasons. The lesson for the latter is that it does no good to be a military giant if in intellectual understanding, political purpose and steady diplomacy the American stature is that of a dwarf.

THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242. By Sydney D. Bailey. Dordrecht (Netherlands): Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, 252 pp. \$45.00.

This is more than a legislative history of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242; it is a diplomatic history of the Middle East crisis and war of 1967, with summary treatment of what came before and what followed. Bailey repeats much of what has been already said but his work has special merits: he tracks down controversial points and decisions, weighing the written evidence and supplementing it with interviews and correspondence; he describes with great skill the role of the United Nations and its then secretary-general (U Thant); and he is cool and impartial without eschewing personal judgments and conclusions.

PEACE-MAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein. Totowa (N.J.): Barnes & Noble, 1985, 244 pp. \$26.50.

These essays from a 1983 conference are better than the usual run of collected papers. Besides giving a general introduction to the problems of negotiating peace, they provide good background information on such topics as the diversity of Israeli views on that question, the attitudes of West Bank Palestinians, and the numbers and status of Palestinian refugees. Bernard Reich and Robert Freedman write their standard good pieces on American and Soviet policy, respectively; and, as the conference was held in Canada, an appropriate essay is included on what Canada might do toward Arab-Israeli peace (not much).

THE WEST BANK: LINE OF DEFENSE. By Aryeh Shalev. New York: Praeger (for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), 1985, 209 pp. \$35.95.

A retired Israeli general subjects various possible terms of political settlement on the future of the West Bank to analysis from the standpoint of Israel's security. He performs an excellent service in confronting the problem in precise terms, so that the issues of boundaries, demilitarization, limited sovereignty, guarantees, etc., may be better understood by any negotiator—Israeli, Arab or other—and by the public. Moreover, Shalev is realistic in his estimate of what kinds of settlement might be acceptable to the Arab side. He knows Israel cannot have absolute security.

THE WEST BANK: A PORTRAIT. By John P. Richardson. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1984, 214 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

An admirable introduction to the territory which stands at the center of the Palestinian problem. Inevitably, since history and politics have not been confined by the borders of this small area, the author has to expand the scope of his book to take in Arab and Palestinian nationalism, the conflict with Zionism and Israel, British policy during the mandate, and successive Arab-Israeli wars. But the meat of the book is the description of how the people of the West Bank fared after 1948 under Jordanian sovereignty (not very well) and since 1967 under Israeli occupation (worse). The presentation is sober; the conclusions are pessimistic.

JEWS OF ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. By Heskell M. Haddad. New York: Shengold, 1985, 167 pp. \$12.95.

After brief treatment of the origins and history of Sephardic Jewish communities in the Islamic world and beyond, and of the events which brought so many of them to Israel after 1948, the author turns his attention to the gap between the two major segments of Israeli society today and the

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pressing need to reduce and close it. Not a detailed, data-based technical study, the book treats the problem generally but not superficially, fairly but with special concern for the Sephardic community. Dr. Haddad, educated in Iraq and Israel, is a New York physician and president of the World Organization for Jews from Arab Countries in the U.S.

JEWS IN AN ARAB LAND: LIBYA, 1835-1970. By Renzo De Felice. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985, 406 pp. \$22.50.

The Jews of Libya, never very numerous, endured varying degrees of discrimination and persecution under Arab, Ottoman, Italian and British rule but continued to maintain their identity and community life. In the years following World War II, when pogroms erupted under the impact of Arab nationalism, Zionism and events in Palestine, they made their choice for emigration, mainly to Israel. By the time Qaddafi took power in 1969 there were but 200 left. This history, which covers both the internal life of the community and the swirling international and local forces which buffeted it, is as near to definitive as one can get. The original Italian edition was published in 1978.

HOLY WAR. By Wilhelm Dietl. New York: Macmillan, 1985, 349 pp. \$19.95.

This popular, overdramatized account of Islamic resurgence stands in contrast to the duller, weightier and more accurate work of scholars, but it tells much the same general story of religious ferment, with its accompanying violence, that has swept through the Muslim world in recent years. Dietl is a German journalist who traveled far and wide to see things for himself and to interview a great variety of persons: sheikhs and imams, princes and revolutionaries, ministers and terrorists. The interviews add authenticity as well as local color.

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF JUSTICE. By Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984, 256 pp.

A learned discourse, mainly of interest to scholars, on ideas of justice, duty, morality and law, as interpreted by Islamic savants since the time of the Prophet. The book is not directed to contemporary international issues but has an enlightening chapter on traditional Islamic views on relations among nations, and the discussion of the debate between modernists and revivalists provides a basis for understanding much of what is happening in the Muslim world today.

THE RETURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS. By Tawfiq al-Hakim. New York: New York University Press, 1985, 89 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, \$30.00).

The author is a prominent Egyptian literary figure who welcomed the revolution of 1952, was honored by the Nasser regime, but in time turned against it because of its failures, deceptions and denial of freedom. This severe critique, first published in Beirut after Nasser's death, caused sharp controversy in Egypt (some of it reprinted here at the end of the book) and remains of interest because of Nasser's role and reputation as charismatic hero and the mythology which still envelops his era.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

BEYOND WAR: JAPAN'S CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY. By Robert W. Barnett. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984, 155 pp.

THE MILITARISTS: THE RISE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM SINCE WW II. By Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1985, 256 pp. \$18.95.

Robert Barnett's short volume contains 54 selected conversations with American, Japanese and Southeast Asian officials and scholars on the Japanese concept of "comprehensive security"—the notion that Japan can contribute to mutual security in ways other than an arms buildup. One of the basic issues, confronted directly by Hoyt and indirectly by Barnett, is whether there is likely to be a revival of Japanese militarism. On one side, Commander James Auer of the U.S. Defense Department points out in the Barnett volume that the American military presence in Japan has obviated the need for Japan to build up its armed forces so much as to thrust the military extremists close to power. Withdrawal of the United States, not greater Japanese burden-sharing, Auer argues, might cause a swing to the right. In contrast, Hoyt argues that Japanese militarism is on the rise and encouraged by U.S. pressure on Japan to rearm. Although full of exaggerations, Hoyt's book does contain some scenarios that need to be taken seriously and avoided. The most alarming: a serious economic recession in the 1990s causes the U.S. to impose paralyzing penalties on Japanese exports and the result is a serious depression in Japan. This leads to the breakup of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the rearmament of Japan, and the conclusion of a Chinese-Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

THE COMPETITION: DEALING WITH JAPAN. By Thomas Pepper, Merit E. Janow and Jimmy W. Wheeler. New York: Praeger (for the Hudson Institute), 1985, 374 pp. \$24.95.

At a time when American popular media and some U.S. congressmen offer simplistic and even inflammatory explanations of U.S.-Japanese trade problems, this volume comes as a breath of fresh air. The authors warn against expectations of immediate improvement in trade patterns and encourage officials in both countries to focus on the macroeconomic issues; specifically, they urge Japan to stimulate domestic demand and the U.S. to take measures that would increase savings, investment and productivity. But they argue that trade disputes between the two allies could be ameliorated during the second half of the 1980s by the relatively buoyant economic environment that they think is likely to prevail in both countries. As Professor Henry Rosovsky of Harvard suggests in a foreword, their optimism about the future would have a better chance of being realized if Japanese and U.S. government and business leaders studied their analysis with care.

AFGHANISTAN: INSIDE A REBEL STRONGHOLD. By Mike Martin. Poole, Dorset (U.K.): Blanford Press, 1984, 256 pp. (New York: Sterling Publishing, distributor, \$16.95).

This is a vivid account by a British journalist who traveled 1,300 kilometers on foot during more than four months in Afghanistan and spent five weeks in Peshawar talking to refugees and resistance leaders. He stresses the Mujahedeen hatred of the Russians. According to the author resistance is growing stronger and the Russians have no chance of pacifying the country without bringing in several hundred thousand more troops. He deplores the lack of antiaircraft missiles from the West which could be used against low-flying Soviet gunships. The author also points up one unsettling aspect of the Mujahedeen—the fact that at least one influential element, the Hezb-i-Islami, identifies with Iranian fundamentalism and is as much anti-American as it is anti-Soviet. According to some in the Hezb, the world is divided into Western imperialism, godless communism and corrupt Muslim countries, which seems to be all of them except Afghanistan and Iran.

A VIETCONG MEMOIR. By Truong Nhu Tang. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, 368 pp. \$17.95.

This is a moving if rather naïve account of life as a Vietnamese revolutionary, written by one of the Vietcong's highest-ranking leaders who is now in exile in the West. Thoroughly disillusioned, the author describes how Hanoi used Southern "bourgeois" revolutionaries to overthrow the Saigon government and then quickly shunted them aside after victory. It is unfortunate that Southern patriots such as this one did not understand earlier the nature of the Hanoi regime they served so well. To this day the author, while critical of all the key actors in the Vietnam drama—the North, the Thieu government and the United States—does not devote much space to self-criticism. Yet as one of Saigon's privileged elite, he cooperated directly or indirectly with Hanoi for 20 years.

CHINESE DEMOCRACY. By Andrew J. Nathan. New York: Knopf, 1985, 292 pp. \$22.95.

Misleadingly titled, this book is not about Chinese democracy, which does not exist, but about the Chinese Democracy Movement which flourished for a year or two in the late 1970s and was then crushed. The author convincingly shows that although the Deng regime has achieved significant economic results by tapping the dynamism of the Chinese people, it has not introduced much vigor into the political realm, much less allowed the free press and competitive elections demanded by the Chinese democrats. He does hold out the prospect that economic development will "cause a kind of internal political evolution" as the government loosens the control of the economy, accommodates more ideas from the West, and yields to the demands for more freedom from a rising managerial class.

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CHINA: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS. By A. Doak Barnett. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press/Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1985, 160 pp. \$18.50 (paper, \$10.95).

Relying heavily on interviews with Chinese officials and scholars during the past two years, one of the West's most distinguished China specialists has written a pioneering account of the foreign policy process in China. He shows that the policymaking process has become more systematic and professionalized and that major policy decisions now receive careful consid-

eration by a variety of institutions before decisions are made. Although there has been a certain shift of power to a younger generation of specialists, China's Old Guard still retains significant influence.

JOURNEY TO THE FORBIDDEN CHINA. By Steven W. Mosher. New York: Free Press, 1985, 180 pp. \$17.95.

This book adds little to the author's earlier account in *Broken Earth* (reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84). Moreover, the unremitting stress on China's poverty and lack of freedom, untempered by any acknowledgment of the stunning changes that have taken place in China during the past seven years, suggests more of a desire to score points than to present a balanced picture.

CHINA AND THE ARMS TRADE. By Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 229 pp. \$32.50.

One tends to think of China as an actual or potential recipient of arms, but this small yet comprehensive study reminds us of the extent to which Beijing has also been a supplier of military assistance. The British authors look at China's arms aid to such countries as Vietnam, North Korea and Pakistan in the context of its foreign policy goals. The motivations have often been political or ideological, including support for liberation movements, but recently economic incentives have begun to play a part in China's arms exports. A pioneer work. A.P.

DEFENDING CHINA. By Gerald Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, 264 pp. \$17.50.

The principal value of this book lies in its carefully researched case studies of the Chinese use of force against Tibet (1950-51), Korea (1950-53), Taiwan (1954-55, 1958), India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), Paracels (1974) and Vietnam (1979). His conclusion, as he says, is more "loose ends" than "neat synthesis."

TIBET: A POLITICAL HISTORY. By Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa. New York: Potala Publications, 1984, 369 pp. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, distributor).

The author, born in Lhasa, was Tibet's secretary of finance from 1930 to 1950 and then, in exile, he was the Dalai Lama's official representative in New Delhi until 1966. Drawing on original Tibetan documents, government archives and ancient chronicles, he gives a full account of the Tibetan nation from its earliest civilization to the Chinese invasion of 1950, the mass exodus of refugees across the Himalayas and the current Chinese occupation. An essential source for students of Asian affairs.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 364 pp. \$29.95.

This ambitious overview of independent Africa's first two and a half decades fittingly marks a culminating point of African specialist Gwendolen

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Carter's impressive career as teacher and writer. A brilliant array of colleagues, including Richard Sklar, Donald McHenry, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Crawford Young, John Saul and Immanuel Wallerstein sum up predominant political, economic and intellectual trends. Despite their significant differences in approach and ideology, the prevailing tone is wariness: few grand theories of how Africa can, should or will develop have survived the last 25 years in credible form. This moment may provide a great opportunity: while Western intellectuals are baffled, perhaps Africans may pick up the ball and run for real self-reliance.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE 1980s. Edited by Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1985, 327 pp. \$35.00.

Essentially an up-to-the-minute rehash of the major issues, this collection is distinguished by several unusually focused essays on Britain and the EEC in southern Africa (by Geoffrey Berridge and Humphrey Asobie) as well as by a large component of African authors, whose perspectives as a whole reflect both activism and frustration.

THE U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: LOCAL ACTIVISM IN GLOBAL POLITICS. By Janice Love. New York: Praeger, 1985, 296 pp. \$36.95.

Much more narrowly focused than its title implies, this study is exhaustive and highly informative on the sanctions aimed at the state governments in Michigan and Connecticut. In establishing context, the author does take a stab at discussing the possible effects of sanctions, but fails to explore in any depth the roots of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, particularly the key role of blacks.

POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN KENYA AND TANZANIA. Revised ed. Edited by Joel D. Barkan. New York: Praeger, 1984, 375 pp. \$34.95 (paper, \$13.95).

Updating the 1978 edition of this book, some of the best and brightest East African hands indulge in their favorite developmental comparison—between “socialist” Tanzania and “capitalist” Kenya. What emerges is the classic conundrum: in Tanzania, where difficult goals for equity have been set, institutions have been inadequate and economic performance has suffered from the continuing ideological overload. In Kenya, on the other hand, pragmatically oriented political institutions have performed somewhat better regarding both participation and economic growth. Most of the authors seem to agree, however, that bills will be coming due in Kenya in the near future for the country's growing economic inequality.

AFRICA IN CRISIS: THE CAUSES, THE CURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL BANKRUPTCY. By Lloyd Timberlake. London and Washington: Earthscan, 1985, 232 pp.

Chatty, anecdotal and laced with statistics, this study surveys Africa's farming, livestock, forestry, fisheries and water resource problems and potential. Given the author's advocacy of small-scale local programs to deal with environmental dilemmas, the ad hoc approach to policy is perhaps inevitable. Lacking a systematic summing up, however, the reader is left

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gasping at the seemingly impossible complexity of policy choices—for Africans and for donors.

IN SEARCH OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Geisa Maria Rocha. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 192 pp. \$16.95 (paper).

An aide (from 1976 to 1982) to the former secretary of the United Nations Council for Namibia recounts almost 40 years of efforts by the U.N. to pry loose South West Africa/Namibia from South Africa. As the author says, the Namibia saga aptly illustrates the central truth about the world organization: although useful as a tool, the U.N. is only as effective as its members.

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Edited by Janet Rigney

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